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ABSTRACT
The great interest of hispanists in the more glamorous
history of the Banu Umayya dynasty in al-Andalus has over¬
shadowed the efforts of research on the Taifa period
(eleventh century). Furthermore, many of the scholars who
have so far studied the Taifa period are specialists in the
history of the previous Banu Umayya period or periods which
follow, such as that of the al-Murabitun. Consequently,
there is a demand for specialisation in the Taifa period.
The need for a political and social history of Seville
under Banu 'Abbad is significant because, as the most
powerful and influential Taifa state, Seville has sharply
marked Andalusian history not only if one considers the
wide scope and magnitude of its relations with the other
Taifas, but also in the context of its impact on the
relations of al-Andalus with Castile on the one hand and
the Maghrib on the other.
This thesis consists of a general introduction and
survey of the primary sources, and four chapters, as
follows :
CHAPTER QUE
Chapter One consists of an analysis of the rise and
fall of the Banu 'Abbad dynasty, with a concentration on
the period of each ruler individually.
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CHAPTER TWO
Chapter Two studies Seville's political system, the
army, and the judicial system. The political system is
viewed in terms of similarities and differences with the
Banu Umayya model, on which it was based. The dominant
position of the ruler in the system is emphasised. The
subsection on Justice is given particular importance as
the approach to Malikism in al-Andalus differs from the
one generally adopted.
CHAPTER THREE
Chapter Three studies Sevillan society with a
particular stress on aspects which have been overlooked
in other works, such as social mobility and the Sevillan
economy.
CHAPTER FOUR
In Chapter Pour, Seville's foreign relations are
evaluated at the theoretical and actual levels in terms
of Seville's relations with the Taifas, the kingdom of
Leon and Castile, and the Maghrib.
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TRANSLITERATION
Transliteration is based on the system adopted by
Edinburgh University. The determination of the pro¬
nunciation and transliteration of Arabic names has
presented several problems, some of which have been
solved only arbitrarily. For example, where the
vocalisation is lacking, arbitrary choices have been
adopted. Where the names of persons are too long, the
general rule, where possible, has been to include the
kunya, the first name, the father's name, the family
name and the name by which the person has become
commonly known. In cases where the family and common
name are lacking, the rule has been to adopt the name
of the last ancestor in the genealogical list.
U M \t W v
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The Taifa period has generally been taken for granted
by modern scholars, and the greater interest in the Banu
Umayya period has to some extent been at the expense of the
eleventh century. The Taifa period has been conceived
either as a continuation of the Banu Umayya period preceding
it or as a prelude to the period of the al-Murabitun which
followed. Although it is undeniably both, the Taifa period
must, foremost and above all, be conceived within an
independent context, with its own particular attributes.
The temptation to approach eleventh-century al-Andalus as an
extension of the Banu Umayya period should therefore be
avoided, despite links between the two. This is difficult,
because the Taifa period has mainly, almost exclusively,
been studied by historians whose primary interest lies in
the periods of Banu Umayya or the al-Murabitun. Wnat is
therefore needed is an approach that places the Taifa period
in the forefront but, at the same time, considers it within
the more general context.
The eleventh century is a coherent entity not merely
as a division of time into one hundred years, but as a period
that is characterised by the disintegration of al-Andalus
into Taifas. The forces which produced this phenomenon were
above all contemporary and newly developed, even though
inevitably retaining ingredients from the past. The setting
during the Taifa period was, in many ways, similar to that of
the Banu Umayya period. Geographical and climatic conditions
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were identical. The social conditions were highly comparable
ethnically and culturally and, in some respects, economically.
Even the social structure was not altered in any essential
manner. Yet the political climate was fundamentally and
irreversibly changed. The political dimension was of a unique
importance during the Taifa period. Because of the lack of a
comprehensive political framework in al-Andalus during the
eleventh century, the socio-economic scene was drastically
affected. Consequently, any understanding of the socio¬
economic forces behind the mutations and perturbations
characterising the Taifa period will remain incomplete with¬
out a full appreciation of the situation politically. Not
only were the social forces cloaked in a political appear¬
ance, but the two frequently merged together to become
virtually indistinguishable. The political disintegration
of al-Andalus during the eleventh century implies that the
newly developed socio-political entity of the Taifa state
<>?
should be studied individually, in order to throw more light
on the general history of eleventh-century al-Andalus. Hie
Taifa period cannot be disregarded as a transitional phase
or a passing phenomenon, because the same pattern was later
repeated on two occasions in -Andalusian history, and it is
fully legitimate to ask whether the ingredients of the first
Taifa period, during the eleventh century, did not affect
the second and third Taifa periods which followed the rule
of the al-Murabitun and the al-Muwa.lihidun respectively.
Consequently, a better understanding of the Taifa period
during the eleventh century is indispensable.
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The justification for writing a political and social
history of Seville -under Banu 'Abbad is hardly required.^
Seville was the most influential and powerful Taifa state,
and its political predominance in al-Andalus contributed
decisively to the latter's historical evolution during the
eleventh century. Seville's importance is also seen at
other levels. For example, it was of significant commercial
importance, and grew as an urban centre at a time when the
other major Andalusian cities were declining. The importance
of Seville increased during the eleventh century as a result
of its expansion. Not only did Seville conquer the weaker
Taifas, such as those in the Gharb (Western al-Andalus ), and
effectively confront almost every powerful Taifa state such
as Badajoz, Toledo, etc., but it succeeded, during the reign
of al-Mu 'tamid, in annexing Cordoba with all its symbolic
implications as the previous Caliphal capital. Educationally
and culturally, Seville obtained an importance that increased
consistently and continuously. In short, because of the
scope and magnitude of its relations with other Taifas,
Seville is of primary importance for the understanding of
eleventh-century al-Andalus. Furthermore, whether in
positive or negative terms, Seville's role in the development
of the relations of eleventh-century al-Andalus with Castile
and the Maghrib was significant.
1. Originally a thesis presented at al-Azhar University,
A. at-Tawd's Banu 'Abbad bi-Ishblliya, Tetuan, 19^-6,
is now outdated and deficient in several respects.
M. Tayeb Touaybiya began a doctoral thesis entitled
Le royaume Abbadide de Seville at the University of
Aix- en -Fcovence in 1966 (see R. E. I., XXXIV (1966),
p. 200), which has apparently been discontinued.
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When studying the Taifa state of Seville, a central
element of our approach is the consideration of al-And.alus
within a broader context of space and time. Approaching
the eleventh century as such is a convenient manner of
referring to an abstract span of time. We therefore pre¬
suppose that the eleventh-century history of al-Andalus is
a continuous process following the tenth century and itself
followed by the succeeding century. In terms of space,
the history of Seville under Banu £Abbad is conceived
within the more general context of al-Andalus, which is in
turn considered as an interacting entity with other larger-
bodies such as the Northern Christian kingdoms or the
Maghrib. In short, Seville under Banu £Abbad is simulta¬
neously conceived as a product and an inherent part of
eleventh-century al-Andalus. The stress is laid on the
external influence on Seville, without neglecting its
contribution to the general developments in al-Andalus.
Our view of Seville as a Taifa state is extended to the
Sevillan inhabitants and leaders who are considered within
the general socio-economic context. Their role as a
collective human force which contributed to the shaping
of their destiny is not overlooked. Our goal is therefore
to create a balanced and comprehensive approach to Seville
under Banu £Abbad.
The political and social history of Seville may be
perceived at various levels. While considering the
specifically internal aspects of Seville's history, the
latter is conceived within the more comprehensive context
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of amalgamated Taifa states, and their relations with the
Maghrib and the Christian kingdom of Castile and Leon.
The effects of the internal developments on the external
and vice versa is a constant preoccupation, as only by
focusing on the multiple facets of Sevillan history can
they be fitted into a general perspective as a complete
and harmonious whole.
The stress on the political and social dimension in
the present thesis is the result of several practical,
rather than philosophical, reasons. Firstly, apart from
the numerous poems which have survived from eleventh-
century al-Andalus, most of the historical material
pertaining to the period is essentially political and
social. Secondly, this study, while concentrating on the
political and social dimension, includes all those other-
elements, such as the economic or judicial, which affect
or relate to the political and social history of eleventh-
century Seville. Finally, it is hoped that the political
and social study of Seville will be of some use to those
studying Seville with a stress on other aspects.
Chapter One of this thesis outlines the rise and
fall of the Banu 'Abbad dynasty, analysing the internal
causes underlying the establishment of al-Qadl b. 'Abbad
as ruler over Seville in Z1II4./IO23, the consolidation of
power by al-Mu 'tadid b. 'Abbad from lp33/10lj.l to 1^.61/1068,
and the further expansion and final collapse and loss of
power by al-Mu'tamid b. 'Abbad in I4.8I4-/1091. The main
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internal events of Seville's history under Banu 'Abbad will
also be evaluated.
Chapter Two studies the political system in Seville,
as well as the army and the judicial system, which comple¬
mented the former. The main focus is on the political
system, the different aspects of which are compared with
the system under Banu Umayya, on which the Sevillan system
was modelled. Having illustrated in Chapter One the extent
of power enjoyed by the Banu 'Abbad rulers, we consider the
ruler as a central element of the political system since,
in practice, he constituted the ultimate source of power.
The subsection on Justice in Seville has been almost
as fully elaborated as the one on the political system,
for two reasons. (i) It provided the major force for
counterbalancing or, at any rate, minimising the ruler's
predominance in the system as a whole. (ii) Our approach
to the nature and social implications of Malikism in
eleventh-century al-Andalus differs from that commonly
adopted by hispanists. The notion of Andalusian Malikism,
commonly propagated by writers in Tbench and Spanish, is
not subscribed to by the present writer. The rite of
Malik b. Anas was, in substance and form, almost identical
to that adopted in the Maghrib and, indeed, in other parts
of the Islamic world. The criterion that should be applied
when comparing the rite of Malik in al-Andalus and the
Maghrib is the extent to which they were similar in their
fundamental and superficial traits. The problem is one of
selection, and the distinction between the rite of Malik in
al-Andalus and the Maghrib only becomes significant if the
superficial differences are placed in the forefront and
given priority over the fundamental similarities.
Eleventh-century Andalusian and Sevillan society has
been adequately treated in the context of its outstanding
literary output,"'" and our approach in Chapter Three is
purely social and political. The basic problem in this
chapter has been the attempt to exploit the limited
sources available for approaching those aspects of Sevillan
society which are of interest to the modern sociologist,
such as social structure and social mobility.
Finally, Chapter Four studies Seville 's external
relations with the other Taifas, Castile, and the Maghrib.
Unlike Chapter One, where the concentration has been on the
period of each individual ruler, Seville's foreign policy
is comprehensively treated as a coherent and evolving body.
Seville's foreign policy is discussed theoretically, its
actual development is analysed against the general
Andalusian background, and it is evaluated in terms of
its immediate-term objectives and success on the one hand
and its long-term goals and eventual failure on the other.
1. e.g. see H. Perds, La poesie andalouse en arabe
classiaue au XIe slec.le : ses aspects generaux et
sa valeur documentaire, 2nd ed., Paris, 1953? and.
S. Khalis, Ishblliya fl-l-Qarn al-Khamis .al-Hijrl...,
Beirut, 1965-
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In the present thesis, we have relied upon the primary
sources and used the secondary sources to a minimum extent
in the footnotes of the text. The reason for this has
been to avoid the pitfall of building hypotheses and un¬
founded conclusions based on other secondary sources.
With almost exclusive reliance on primary material, it is
hoped that the supporting evidence will be reliable.
However, this choice has the disadvantage of not pointing
out whatever material is available among the secondary
sources with regard to particular problems, issues or
theories. But the specialist will no doubt already be
familiar with available material on the subject of this
thesis, while the general reader may consult the selection
of secondary sources listed in the bibliography.
The primary sources used for this work include a
wide range, and they have therefore been employed in numerous
ways. They include the following types:
1.) 'World' histories.
2.) General bio-bibliographical dictionaries.
3.) Biographical dictionaries of fuqaha * and
religious men.
k. Literary anthologies.




9. Treatises on law and the hisba.
10. Other works which fall into a category of their
own, such as collections of proverbs or
comprehensive works.
11.) Collections of monumental and numismatic
inscriptions, letters and other documents.
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The primary sources for the Taifa period constitute a
wide range of works covering different fields and employing
various approaches; so, when using the materials, the
historian is required to apply strict selectivity, based on
commonsense, or scrupulous evaluation in order to separate
what appears to be forged or superficial from what is
likely to be authentic and important. The informative
value of the combined available primary sources is
significant, despite the vacuum left in particular areas.
There are 'world' histories such as Ibn-al-Athlr's Al-
Kam.il fl t-Tarlkh, which covers an enormous historical
range but remains useful as a complementary source. Of
the general bio-bibliographical dictionaries, Ibn-
Khallikan's Wafayat al-A *yan is extremely useful for
determining the background and biographies of historical
figures. Biographical dictionaries of fuqaha' and
religious men, such as Kitab as-Sila by Ibn-Bashkuwal,
and al-Qadl 'iyad's Tartib al-Madarik, are especially use¬
ful for studying the role of religious men in their social
and political milieu. Literary anthologies, which include
Ibn-Khaqan's Qala'id al-'iqyan or Ibn-Bassam's Adh-Ehakhlra,
are of great utility, not only because they reproduce a
wide selection of eleventh-century poetry but also for
their portrayal of eminent literary figures whose activi¬
ties were extended to the socio-political plane.
Chronicles, such as Ibn- 'idharl's Al-Bayan al-Mughrib
and al-MarrakushT 's Al-Mu'jib fi Talkhls Afchbar al-
Maghrib, contain detailed information on rulers, events, etc.
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Geographical x^orks include Kitab al-Masalik wa-l-Mamalik
by al-Bakrx, who lived during the eleventh century. The
only memoir from the eleventh century is 'Abd-Allah b.
Buluggln's Kitab at-Tibyan, the historical value of which
is incalculable. Tie most useful literary works are the
DIwans, such as Dlwan Ibn-Zaydun and Blwan Ibn-Hamdls,
even though the historical application of poetry is
restricted to particular areas. The unique historical
value of eleventh-century poetry, however, is that it
authentically reflects the general atmosphere and
mentality of the more privileged section of society.
Treatises on law and the hisba, particularly Ibn-'Abdun's
Risala fx 1-Qada' x^a-l-Hisba, are useful for reconstruc-
_____* * '
ting the state of Justice in Seville. Other works fall
into a category of their own, such as az-Zajjail's Ray:/
al- 'Awamm wa-Mar fa s - Sawam fl Nukat al-Khawass wa-1-
'Awamm, which portrays the mentality, attitudes and values
of Andalusian society, and Ibn-Hazm's Naqt al - 'Aril s,
which furnishes specific information relating to the
Andalusian rulers. Finally, we have inscriptions and
coins, which are reproduced in such works as G. iiiles '
Coins of the Spanish Muluk at-Tawa'if, or E. L£vi-
Provenqal's Inscriptions arabes d'Espagne. We also have
some useful letters which were written by rulers such as
al-Mu'tamid b. 'Abbad, Yusuf b. Tashufin or Alfonso VI,
and others by historians like Ibn-Hayyan. These letters
are reproduced in a variety of works such as chronicles,
literary anthologies or works on rhetoric.
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The degree to which reliance can be placed on the
primary sources in the eleventh century varies for
numerous reasons. While some authors, such as 'Abd-Allah
b. Buluggin, al-Bakrl, Ibn-Hazm, Ibn-Zaydun, al-Humaydl
and Ibn-Hayyan, were contemporary with the Taifa period,
others lived shortly after or much later. For example,
Ibn- <Abdun, Ibn-Bashkuwal and Ibn-Bassam wrote during the
eleventh and twelfth centuries. Works were also produced
during the thirteenth century by writers like Ibn-Khallikan
and Ibn-'idJharl, and during the fourteenth century by others
such as Ibn-al-Khatlb and Ibn-Khaldun. As late as the
sixteenth centiiry, we ha.ve the indispensable and comprehen¬
sive Nafh at-Tib by al-Maqqarl. Yet the date of the work
is not by itself an indicator of its value. For example,
the main reason for the value of Nafh at-Hb for the
£ f ..-ft- „ —
eleventh century is that it quotes heavily from previous
A
sources which are lost or incomplete. There is controversy
over the dates of some of the anonymous works such as the
Poema de Pho Cid. Yet anonymous undated works like Al-
Hulal al-Mawshiyya, Kitab al-Tktifa' and. the Poema de Mio
Cjd contain detailed information that is not to be found
elsewhere on key events during the eleventh century such
as the conquest of Toledo by Alfonso VI and Valencia by
the Cid.
Some of the sources we use were written by authors
from the Mashriq with limited knowledge of Andalusian
history and sources. Yet it is in the fourteenth-
- 12 -
century work on style and rhetoric, Husn at-Tawassul by
the Egyptian al-Halabl, that -Alfonso's letter to Yusuf b.
Tashufln is most fully reproduced. Other writers, while
being familiar with -Andalusian history, xvrote in the
Mashriq where they had no access to the required sources
of reference. This was the case of al-Marrakushi, which
accounts for the many technical errors in his Al-Mq '.jib.
The historical value of many of the later sources is
that they quote or borrow from earlier works, some of which
have been lost. One such work is Al-Matin, which is a
history of the Taifa period by a contemporary author, Ibn-
Hayyan. The sixty volumes which originally constituted the
q
work seem to have been lost. However, extracts from it
have been widely quoted. For example, although he con¬
centrated on literary presentation and commentary in his
Adh-Dhakhira, Ibn-Bassam frequently quotes Ibn-Hayyan for
historical information, and extracts from Al-Matin have
been quoted by almost every later Muslim historian who
p
studied eleventh-century al-Andalus. " Although this is
1. Brockelmann mentions that the sixty volumes con¬
stituting -Al-Matln existed in the library of Tunis
but have been lost (C. Brockelmann, Geschichte der
Arabischen Litteratur, vol. 1, p. 33^TT
2. Al-Matln has been used or quoted in the following
works, among others: Ai-Huiia as-Siyara', by Ibn-al-
Abbar, Al-Bayan al-Mughrib, by Ibn- Idharl, Al-
Mughrib fl Hula al-Maghrib. by Ibn - Sa 'id, and Nafh
at-lib by al-Maqqarl. This selection illustrates
the enormous influence of Al-Matln on a variety of
authors over a period of almost five centuries.
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not the place to analyse Ibn~Hayyan as a historian, it
should be indicated that his unanimous recognition by
hispanists as the greatest -Andalusian historian is amply
justified merely from the extracts of Al-Matin available
to us.
Of the sources consulted for the present thesis, two
works stand out: the Dhakhlra by Ibn-Bassam, and Kitab at-
llbyan by 'Abd-Allah b. Buluggln. The Dhakhira is one of
the most reliable sources for eleventh-century al-Andalus
Parts I and IV are of great value in that they contain
illuminating sections on poets who played an important role
in Sevillan history, such as Abu-l-Walld Ibn-Zaydun. These
parts also contain important accounts of the history of such
Taifas as Cordoba, Toledo and Seville. However, it is Part
II, which studies the literary figures of Western al-Andalus
(which includes Seville) that is indispensable for Sevillan
history. The following points indicate its importance for
the historian of Seville:
1. ) Although its principal aims are literary, Part II
Adh-Dhakhlra furnishes us with the biography of the major
political personalities of Western al-Andalus during the
1. The Dhakhlra has been critically studied in a
doctoral thesis (B.E. Hassif, La Dajlra de Ibn
Bassam al-Santarin", estudio critico de su
contenido, unpublished doctoral thesis, Madrid,
1962). It should be noted that the stress of
this thesis is primarily concerned with the
literary nature of the Dhakhlra.
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Taifa period such as the Banu fAbbad rulers, Ibn- 'Ammar,
al-Qadi Abu-1-Walld al-Bajl, etc. Prom the biographical
information on the different personalities studied in
Part II of Adh-BhakhTra, one gets a vivid impression of
the mentality, temperament, values, attitudes and
behaviour of the Andalusian statesmen of the period. While
the large number of figures studied constitutes a positive
contribution to our conception of the general background
that characterised the political state of affairs in al~
Andalus, the inclusion of the major personalities sheds
light on problems of a more particular nature. The value
of such information is increased when one considers the
scarcity of reliable sources for a period that is nine
centuries away, the historian of which is likely to
welcome the smallest scrap of information provided he is
convinced of its authenticity.
2. ) Part II also indirectly furnishes some very
valuable information concerning key events in eleventh-
century Western al-Andalus (al-Gharb) such as the fall
of Seville or al-Mu'tadid's wars with al-Muzaffar b. al-
• 0
Aftas of Badajoz.
3. ) The fact that Ibn-Bassam was a contemporary
figure who lived through many of the events treated in
Part II and was personally acquainted with some of the
characters he studies is of great significance for the
modern historian. Finally, of even greater Importance
is Ibn-BassSm's honesty as an objective scholar and his
heavy reliance on the greatest Andalusian historian,
Ibn-Hayyan.
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It is widely accepted that Prince 'Abd-AllgJa 's
memoirs entitled Kitab at-Tibyan constitute a unique
source for eleventh-century al-AadalusNot only was
Prince 'Abd-Allah a contemporary figure, he actually
participated in many of the historical events he dis¬
cusses. 'Abd-ALlah wrote his work in the Maghrib after
the Taifas had been conquered by Vusuf b. Tashufin.
'Abd-Allah was therefore restricted in what he said about
Vusuf, but could freely discuss the history of Granada
and its relations with the other Taifas such as Seville.
The importance of the Kitab at-Tibyan is not limited to
its value as an important source of information. *Abd-
Allah also presents his thoughts and the motives behind
his decisions. He even analyses the behaviour and
mentality of his adversaries, such as al-Mu'tamid 's
minister, Ibn- 'Ammar, or Alfonso VI. He sometimes quotes
the people he refers to, such as Alfonso 's envoys Sisnando
Davidiz, Alvar Fanez, and Pedro Ansurez. Finally, although
'Abd-Allah is basically concerned with the history of
Granada, he discusses some of the major events during the
eleventh century such as the conquest of Toledo by
Alfonso VI in 478/1085 or the Battle of az-Zallaqa in
479/1086 in which he participated.
1. For a critical evaluation, translation and annota¬
tion of Kitab at-Tibyan, see A„ T. Tibi, The Tibyan
of 'Abdullah b. Bulugguin, Last Zjrid Amir of
Granada, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Oxford, 1972.
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The utility of Christian sources in complementing or
contradicting Muslim works is great. Their outlook is
often different, which enables the historian to assess the
material and approach problems more objectively. Un¬
fortunately, the Christian chronicles on the eleventh
century are scarce, and those which exist can only be iised
to a limited extent. Uninterested in the Muslim societies
themselves, the Christian chronicles only mention the
Andalusians in terms of their relations with the Christian
rulers like Alfonso VI or the Cid Campeador, Rodrigo Diaz.
Two chronicles of particular interest are Historia Roderici
and Primera cronica general de Espana. The first, an
anonymous work in Latin, is the earliest chronicle (dated
c. 12th century) dealing with the eleventh century; it is
attributed to Archbishop Rodrigo.^ Tne Rrimera cronica,
which is the first chronicle in Spanish, was compiled by
the order of Alfonso X and Sancho IV, and is an informative
2
chronicle which relies heavily on Historia Roderici.
These two sources are important for studying Seville fs
relations with the Christian states and furnish detailed
accounts of the major eleventh-century events such as the
conquest of Toledo by Alfonso VI, the Battle of az-Zallaqa,
and the conquest of Valencia by the Cid.
1. For an evaluation of Historia Roderici, see R.
Menendez Pidal, La Espana del Cid, vol. 2, Madrid,
1929, pp. 901-15-
2. On this work see Alfonso X and Sancho IV, Primera
cronica general de Espana, Madrid, 1955, vol. 1,
pp. XV-LXXII, and vol. 2, pp. CXXXIX-CCVIII.
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The Cantar de Mjp Cid or Poema de Mlo Cjd is among
the most reliable Christian sources for the eleventh
century, despite the many criticisms that have been
advanced to contest its historical authenticity."'"
Although, from the historian's point of view, the Poema
de Mio Cid is subject to the limitations of an epic and
must consequently be approached with suspicion, the work
refers to several well-established historical figures of
the period and reflects the spirit of eleventh-century
Castile and the mentality of the contemporary Castilian
with much vigour, colour and clarity, without contra¬
dicting the general impression derived from acceptable
historical texts.
1. Of the numerous original editions and available
re-editions of the epic, Colin Smith's 1972
edition, Poema de Mio Cid, is among the best.
However, direct familiarity with the basic
Arabic sources would have enabled the author
to adopt a more constructive approach when
analysing the 'historicidad' of the epic in
his introduction. For example subsection II,
entitled Ejpic and History, does not consider
the historical accounts of many of the
characters found in the epic despite the unique
historical value in this respect of some of
the Arabic sources such as Adh-Dhakhlra, Kitab
at-Tibyan and Al-Hulal al-Mawshiyya. The
result is that Smith's evaluation and assess¬
ment of the epic's 'historicidad' is deficient
and unbalanced.
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the Poema de Mio Cid, two intrinsic features of
the eleventh-century Castilian are echoed throughout the
epic and appear in the forefront : an excessive lust for
material gain and an instinctive violence.^ A similar
excessive degree of violence is reflected in the
historical texts. Despite its idealistic dimension,
the epic does not contradict the historical reality of
the period, because a powerful lust for material gain,
depicted in the epic, was a major stimulating factor
2
for the dynamism of the Cid and his supporters.
1. For example, strength is conceived as one of
the Cid's admirable assets, and its full
application against the Moors is considered
as an ethical duty. Violence is omnipresent
in the description of the Cid's conquest of
such fortresses as Castejon, Alcocer, Ateca
and Terrer (Poema, pp. 17-26). The high
emotions of the participants in the trial
of the Princes of Carrion are expressed in
verbal violence (ibid., pp. 96-IO3). Even
the swords carried by the Cid's men are
described as 'espadas dulces e tajadores'
(ibid., p. 94)»
2. For example, the booty acquired from the
Moors is generously divided by the Cid
among his men on such occasions as the
defence of Valencia against the Sevillan
king (Poema, pp. I4-O-I4.I). The Cid re¬
gained the king's favour by sending him
presents on various occasions, such as the
one hundred horses he sent the king after
defending Valencia (ibid., pp. pl-lj.2).
When the Princes of Carrion were brought
to trial, the Cid requested the two swords,
Colada and Tizon, and the three thousand
marks he had given them before, demanding
justice for his daughters whom the two
princes had wronged (ibid., pp. 96-97,
99).
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However, far from being crudely presented in the
epic, both violence and greed are legalised and sanctified
by the support they received from king and Church. Hence
although the king banished the Cid initially, he later
not only admired, but welcomed and defended, the hero."^
The Cid's deep-seated religious belief constituted
an intimate source of inspiration during his most
difficult moments. Furthermore, it was in the monastery
of San Pedro de Cardena under the care of the Abbot Don
Sancho that the Cid left his wife and two daughters when
exiled, while Jerome, possibly a Frenchman, who fought by
his side, was made bishop of Valencia when the Cid
conquered it.
The Poema de Mfo Cid is therefore indispensable for
appreciating the fundamental socio-historical forces that
lay behind the evolution of Castile, which after 1^.78/1085
embarked upon a policy of annexing al--Andalus entirely.
The transcendental role of the Church is present through¬
out the epic, but the authority of the king is the major
unifying factor politically and even the hero bows before
the might of his sovereign.
1. For example, see the king's opening speech during
the trial of the Carrion brothers (ibid., p. 95)*
2. ibid., pp. 9-H, 1|2-1|3.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE REIGN OF BANE 'ABBAD:
AN ANALYSIS OP THEIR RISE
AND FALL FROM POWER
I. Al-QadI Muhammad b. Isma'll b. 'Abbad
(Ij.lVi023-I1.33/10hl)
(1) The General Background and Situation in al-Andalus
prior to Banu 'Abbad
Never in history had a highly civilised nation broken
down internally and systematically into as many politically
autonomous sub-sections as did al-Andalus during the fifth
century of the Hijra (11th A.D.). Rarely have so many
independent political entities the size of the Andalusian
Taifa states simultaneously guarded their autonomy for as
long as the latter. The phenomenon is not sufficiently
understood because much research for the period needs yet
to be undertaken. Hence the urgent need for a fresh
approach to the period of the Taifa states and a greater
consideration of its implications in Andalusian history.
The general administrative and political system of
eleventh-century al-Andalus was one of unprecedented
decentralisation and separatism. With the fall of Banu
Umayya, the pole of attraction which Cordoba had constituted
until the early eleventh century was irreplaceably lost and
the provinces of al-Andalus were transformed into semi-
independent, semi-isolated spheres of influence, the Taifa
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states. Regionalism was the end product that gradually
demolished the decadent Cordoban Caliphate during the early
eleventh century; this regionalism persisted, constituting
the comprehensive framework for the political perturbations
that shook al-Andalus throughout the century. Decentralisa¬
tion, regionalism and disunity characterised and, in many
phases, determined the historical period known for a unique
phenomenon, the development of the Taifa states.
The complex intersecting and inter-reacting forces in
al-Andalus imposed themselves variously in different circum¬
stances throughout the eleventh century. Ideological
factors were of the highest influence in moulding eleventh-
century political developments in al-Andalus. Forces of an
Islamic collective consciousness were released as a reaction
whenever the Christian threat from the North attained
perilous dimensions. The Islamic element seems to have
shown two conflicting tendencies. On the one hand, the Taifa
kings retained an Islamic appearance to legitimise their
domination over ex-provinces of the Banu Umayya Caliphate,
despite the separatist and hence anti-Islamic implications of
their fragmentation. The most impressive example was the
appeal for Vusuf b. Tashufln's assistance, sought and justi¬
fied by the Taifa kings on religious grounds (despite the
non-religious long-term and immediate causes), in response
to Alfonso VI Ts aggressive policy following 1;78/1085."*" An
1. Alfonso VI's new policy towards the Taifas following
his conquest of Toledo in lj.78/1085 will be analysed in
greater detail in Chapter Four of the present thesis.
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Islamic terminology characterised the Taifa kings ' speech,
letters, prose and poetry. For example, al-Mu 'tamid's
reply to Alfonso's letter resounds with religious overtones
throughout, while it is clear in his Kitab at-Tibyan that
Prince 'Abd-Allah b. Buluggln b. Zlrl of Granada includes
Islamic justifications for almost every decision he makes.
Furthermore, the Qur'an is frequently quoted as supporting
evidence. Another example of their religious tendencies is
reflected in their adoption of such titles as al-Mu'tadid
bi-I>In Allah, al-Mu 'tamid 'Ala-Allah or al-Musta'ln bi-DIn
Allah. However, the Taifa kings ' Islamic exterior contrasts
with their numerous anti-Islamic actions, thus illustrating
the former's superficiality.
It was by criticising these actions, while enjoying
internal popular support and later the external help of
Yusuf, that a powerful intellectual movement contesting the
right to rule of the Taifa kings in general developed,
supporting its claims by Islamic principles of legality.
This intellectual opposition included individuals of vary¬
ing professions throughout al-Anda'lus who were united by
their open denunciation of the Taifa kings and their sub-
^ scription to the principle of reunifying al-Andalus under
'"one banner. Unlike the Taifa kings who desired the
maintenance of a status quo which would provide the stability
required for their survival, the militant intellectual
opposition sought the radical transformation of al-Andalus
through the reintegration of its disintegrated regions. The
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widespread discontent was expressed at various levels,
ranging from al-Qadi Abu-l-Walid al-Bajl's visits to
several eminent Taifa kings and his unheeded plea for peace
and unity following his return from the Orient in lj.26/103
the bitter condemnations of Ibn-Hayyan found in the -widely
quoted extracts from his al-Matin, the piercing irony of Ibn-
Hazm or the active militancy of such devoted supporters of
Yusuf b. Tashufln as al-Qadi Ibn-Sahl, or the collaboration
of Badis b. Warwl or Ibn-al-QulayfI. The popular condemna¬
tion of the Taifa kings is reflected in contemporary
political poetry, which constituted an effective means of
mass communication. Although this movement contributed to
1. Dhakh., II: Rabat, fol. 28v.; Bodl., fol. 2£v.
2. Tib., pp. 117-18, 12+6.
3. Probably the most popular satirical poem condemning the
artificiality of the Taifa kings included the following
verses by Abu-l-Hasan 'All b. Rashlq al-Qayrawanl:
'Mimma yuzahhidunl fl ard1 Andalusin
Sima Muqtadirin fIha wa-Mu 'tamid^
Alqabu mamlakatin fl ghayr1 mawdifiha
Ka 1-hirr^" yuhkl ntif akh811 sawlata l-asada '
(Mu f,j ib , p. 70; Rayat, p. 101.)
('What makes me indifferent to the land of al-Andalus
Is the echoing of [the titles] Muqtadir and Mu'tamid,
Titles of a kingdom, used out of context,
Like an inflated cat imitating the aggression of a lion. ')
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the final collapse of the Taifa states, its lack of
organisation, and the fact that each individual manifested
his opposition for individual motives, implied that the
better organised al-Murabitun (Almoravids) would lead al-
Andalus following their triumph over the Taifa kings.
Furthermore, the intellectual opposition was an ethical
rather than a politically organised movement.
Forces of ethnic awareness were displayed internally
when different racial factions organised and clashed in
al-Andalus. The ethnically composite Andalusian society,
which included Arabs, Berbers, Slavs and Latins, was agitated
and more sensitive during a turbulent eleventh century. With
widespread social unrest, agitation and violence, ethnic
groupings served as a limited means of seeking security and
strengthening defence. Although the ethnic dimension is a
necessary element for explaining inter-Taifa relations, the
former must not be conceived as a consistent or a pre¬
dominating factor. The vulnerability of the racial approach
is demonstrable by examples of peaceful co-existence between
Arab-Berber, Berber-Slavic and Slavic-Arab states. For
example, under Banu 'Abbad, Seville temporarily enjoyed
peaceful relations with the Berber leader of Carmona (Qarmuna),
Muhammad al-Barzall, while Prince *Abd-Allah, expresses deep
gratitude to al-Muftamid who assisted him during times of
internal troubles and insecurity.^" Inter-racial allegiances
1. Prince 'Abd-Allah compliments al-Mu'tamid almost every
time the latter is mentioned, e.g. Tib., p. 82.
- 25 -
were further encouraged by mixed marriages, as is illustra¬
ted by al-Mu'tadid's marriage to the daughter of Mujahid
al-'Amirl, sister of 'All b. Mujahid of Denia (Darya)."1"
Examples are equally abundant of military confrontations
between Taifa states of similar ethnical backgrounds,
illustrating inter-Arab, inter-Berber and inter-Slavic
strife. As examples of conflicting Taifa kings of identical
ethnic backgrounds, one might cite the confrontation of al-
Mu'tamidwith Ibn-Jahwar, Prince 'Abd-Allah's struggle with
his brother Tamlm or Muhammad al-Barzall's alliance with
#
2al-Mu'tadid against another Berber, Yahya b. Hammud.
Previously, al-Qasim b. Hammud had had to confront his
O
brother 'All and later his nephew Yahya b. Hammud.
Finally, the racial division of states, while ignoring the
role of the original inhabitants of al-Andalus, is based on
the racial origin of the Taifa leaders and underestimates
the ethnic variety of local populations.
Individual greed, personal gain and self-interest some¬
times overshadowed all other considerations in determining
political developments within and between Taifa states. The
eleventh century having been a period during which power was
extensively abused to determine the outcome of differences
at individual and state levels, personal ambitions found
1. Hulla, II, p . Ip3 •
2* Bhakh., I, vol. i, p. 3&1; Tib., pp. 90-95? Bhakh.,
I, vol. i, p. 271•
3* Bayan, III, pp. 125-25, 135? Dhakh., I, vol. ii,
pp. 13-15, 17.
- 26 -
fertile breeding grounds. Even if the first generation of
Taifa kings is not considered to have illegally imposed its
authority on different regions of the Banu Umayya Caliphate,
examples of adventurers who rose against the Taifa kings
themselves abound. Prince £Abd-Allah's Kitab at-Tibyan
illuminates this problem, furnishing detailed examples of
rebels or potential rebels who threatened the unity of
Granada. Prince 'Abd-Allah's own brother, Tamlm of Malaga,
attempted to encroach upon Granadan territory and, militarily
defeated, he continued pressing his claims upon Yusuf b.
1
Tashufln, following the Battle of az-Zallaqa. Having
defeated his rebelling commander, Ibn-Taqnawt, Prince £Abd-
Allah had him executed with his supporters, while his
commander over Arjona (Arjuna) and Antequera (Antaqayra),
Kabbab b. Tamlt, constantly kindled trouble between al-
2
Mu £tamid and Prince £Abd-Allah until the latter crushed him.
The heavily taxed Jewish community of Lucena (al-Yussana),
led by Ibn-Maymun, revolted and an agreement was finally
reached through the pressures and intervention of Prince
£Abd-Allah's commander over Loja (Lawsha), Mu'ammal, and
friendly Jewish elders. Mu'ammal himself led an
unsuccessful revolt against Prince £Abd-Allah and, having
failed to obtain Yusuf's support, fled.^" Nu'mSn, the
1. Tib.t pp. 90-95, 106-7, 113-
2. ibid., pp. 95-100.
3< ibid., pp. 130-32.
I4.. ibid., pp. 136-38-
- 27 -
commander who defeated Mu'ammal, joined Yusuf's ranks
following as-Zallaqa, leading his victorious armies during
the conquest of Lucena and other fortresses of Western
Granada.The revolt of Prince 'Abd-Allah's Zanata com¬
manders was only averted by the former's resolute and timely
action. Most revealing is Prince 'Abd-Allah's obsessive
suspicion of almost every highly ranking functionary and
commander in Granada and his constant adoption of preventive
measures. For example he abolished the post of minister,
holding each individual official directly responsible to
3
him.
Rebels against al-Mu 'tamid included Ibn-Rashlq and the
former's life-long companion and friend, Ibn-'Ammar.^
Rebellions against the Taifa kings were the mile rather than
the exception and it is probably impossible to find a Taifa
ruler who remained unchallenged. More common than rebels,
however, were the regional commanders who effectively con¬
trolled their fortresses while retaining a merely nominal
allegiance to their Taifa kings. Finally, the individual
self-interest of the rebels is deduced from the non-existence
of other serious ideological motives for their actions, as
may be that of the Taifa kings from their petty squabbles and
1. ibid., pp. 138-39, lU+, 1^8.
2. ibid., pp. 133-35'
3- ibid., p. 86.
I4.. ibid., pp. 110-2, 79-81.
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attempts at mutual destruction, added to their oppressive
internal policies of over-taxation.
The geographic factors were of minimal significance in
determining military confrontations in al-Andalus, unlike
the Christian North where cold temperatures, forests and
mountains combined to form discouraging natural barriers for
Muslim military expeditions such as those of al-Mamsur b.
Abl-'Amir. However, purely political, social or economic
conditions greatly influenced the general course of events
in eleventh-century al-Andalus, as did the deliberate inter¬
vention of men. The latent existence of a combination of
interacting forces which co-existed harmoniously at times
and conflicted at others, changed in a variety of patterns in
which some were imposed more sharply in accordance with vary¬
ing circumstances. Hence the contradictions which constitu¬
ted the essential pattern of Taifa state political struggles.
However, the conflict between contradictory forces and
their political expression during the eleventh century is not
indicative of any natural social disintegration of the
Andalusian society, the latter having previously proved the
solidity of its cohesion despite a unique and continuous
multi-cultural interaction. The intolerance of the Banu
Abl-'Amir dictatorship effectively inflamed different under¬
ground reactions promoting the defence of narrow group
interests. The Banu Abl- 'Amir usurpation of poxijer prevented
1. ibid., p. 109.
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any constructive replacement of the decadent political struc¬
tures of Banu Umayya. The brutal suppression of legitimate
political activity in what had long been a tolerant, highly-
politicised society had the inevitable long-term result of
violent explosions and the final division of al-Andalus into
a multiplicity of Taifa states. Daring the transitory period
of Banu Abi-'Amir domination, their apparently unifying role
of leadership in al-Andalus was outweighed by the long-effect
negative implications which resulted from their suffocation
of all existing political forces. Daring the period of Banu
Abi- 'Amir, al-Andalus ' outward expansion and pseudo-imperial
appearance concealed its internal weakness and decaying
elements.
Although the beginning of the rule of Banu Abi- 'Amir
marked the effective end of the Banu Umayya dynasty, the
latter's legal and spiritual status was recognised throughout
the rule of Banu Abi-'Amir, and after it. In fact, Banu
Abi- 'Amir administered their Cordoban Caliphate in the name
of Banu Umayya. With the fall of an-Nasir Sulayman b. al-
Hakam in l\.07/1016, Hisham II vanished from the political
scene and, with his disappearance, the role of Banu Umayya
as a major force of centralisation and cohesion ceased to
exist forever. Its credibility as a political force had
vanished and its past grandeur was only echoed by a handful
of Taifa leaders who falsely claimed the rediscovery of
Hisham II.
The death of al-Hakam al-Mustansir bi-Allah on the
• *
2 Safar 366/3O September 976 was followed by the engagement
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of different factions in a power struggle which stimulated
the numerous factors eventually promoting the final collapse
of the Banu Umayya Caliphate in al-Andalus. In the words of
Prince 'Abd-Allah, Muhammad b. Abi-'Amir gradually '..reduced
to obscurity the men who had been prominent during the
Caliphate of al-Hakam and. .ruthlessly eliminated them.. As
a result of the assassination of al-Mughlra b. 'Abd-Allah an-
Nasir, which followed immediately upon the death of his
brother al-Hakam, opposition from the supporters of the
saqaliba leaders, Fa'iq and Jawdhar, was weakened and later
2
crushed. Al-Hakam's ten-year-old heir, Hi sham ai-Mu'ayyad,
also known as Hi sham II, was rapidly proclaimed Caliph on the
3 Safar 366/I October 976 and received widespread recognition
3
throughout al-Andalus. The plotters of the assassination,
the Hajib Ja'far b. 'Uthman al-Mushafl and Muhammad b. 'All
b. Abi- 'Amir, then assumed power as guardians of Hisham II.
They further benefited from the support of Hisham's mother
Subh, who exercised much influence through her nomination of
high officials and determination of policies.^" Eventually,
'Uthman al-Mushafl's and Muhammad b. Abi-'Amir's mutual dis-
• • *
trust and personal ambitions resulted in the former's
elimination and the latter's monopolisation of power.
1. Tib. , p . 15 •
2. Bayan, II, pp. 26l-6i|; Nafh, I, p. 272.
3» A'mal, pp. 48-57; Mu '.jib, p. 25-
!)_• Bayan , II, pp. 25l 52; Mu 'jib , p. 74*
Muhammad b. Abl-'Amir was able to achieve his objective
by exploiting his position of increasing influence while
gradually reducing al-Mushafx's powers by competing x^ith him
in the latter's areas of authority."'" Administratively,
Muhammad b. Abx-'Amir rose from his initial post of minister
to that of supreme commander of the army and civil adminis¬
trator of Cordoba. The increase in Christian attacks from
the North became a potential threat until Ibn-Abx- 'Amir
assumed the army's leadership. He directed his first
military expedition inside Galicia in Rajab 366/February-
March 977 and returned triumphant fifty-three days later
2
with captives and booty. His popularity increased follow¬
ing his second success when he joined forces with the
commander G-halib b. 'Abd ar-Rahman of Salim ana commanded a
__ O
military expedition into Castile on 'id al-Fitr 366/May 977-
In Safar, his third expedition into Leon was a success that
contributed even further to the increase of his influence in
internal affairs. When Ghalib agreed to marry his daughter,
Asma', to al-Mushafx's son, 'Uthman, Muhammad b. Abx- 'Amir pro
posed his own candidacy instead and consummated the marriage,
with Subh's blessings, on the 2l+ Muharram 3&7/12 September
977.^ Having prepared the way for al-Hajib al-Mushafx's
downfall, Muhammad b. Abx-'Amir deposed the former from his
1. Bayan, II, p. 26 Ip; Ehakh. , IV, vol. i, p. l+% -
2. Bayan, II, p. 261+; Dhakh. , IV, vol- P- •
3. Bayan, II, p. 26£; Bhakh. , IV, vol. i, pp. ip7 •
I4.. Bayan, II, pp. 267; Dhakh. , IV, vol. i, p. 1+7-
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position as Ha jib on the 13 Sha 'ban 367/27 March 978, im¬
prisoned him and expropriated his belongings and finally had
him killed."'"
Muhammad b. Abl-'Amir's reign, which lasted until his
death on the 27 Ramadan 392/9 August 1002, was characterised
2
by great military activity. His military expeditions into
the Northern kingdoms of Castile, Leon, Navarre and Galicia
total about fifty-three. These incursions were unprecedented
in their regularity, having become an annual venture, by their
large scale, ranging over such extreme parts of Northern Spain
as Santiago de Compostela, and by their success as the
Christian states were constantly on the defensive. Their chief
objective being economic, the riches acquired from these
plunders contributed directly to the consolidation of Muhammad
b. Abi-'Amir's internal position as ruler. Muhammad b. Abl-
'Amir's military efforts were even extended to the Maghrib,
where internal strife characterised the direct struggle
between the Idrisls on the one hand and the Zanata Maghrawa on
the other, supported respectively by the Fatimls of Egypt and
Banu Umayya (followed by Banu Abl-'Amir) of al-Andalus. The
'Arniri armies therefore intervened repeatedly in the Maghrib.
Despite its significance, Muhammad b. Abi-'Amir's con¬
tinuous military success following the elimination of al-Hajib
al-Mushafl did not enable the former to crush all opposition.
Having attained full control over the entire administrative
Bayan, II, pp. 267-73 j Dha.kh. , IV, vol. i, pp. 1+8-1+9.
2. Tib. , pp. lf?-17.
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and military apparatus, Muhammad b. Abi-'Amir became in¬
dependent of Subh's influence and constituted a threat to
Hisham's position as the legal Caliph. Consequently,
Subh engaged in a discreet effort to stimulate Ghalib and
later Zlrl b. 'Atiyya to challenge the 'Amirl rule.
Ghalib's opposition to Muhammad b. Abi-'Amir took the
form of a military confrontation which culminated in the
former's death during a battle at San Vicente near Atienza
on the I). Muharram 381/2 April 991Muhammad b. Abi- 'Amir
then directed incursions into Leon in revenge for Ramiro
Ill's participation with Ghalib's armies, defeating him and
his allies, Sancho of Navarre and Garcia Fernando of Castile.
Subh's support of Zlrl was financial as she enjoyed
free access to the state treasury. On the 3 JumadS. 1,386/
2ij. May 996, Muhammad b. Abi-'Amir reacted to Zlrl's
opposition by transferring the state reserves to his own
palace with the blessings of 'ulama', ministers, and the con-
2
sent of Hi sham II. To counter Banu Umayya propaganda
against himself, he organised a grandiose procession, seating
himself beside his son, 'Abd-al-Malik, and Hi sham II who wore
O
_
the Caliphal dress. Muhammad b. Abi-'Amir thus eliminated
all serious opposition to his rule, which lasted until Safar
392/December 1001-January 1002 when he died of sickness
1. Bayan, II, pp. 298-99.
2* Dhakh. , IV, vol. i, p. 53-
3- Mu '.jib, pp. iq 0—lp2; Dhakh. , IV, vol. i, p. Sb-
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during a military expedition inside Castilian territories."'"
Muhammad b. Abi-'Amir's long reign had the unfortunate
consequence of destroying the concept of legality of power
among future contenders for the Caliphate. Having nullified
Hisham II's role, Muhammad b. Abi-'Amir was succeeded by his
son 'Abd-al-Malik, who was himself succeeded by his brother
'Abd-ar-Rahman.. However, others were to seek power as
Muhammad b. Abl- 'Amir had, by resorting to violence. In
Jumada . I or Jumada II, 399/January-February 1009, Muhammad
b. Hishan b. 'Abd al-Jabbar an-Nasir, known as al-Mahdl,
overthrew 'Abd ar-Rahman b. Abl-'Amir, whom he crucified,
and renounced his allegiance to Hisham II, although the
latter was re-established in Lj.00/1009^ Al-Mahdl ma.rked the
commencement of the fitna (trouble) which led to the creation
of the Taifa states, and symbolic of his plunders was his
razing to the ground of the majestic Madlna az-Zahra'
Cordoba's devastation followed vjhen, after resisting for
three years, the city was finally surrendered to Sulayman b.
al-Hakam b. Sulayman who entered the capital in 1+ 03/1012
it
and Hisham II was apparently assassinated.
1. Ehakh., IV, vol. i, pp. 5^-55•
2* Mu 'jib, p. Ij-0; for a full account of the reigns of
Abd al-Malik and 'Abd ar-Rahman, see Bayan, III, pp.
2-50.
3. Mu 'jib, pp. lj.0-1; Bayan, III, pp. 50-2, 59-60.
I4.. Bayan, HI, p. 6I4..
5- Mu 'jib, pp. I4.I, 53.
V.
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The exact period when Hisham II ruled was a controversy
even among his contemporaries. Further, it is legitimate
to demand whether he actually ruled at all. The sovereign
Hisham al-Mu'ayyad had remained from the beginning of his
nominal reign in an isolated atmosphere, surrounded by toys,
musicians and concubines, without receiving any instruction
in the administration of state affairs. However, despite
his isolation, his image was promoted among the populace to
■gain widespread acceptance and esteem and to legitimise
conflicting political claims and movements during a period
of sixty years, to be revived again.
Hisham II was the figurehead throughout the 'Amirl rule.
His symbolic status during the reign of al-Mansur Muhammad b.
Abl-'Amir continued during the succeeding reign of 'Abd--al-
Malik b. Abl-'Amir Hisham II aroused widespread discontent
and opposition to the 'Amirl ruler throughout al-Andalus when
he designated 'Abd ar-Rahman b. Abl-'Amir as his legal heir
and offered him the title of Wall 'Ahd al-Muslimln, thus
officially preparing for the transfer of power from the Banu
2
Umayya dynasty. The violent uprising of al-Mahdl Muhammad
1. The increased status of 'Abd-al-Malik is documented by
a letter attributed to Hisham II in which the latter
bestowed the title of al-Muzaffar upon 'Abd-al-Malik
and the office of Dhu-l-V/izarata:/n upon 'Abd-al-Malik 's
son, Muhammad. For a full text of the letter, see
Bayan, ill, pp. 16-17.
2* Bayan, III, pp. 38-39-
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b. Hi sham accelerated the declining status of Hisham II as
the latter was forced to abandon the Caliphate, proclaiming
his resignation publicly.^ Although Hisham II was restored
to power during the period lj.00/1009-1^03/1012, his assassina¬
tion during Sulayman b. al-Hakam's march into Cordoba marked
the definitive termination of the long-ailing Banu Umayya
dynasty. In 1;07/1016-7 'All b. Hammud led a movement
against Cordoba, the alleged objective of which was the re¬
instatement of the resurrected Hisham II. When al-Qadl b.
'Abbad's rule over Seville was threatened by Yahya b.
Hammud, he proclaimed the rediscovery of Hisham al-Mu'ayyad
in if26/103l|-5 and was supported by other leaders of Taifa
2
states. Historically, apart from the certainty of his
existence, the personality of Hisham II remains very much a
mystery. The image of Hisham II as a motivating political
force in al-Andalus was therefore the last remaining vestige
of the long reign of Banu Umayya.
The bloody struggle over Cordoba finally led to the rule
of Banu Hammud over the capital. However, this triumph
of Banu Hammud was not accompanied by a reunification of al-
Andalus and, throughout this period, some Taifa states
enjoyed de facto sovereignty while others were in the process
1. ibid., pp. 59-62.
2- Bayan, III, p. 198; A*mal, p. 179; Dhakh., II:
Hist.Abb., I, p. 122; Rabat, fol. 3*1.; Bodl.,
fol. 3r.
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of total disintegration from the central capital, Cordoba."1
In IpOlp/l013—'All b. Harnmud, who then ruled over
Ceuta (Sabta), received a letter allegedly from Hisham II
pleading with the former to help him recover Cordoba, which
was controlled by an-Nasir Muhammad b. Sulayman, and
2
promising him the right of succession to the Caliphate.
The letter, which established 'All's position as a serious
contender for the Cordoban Caliphate, won him the support of
'Amir b. Path of Malaga and Buluggln b. ZIrl of Granada
and led to his military occupation of Cordoba where Hisham II
was said to have been found dead. 'All then declared him¬
self Caliph on Dhu-1-Q,a'da 1+08/1017."^ Having initiated his
reign by ruling justly and securing law and order, 'All
reversed his policies after the first eight months when his
suspicion of the local inhabitants grew as a result of their
support for al-Murta£a's claims to the Caliphate, leading to
a reign of terror which culminated in 'All's assassination
1. Dhakh., I, vbl.ii, p. 161; examples of Taifa states
which gained autonomy throughout the gradual collapse
of the Cordoban Caliphate included the following:
Saragossa (379/989), Ronda (383/993)? Malaga (391/
1000), Valencia (399/1008), Denia and Tortosa (1+00/
1009), Almeria, Murcia, Moron (1+03/1012), Carmona
(1+ 01+/1013 ), Balearic Islands (1+05/1011+), Toledo
(1+18/1027) .
2- Mu 'jib, p. 1+1+.
3. Dhakh. , I, vol.ii, pp. 79, 82; Mu 'jib, pp. 1+9-50.
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by three saqaliba eunuchs in his oivn palace bath."'" His
brother al-Qasim b. Hammud who ruled over Seville then came
to Cordoba to succeed him and was proclaimed Caliph in Dhu-
p
1-Qi fda lp08/March-April 1018. His first reign ended when
his nephew Yahya b. Hammud of Malaga overthrew him in Rabl' 1
i|12/June-July 1021, but al-Qasim re-entered Cordoba, in Dhu-
1-Qi'da IpL3/0ctober-November 1023 to be proclaimed Caliph.^"
He was finally overthrown by the populace seven months later
and, having failed to defeat the Cordobans, he fled to Seville,
where his son Muhammad had been ruling, in Sha'ban 1;ll;/1023-
However, the city gates were closed against him, and his sons
Hasan and Muhammad who had been besieged in their palace were
released by local leaders under the new leadership of al-Qadl
b. 'Abbad.^ The impregnability of Seville is explained by
its solid, recently-built wall.^ Al-Qasim, most of whose
1. Dhakh., I, vol. i, pp. 80-1; 'Abd ar-Rahman b. Muhammad
b. 'Abd-Allah b. an-Nasir al-Murtada of the Banu Umayya
family was declared as the rightful Caliph by Khayran
al- 'Amirl of Murcia in I4.07/1016, to contest 'All b.
Hammud's own claims (Bayan, III, p. 121).
2* Dhakh., I, vol. ii, pp. 12, 83; Bayan, III, pp. 122,
121;; Mu 'j ib , p. 50.
'3- Dhakh. , I, vol. ii, pp. l£-l6; Bayan, III, p. 121;;
Mu 'jib, p. 50-
1;. Dhakh. , I, vol. ii, p. 17; Bayan, III, p. 121;;
Mu 'jib, p. 50; Nafh, II, p. 32*
Dhakh. , I, vol. ii, p. 17; Dhakh. , II: Hist .Abb. , I, p.
221; Rabat, fol. 2v.; Bodl., fol. 2v.; Bayan, III,
pp. 133-31;; Mu *,]' ib, p. Hullal, II, p. 38 .
6. Seville's city wall was first solidly built in stone by
'Abd ar-Rahman b. al-Hakam (206/821-2l;8/862 ) when the
city became exposed to attacks by the Vikings (Ma.jus).
(Mamalik, p. 112)
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troops had deserted him to join his nephew Yahya b. Hammud
in Malaga, was then pursued by his nephew who defeated him
at Jerez de la Prontera (Sharlsh) and took him prisoner to
Malaga. Al-Qasim was finally strangled in 1|27/1035, while
in the prison of his nephew Idrls, and buried in Algecira.s
by his son Muhammad."^ At this point, Seville became master
of its own destiny as Cordoba plunged into a series of
assassinations of rulers and general revolts that eventually
led to the establishment of a republic under Banu Jahwar.
(2) The Establishment of al-Q,adI b. 'Abbad in Seville
Seville, which had escaped central control from Cordoba
when al-Qasim had earlier established his rule over it, was
for the first time ruled by a native with al-Qadl's establish-
ment in i|lJ|/1023. Following the latter's acquisition of
the reins of power, the Banu 'Abbad dynasty was to determine
the evolution of Seville's politics within and beyond its
constantly expanding frontiers. Seville's history therefore
assumed a new direction acquiring an -unprecedented level of
influence in Andalusian history.
The political awareness, skilful manoeuvres and
diplomatically imposed leadership of al-Qadl Muhammad b.
Isma/ll b. 'Abbad contributed as decisively to the establish¬
ment of Banu 'Abbad in Seville as the general political
situation in al-Andalus following the total disintegration
1. Ehakh., I,vol. ii, p. 17; Mu 'jib, pp.
Nafh, II, p. 33; Bayan, III, pp. 12i|-23>.
2. Jadwa, p. 80; Nafh, II, p. 32.
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of the Caliphate of Banu Umayya. His discretion and subtlety
as Qadl of Seville during the reign of al-Qasim b. Hamrtiud
contrast with his determination, ruthlessness and systematic
elimination of any contenders once his power was firmly
established following the unanimous rejection of Ibn Hammud's
de facto sovereignty over Seville in l\.±l+/1023- The manoeuvres
which enabled al-Qadi to achieve his unchallenged leadership
over Seville indicate a deep sense of perception and deter¬
mination to strive towards long-term ambitions. Al-Qadi
b. 'Abbad established himself as the absolute ruler over
Seville through a long-term strategy that only a highly-
skilled tactician who planned and timed every move could
succeed in transforming into a reality.
By I4-II4./IO23 al-Qadi Muhammad b. 'Abbad had overcome
several major obstacles and used various methods to achieve
dominance over Seville. Having no legal foundations for his
power, al-Qadi had to establish himself on a tacit principle
of general acceptance by the Sevillans. Hereditary succes¬
sion, which was an uncontested principle of popular acceptance,
was incompatible both with the political realities in Seville
following the overthrow of Banu Umayya and the personal con¬
dition of al-Qadi as a possible contender. However, the fact
that nobody could claim power over Seville through this
principle was to al-Qadl's advantage.
Al-Qadi's extreme pragmatism minimised the impact of his
initial lack of theoretical justification for his rule and he
was able to gradually secure the necessary power to actually
- 1+1 -
implement this rule. His gradual acquisition of a basis for
power was therefore the product and not the cause of his
actual condition as ruler. This handicap was overcome by
two basic strategies. (i) Without renouncing his right to
rule, he did not make any claims to power even when he
actually ruled. For example he did not adopt any honorific
]_
titles and kept his previous title of al-Qadl. lii) He
linked his position as actual ruler with the universally
established position of Hisham II, when in I+26/IO3I+ he
2
claimed to have rediscovered Hisham II. Furthermore, al-
Qadl adopted several measures to secure his position as ruler
over Seville. The important factor that contributed to his
increasing political power was his financial base, as he is
said to have owned one third of Seville. The high social
status of his family had been established by his father al-
Qadl Isma *11 b. 'Abbad who attained widespread prestige when,
as Qadl of Seville, he administered the city's affairs fol¬
lowing the breakdown of the Cordoban Caliphate.^ The
religious implications of al-Qadl Muhammad b. 'Abbad's
occupation added weight to his stature.
1. The lack of extravagant titles in the coin attributed
to al-Qadl confirms this position. Reyes, p. 227;
Matmah: Hist. Abb . , I, p. 2l+.
2. A 'mal, p. 179; Naqt, p. 25; Bayan, III, pp. 197-99;
Dhakh.. II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 222; Rabat, fol. 3? •!
BodI., fol. 3r.
3- A *mal, p. 177; Bayan, III, p. 195; ' Ibar, IV,
pT T5"6; Dnakh. , II: Hist .Abb. , I, p. 221; Rabat,
fol. 2v.; Bodl., fol. 2v.
A *mal, p. 177; Dhakh., II: Hist. Abb ., I, p. 220;
Rabat, fol. 2v.; Bodl., fol. 2v.
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Al-Qadl was able to assert his leadership and to in¬
crease his political influence by exploiting external
threats, the power vacuum in Seville, and by keeping other
local leaders under his control. These three basic factors
enabled him to succeed Banu Hammud. Al-Qasim b. Hammud ' s
* *
reign was not solidly founded when he became the established
ruler over Cordoba, and this led to his absence from Seville
which remained under the unreliable command of his son
Muhammad b. Hammud. Al-Qasim's arrogant attitude towards
the inhabitants of Seville led to the latter's decreasing
support of the former which, in turn, contributed to the
creation of a power vacuum. Al-Qasim made his greatest
political miscalculation when, preceding his flight from
Cordoba in 1+11+/1023, he sent the Sevillans a message order¬
ing them to prepare their city for accommodating his army.^
This threat to the city's peace and security was effectively
exploited by al-Qadl Muhammad b. 'Abbad to kindle popular
discontent and suspicions of al-Qasim b. Hammud and his son
2
Muhammad in Seville. The elimination of Banu Hammud
* «
culminated in al-Qadl's monopoly of power and in crushing any
possibility of power-sharing among other contenders.
Threatened by al-Qadl's army, the local leaders had remained
unaware of al-Qadl's increasing political strength until this
was suddenly manifested to crush any local contestation of
3
his position as the absolute ruler.
1. Bayan, III, p. 196; A *mal, p. 179-
2. Dhakh., I,vol. ii, pp. 16-17; A fmal, p. 179;
'Ibar, IV, p. 156.
3. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 223; Rabat, fol. 3v.;
Bodl., fol. 3v•
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The local Sevillan leaders were also outwitted by al-
Qadl 's manipulation of the oligarchy established to confront
the Hammudl threat. Being in a position of relative power,
al-Qadl refused the local leaders' offer to accept full
responsibility for Seville's affairs when the threat from
al-Qasim became imminent."'" This move expresses great
political perception on al-Qadl's part because, had he been
tempted by the offer, he would have had to assume full
responsibility in confronting Banu Hammud, while exposing
himself to the intrigues of local contenders. Consequently,
by agreeing to preside over a group of ministers nominated
by local leaders, he assumed a directing position without
being responsible for any negative consequences of their
4-- 2actions.
1. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 221: Rabat, fol. 2v.;
Bodl .*, fol. 2v.
2. This group of ministers has been described in various
"ways by different historians. Ibn-al- 'idharl describes
the group as follows: 'A group which included [Abu-
Bakr ] az-Zaydi [an-Nahwl], Banu Marlm, Banu al- 'ArabI
and others...'
(Bayan, III, p. 5l«) Ibn-Bassam names them as:
'A group including Ibn-Abl-Bakr az-Zubaydl an-NahwI,
Banu iarlm. . . Ibn- 'Abbad and others .. . '
(Dhakh. , II: Hi s t. Abb . , I, p. 221; Raba,t, fol. 2v.;
Bodl♦, fol. 2v.) Al-Marrakushi describes the group
in the following terms: 'They appointed over themselves
three of the country's greatest men, one of them al-Qadl
Abu-l-Qasim b. Isma'll b. 'Abbad al-Lakhmi, Muhammad b.
Yarlm al-Alhanl and Muhammad b. al-Hasan ar-Raydl...'
(Mu 'jib, p. 37.) The group is described still differently
in other works (e.g. Hulla, II, p. 37). Unlike Ibn-Bassam
and Ibn-al- 'idharl, al-Marrakushl describes the formation
of the group of ministers as having taken place following
Muhammad b. Hammud's defeat, which does not explain who
forced him out of Seville. Furthermore, without the threat
from Muhammad b. Hammud, al-Qadl b. 'Abbad would have had
no need to rule through a group of ministers. Finally,
Ibn-Bassam being closest in time to the events, he should
be the most reliable primary source, not to mention the
fact that al-Marrakushl wrote his work while away from al-
Andalus, thus lacking sources and depending on his memory
alone (Mu '.j ib , p. [(.).
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His apparent reluctance to accept the reins of power must
have promoted his credibility, because the local contenders
were totally unprepared when al-Qadx unexpectedly dismissed
his ministers and effectively assumed control of Seville
after the elimination of Banu Hammud.
#
Al-Qadx Muhammad b. 'Abbad's close affiliation with
t »
Banu Hammud in Seville was deeply rooted. He established
himself as QacLx of Seville during al-Qasim b. Hammud's reign
when the former's father al-Qadx Isma'xl b. 'Abbad was no
2
longer able to continue his functxon as Qadx. He co¬
operated with al-Qasim b. Hammud and his son Muhammad,
restricting himself to his official duties as QadI. Although
in no way directly related with politics before i|JLi|./1023,
his position must have enabled him to familiarise himself
with the rulers and to observe their weaknesses. His
subtlety enabled him to remain unobserved and unsuspected.
Al-Qadx Muhammad b. 'Abbad established himself as ruler
* *
in l|llj./1023, through his acquaintance with Banu Hammud and
the support of the local leaders with whom he maintained a
permanent contact. Having succeeded as the instrument
through which the local leaders eliminated Banu Hammud from
Seville, he was able to impose himself as an uncontested
leader. It was by opposing the forces of discontent, as
portrayed by the populace and the local leaders, to the
1. Bayan, III, p. 195 J Mu ib , p. 5lj A 'rnal, p. 178;
Hulla, II, p. 37; Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 221;
Rabat, fol. 2v.; Bodl., fol. 2v.
2. A *mal, p. 177; Dhakh., II: His t.Abb., I, pp. 220-21;
Rabat, fol. 2v.; Bodl., fol. 2v.
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suppressing forces of Banu Hammua that al-Qadi was able to
divert both from being directed against himself. Once the
two threats had exhausted one another, al-Qadi was able to
seize the reins of power for himself."'"
The army was instrumental in enabling al-Qadi to achieve
his final objective. The threat of Banu Hkmmud's army was
eliminated when the Sevillans forced Muhammad b. Hammud's
« •
army out of their city and closed the city gates to al-
Qasim's army following his failure to recover Cordoba. Al-
Qadi b. 'Abbad was then quick to establish an army directly
under his control as a means for imposing himself. He later
used his abundant wealth to attain this objective by buying
slaves and recruiting mercenaries, creating one of the most
2
powerful armies in al-Andalus.
A significant contributor to al-Qadi's diplomatic
excellence and credibility as a negotiator was his clear
and comprehensive vision of his objectives. The progress
or outcome of his negotiations with one party alx^ays con¬
tributed to the amelioration of his position vis-A-vis
another party. His negotiations with Ibn-Hammud, the army
and local leaders constitute a case in point. The
most pressing threat to al-Qadi was that of Muhammad b.
"2
Hammud who ruled through his minister Muhammad b. Khalis.
1. Bayan, III, pp. 19^-96; A fmal, p. 178; Dhakh., II:
Hist.Abb., I, p. 221; Rabat, fol. 2v.; Bodl., fol. 2v.
2. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 221; Rabat, fol. 3r.;
Bodl., fol. 3r.; Bayan, III, pp. 196-97; Hullal,
II, p. 38; A 'mal, p. 178.
3. Dhakh. , I, vol. ii, p. 16; A fmal, p. 178.
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Being in a position of superiority, al-Qadl demanded the
unconditional departure of Muhammad b. Hammud from Seville
and proved uncompromising. Realising the real dimension
of Muhammad b. Hammud's threat to his own position. al-Qadl
# 0 X " 9
attacked the former through his own ministers, forcing the
former out of Seville in i.plip/1023 Having surrounded and
attacked his palace, al-Qadl negotiated his release with
his father, al-Qasim b. Hammud, agreeing to allow his
departure from Seville on condition that the Banu Hammud
2
renounce all claims over the city. Having attained this
double objective, al-Qadl managed to force the disordered
army that had attacked Muhammad b. Hammud's palace out of
Seville and to negotiate the release of their leader, Muhammad
b. Zlrl b. Bunas, on condition that they leave the city in-
•3
definitely. An essential condition for his success was al-
Qadl's ability to win the army to his side when confronting
Muhammad b. Hammud, a condition which he achieved by promising
Muhammad b. Dunas Seville's allegiance to him as ruler in
exchange for his support.^1"
Al-Qadl again demonstrated his credibility as a subtle
negotiator when Seville was besieged by Yahya b. Hammud's
forces in 414/1023.^ Al-Qadl was able to persuade him to
1. Dhakh., I,vol. ii, p. 16; Mu'jib, p. 94.
2. Dhakh., I,vol. ii, p. 16.
3- Dhakh., I,vol. ii, p. 17; 'ibar, p. 156.
4. ibid.
5. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 223; Rabat, fol. 3V•;
Bodl., fol. 3r.
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end the siege in return for recognition of the latter's
sovereignty over Seville."'" He achieved this success by
offering his son 'Abbad hostage as a gesture illustrating
2
his sincerity. This was an ingenious decision that satis¬
fied Yahya b. Hammud and increased al-Qadl's internal in¬
fluence as he alone was able to make the necessary personal
sacrifice that could divert the peril facing the city.
Furthermore, al-Qadl's recognition of Yahya's sovereignty
was merely nominal and one which was later abandoned, lead¬
ing to al-Qadl's battle against Yahya in Muharram 1+27/
November-December IO35 in Carmona, Xi/hich resulted in the
3
latter's defeat and death.
(3) Al-Qadi b. 'Abbad's Consolidation of Power
Once established, the consolidation of al-Qadl's
position as ruler over Seville proved to be permanent.
Having eliminated all internal threats, he united Seville's
political forces under one banner and was recognised
throughout al-Andalus as one of the most privileged and
powerful Taifa leaders. Three essential factors which
greatly contributed to this condition were his declared
allegiance to Hisham II, his ability to divert dangers and
to win the allegiance of Taifa states and, finally, his






Bayan, III, p. 199; Mu '.jib , p . 51+.
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Following the wide ciroulaton of popular rumours
relating to the reappearance of Hisham II in Almeria (Al-
Mariyya) in i|26/103i|, al-Qadl declared that he had re-
1
discovered Hisham II himself. Despite the claim's appeal
to the popular fantasy and its acceptance by several Taifa
leaders, it was recognised by many for what it was, a fraud
intended to unite forces against the growing threat of
Yahya b. Hammud through the proclamation of Khalaf al-Husri
2
as Hisham II. All primary sources agree on the forged
nature of the claim as is attested by such authorities as
Ibn-Eazm, Ibn-Bassam and Ibn-Hayyan. The success of the
claim can be explained by the general need for a central
authority in al-Andalus. At a time when al-Andalus was a
mosaic of party states, the attraction of a uniting force was
more impressive to the popular minds of the masses than
either its incredibility or the desire of particular Taifa
leaders to disregard it as a force to contend with. The
failure to reunite al-Andalus through the new claim xi/as
partially due to its rejection by some Taifa states which
sent representatives to Seville who were shown the alleged
Hisham II behind curtains in a dark room. Despite the
potentiality of the claim to reunite al-Andalus, its intended
objectives must be sought at a personal level. The claim
1. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 222; Bayan, III, p. 198;
A 'mal, p. 17 9 •
2. Naqt, p. 2£.
3* Bayan, III, p. 200; A 'mal, p. 180.
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was consequently successful in realising al-Qadl's ambitions
by diverting the threat posed by Yahya b. Hammud and con¬
solidating his power at the internal and external levels.
Al-Qadl's nominal allegiance to Hisham II furnished him with
a degree of legality that he had always lacked, having had
no theoretical basis for legitimising his power.
By the end of his reign in 2+33/IOi+X, al-Qadl's rule
over Seville was firmly established. Having enabled him
to impose his power over Seville, his basic qualities as a
shrewd leader and politician contributed to its preservation.
Daring al-Qadl's reign, his power was legalised by his
allegiance to Hisham II, his army well organised and on the
offensive and his major enemy, Yahya b. Hammud, eliminated.
If al-Qadl did not achieve all that he had desired, he had
secured the necessary conditions for the succession of his
son, al-Mu'tadid.7 4
II. Al-Mu'tadid 'Abbad b. Muhammad b. 'Abbad
< *
(1+33/10ljl-l;6l/l 068 )
(1) The Circumstances of al-Mu'tadid' s Succession and
his Methods for Maintaining Power
When al-Mu'tadid 4Abbad b. Muhammad b. 'Abbad came to
4 4
power in Jumada II, 14.33/January-Pebruary IOI4.2, the
legitimisation of Banu 'Abbad as rulers of Seville had been
1. Hulla, II, p. I4.I; Al-Humaydl, a contemporary, places
his death as close to I4.3O/IO38 (Jadwa, p. 8l).
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completed. Hence 'Abbad b. 'Abbad's adoption of the
honorific titles Fajr ad-Dawla and later al-Mu'tadid bi-
-I
Allah. Seville's acceptance of al-Mu'tadid 's legitimacy
as ruler was complemented by the recognition of his leader¬
ship by other Taifa states, as attested by Ibn-Hayyan's
reference to him as 'al-Mu 'tadid fAbbad, leader of the
2
Princes of al-Andalus... Al-Mu 'tadid found it convenient
to maintain the recognition of Hisham II as the Caliph of al-
Andalus until"this fabrication no longer served any useful
purpose. Once solidly established, al-Mu'tadid ended this
recognition in 451/1059.
Although al-Mu'tadid's impact was greater through his
violent methods than any theorisations for legitimising his
rule, his image as the legitimate ruler was impressively
propagated through the attraction of his pompous costumes,
his luxurious entertainments, splendid palaces, etc.^"
Exploited to conceal his crimes, the legitimacy of his
position was consequently a factor that stimulated the en¬
forcement of his decisions and policies.
Al-Mu 'tadid remained the undisputed ruler of Seville
throughout his thirty-two-year reign. An absolute ruler of
Seville, his policy was to exterminate anyone constituting
1. Phakh. , II: Hist. Abb . , I, p. 2I4.I; Rabat, fol. .;
Bodl., fol. 5r.
2. ibid., p. 242; in a letter opening, Ibn-Hayyan describe
al-Mu 'tadid as al-Hajib, Fajr ad-Dawla and other Calipha
forms of address (Dhakh., I, vol. i, p. 341).
3. Mu'jib, p 96; Jadwa, p. 30.
Bayan, III, p. 205; A 'mal, p. 182.
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a danger to his position or even having the potential to
develop into a threat. His behaviour towards friends and
foes was usually instinctive rather than rational, religious
philosophical or emotional. Internally, and externally, al
Mu'tadid asserted himself as a tyrant who was obeyed and
respected out of fear. He was as much dreaded by his
terrorised ministers as he was by rival leaders of Taifa
states, who could never predict his spontaneous outbursts of
violence.
Unlike al-Qadi b. 'Abbad who obtained power through
competition with other contending factions, al-Mu 'tadid's
succession to his father was hereditary. Despite his young
age of twenty-six when he occupied office as ruler over
Seville, al-Mu'tadid had been fully conditioned for his new
office. He had undergone his first dramatic experience
when, at the age of seven, he was offered as hostage to
Yahya b. Hammud, following negotiations between the latter
and al-Qadl b. 'Abbad in lpLL|./1023-^ At such an early age,
his captivity may have influenced him psychologically by
hardening his later attitudes, partially explaining his
1. The incident of offering 'Abbad as hostage to Yahya
b. Hammud is described by Ibn-Bassam with the
circumstances leading to al-Qadl's establishment as
ruler over Seville in lpLl|/1023-i;. Given that 'Abbad
succeeded his father in i-i-33/1 OlpIL—2 at the age of 26,
his age in 5ll|/l023-5 must have been 7 years. This
age is further deduced from his birth date of Safar
I4.O7/July-August 1016, according to Muhammad 'Abd-
Allah 'inan (Duwal, p. 39)-
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continuous, determined and systematic extermination of
rivals. Having been raised in his father's palace, he
must have been able to enjoy close contact with the
mechanisms of government, while his participation in his
father's military campaigns furnished him with knowledge
of the essentials of securing and maintaining power. As
a ruler, he depended extensively on the army to confront
his opponents and to expand Seville's territorial bound¬
aries .
Lacking tact and subtlety, al-Mu'tadid relied on force
as his primary means for implementing policies. His in¬
stinctive tendency to apply violence is testified by his
infamous garden of skulls belonging to his victims of war
or assassination plots. This most unusual garden was
attentively maintained and its skulls unearthed and returned
to the relatives of the victims for burial at the fall of
al-Mu tamid in 585/1091* Among the numerous skulls in the
garden were those of Muhammad b. fAbd-Allah al-Barzall, al-
2
Hajjab b. Khazrun, Ibn-Nuh and Yahya b. Hammud. Al-
Mu 'tadid took much pride in this garden of skulls as a
symbol of his victories and superior strength, using it to
terrorise his subordinates and guests. The existence of
this infamous garden was common knowledge in Seville and
beyond its frontiers.
1. Bayan, III, p. 206; Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 255;
Rabat, fol. 6r.-6v.; Bodl., fol. or.
2. ibid.
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When he became ruler over Seville, it took al-Mu'tadid
t
little time to apply force in asserting his leadership. His
first move was to exterminate all the powerful officials
whom he inherited from his father's reign, by banishment,
expropriation and deprivation of their means of livelihood
and by killing them.^" This initial policy, which cleared
away all opposition at an embryonic stage, was continued
throughout al-Mu'tadid's reign.
Being in a position of strength in relation to other
leaders of Taifa states, al-Mu'tadid fully used his
superiority to exploit and manoeuvre them. His motives for
supporting particular leaders in accordance with changing
circumstances were purely political, coinciding with his
tactics for implementing a strategy designed to fortify his
predominance. An illustrative example is how Banu 'Abbad's
traditional co-operation with and defence of Carmona
(Qarmuna) was inexplicably transmuted to mutual hatred and
designs to annihilate one another. In lj.27/1035 al-Qadl
b. 'Abbad had contributed to Muhammad al-Barzall's re-
installation in Carmona when it was occupied by Yahya b.
Hammud. Conversely, al-Muftadid abruptly decided to occupy
2
it for himself in 9/1066. Having indirectly benefited
from al-Barzall's past services to his father in confronting
such potential enemies as al-Muzaffar b. al-Aftas of Badajoz
(Batalyaws) and Yahya b. Hammud of Malaga, al-Mu'tadid no
1.
2.
Mu 'jib, p. 95-
Bayan, III, p. 312.
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longer found it profitable to continue his alliance with
Carmona, a weaker Taifa state.
(2) Al-Mu 'tadid's Use of Terror as a Political Weapon:
A Classification of his Assassinations
Assassination as a means of eliminating contenders is
an infamous feature of al-Mu'tadid's reign that has been
thoroughly recorded by his early biographers. This prevented
all opponents from developing any degree of threatening
potentiality. Al-Mu 'tadid's assassinations were minutely
planned and executed for various reasons and in a variety of
crude, if effective ways. Although most of his assassina¬
tions are to some extent related to his struggle to safeguard
power, others can only be attributed to his traits of
character and transformation of a means of protecting him¬
self from political rivals into an objective per se.
The details of the circumstances of the assassination
of several of al-Mu'tadid's ministers are described by their
biographers such as Ibn-Bassam. A close friend of al-
Mu 'tadid prior to the latter's rule, 'Umar b. al-Hasan
al-HawzI, left Seville out of fear in 440/1048 and returned
in 458/1065 after much travel in Syria, Iraq, Egypt and the
Maghrib, to be assassinated by al-Mu'tadid personally in
RabI ' 1, 400/January-February 1068."^" Other examples were
Abu-l-Walld Isma/ll b. Muhammad b. al-Hablb, whom al-Mu'tadid1 » y •
1. Hulla, II, pp. 239-40.
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killed at the age of twenty-nine, and Abu-1-Hasan Ghalib
b. Hafs, whom Ibn-Zaydun despised and intrigued against and
who was assassinated by al-Mu'tadid.
While contributing to the maintenance of his rule, al-
Mu'tadidTs violent reactions are an expression of his
egocentric and paranoiac states of mind. This conclusion
is supported by examples in which his extreme state of
violence served no apparent end, political or otherwise.
The spontaneity of his decisions to suddenly resort to
violence is indicative of mental imbalance. The most in¬
credible example was his audacity in personally carrying
out the act of murdering his own son, Isma'll. In Ibn-
O
Hayyan's version, a controversy arose between al-Mu 'tadid
and his son, Isma'll, when the latter refused to command an
attack against Cordoba in i|50/1058 because of the small size
of the army. Leading a caravan carrying his riches and
possessions, Isma*11 left Seville for Algeciras, and was
refused entrance into several of his father's fortresses on
the way, to be finally accepted by 'All Hisad in the
fortress of Sedona (Shadhuna). Hisad then negotiated
Isma'll's return and al-Mu'tadid promised to forgive his son
out of fear that the latter might join his enemies such as
al-Muzaffar b. al-Aftas of Badajoz. Nonetheless, on his
1. ibid., p. 550-1.
2. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, pp. 253> 259; passage
missing from Rabat and Bodl. mss.; Ma'jib, p. 97;
A fmal, p. l8l; "^Tbar, p. 157.
3. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, pp. 256-59; passage
missing from Rabat and Bodl. mss.
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arrival in Seville, Isma'll was confined to a cell while
his supporters, including the minister Abu-'Abd-Allah
Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Bizilyanl, who had organised his
escape, were beheaded. This led Isma *11 to organise an
attempt on his father's life, which, failed and led to
the execution of his supporters and his own end.
This crime is documented in an unusual manner in an
eloquent letter by al-Mu'tadid explaining the circumstances
and justifying his murder of Isma/ll to other leaders of
Taifa states."'" His two basic premises for arriving at his
decision are: (i) Isma/ll had attempted to have him killed,
(ii) It was therefore his duty and fate to repay his son
with the maximum punishment, having been forced into the
difficult position by the latter. The letter expresses al-
Mu'tadid's dilemma in having to kill his own son, whom he
had loved dearly and designated as his heir. He explains
that IsmS*11 had expressed such disobedience, disrespect and
arrogance that it had become his duty to punish his son as
he did. Resentment at being compelled to make this
decision is powerfully expressed in overflowing emotions,
but his conclusion was to confront the inevitable. The
letter clearly demonstrates that the act was not an inten¬
tional, cold-blooded murder, but an over-emotional reaction
to a serious provocation. Al-Mu 'tadid's psychological
suffering as a result of this experience is reflected in his
shock and isolation for a period of three days following
the dramatic affair.
1. ibid., pp. 25^-56.
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Complementary examples of this abnormal behaviour
include al-Mu'tadid' s assassination of his brother,
1
uncle and the latter's son, reported by Ibn-Hazm.
His lust for revenge was sometimes the sole motive for al-
Mu'tadid's assassinations. An exemplary illustration is
that of a blind man from the rural areas of Seville who,
having escaped from Seville to settle in Mecca, was pursued
2
on the orders of al-Mu'tadid and poisoned. The fact
that this man had sought al-Mu 'tadid's enmity was of more
concern to the latter than the former's physical absence
from Seville or his dissociation from politics through his
retirement to a life of meditation and worship. A similar
example was that of a Sevillan mu'*adhdhin who was tracked
3
down in Toledo and whose head was brought to al-Mu tadid.
If motivations for some of al-Mu 'tadid's assassinations
*
were psychological or personal, almost all had political
implications that explicitly or implicitly contributed to
the immediate stabilisation of his mile. Pragmatism and
opportunism constituted an effective weapon for stippressing
minimal political threats through assassinations. Although
all of al-Mu 'tadid's assassinations were partly politically
motivated, some were totally political. One such example





Mu 'jib, pp. 97-98.
Mu '.jib , p . 98 .
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'Abdun b. Khazrun of Arcos (Arkush) and Abu-Nur b. Abi-
Qurra of Ronda who, following their refusal to join al-
Mu'tadid's forces against his enemies, were suffocated in
his palace bath."*" Only Abu-Nur b. Abl-Qurra was success¬
ful in escaping alive, while the first two died in the
bath. Despite their being guests and trusted allies, al-
Mu'tadid did not hesitate to murder them with the objective
of inheriting their Taifa states. On the other hand, for
these leaders to have suffered such an unhappy fate through
their incautious trust in al-Mu'tadid, the latter's deceit-
* J
fulness must have been convincing.
III. Al-Mu'tamid Muhammad b. 'Abbad b. 'Abbad
0
(1|61/1068 -58k/l 091)
(1) Al-Mu 'tamid 's Succession
The outwardly flourishing reign of al-Mu'tamid Muhammad
b. 'Abbad b. 'Abbad terminated with the disappearance of the
Banu 'Abbad dynasty, and Seville's incorporation into the
Maghrib by the al-Murabitun. Alongside the external causes
(which will receive wider treatment in Chapter Pour) and
internal conditions and causes, al-Mu 'tamid's personality
and temperament failed him as a quasi-absolute ruler on
whose shoulders lay the entire political system, and he was
unable to impose his leadership within an inflexible
political system. Al-Mu'tamid was further exposed to the
increasingly heavy pressures of insurmountable external
threats.
Bayan, III, pp. 295-96; A'mal, p. l8l; 'Ibar, p. 157.
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Al-Mu'tamid1s accession to power following al-Mu'tadid 's
death in lj.61/1068 had been made technically possible by the
death of the former's eldest brother Isma'll in 1}.50/1058
Muhammad b. 'Abbad's adoption of the pompous title al-
Mu etamid 'ala-Allah is symbolic of his reign, which appeared
to be more glorious than it was in actual fact. His estab¬
lishment as ruler over Seville was solid enough to last for
a period of twenty-two years, but his definitive defeat in
Rajab 1^81|/1091 meant the annexation of Seville to the
2
Maghrib. Hie same internal and external forces which
worked together to produce the fall of Seville determined
the fate of other Taifa states which succumbed to the armies
of the al-Murabitun. However, the termination of al-• *
Mu'tamid's reign was also the result of other specifically
internal conflicting forces that clashed throughout the
eleventh century and which al-Mu'tamid was incapable of
directing or even containing.
At the time of al-Mu 'tamid's accession to power, he
enjoyed a general recognition and acceptance which were the
fruit of his father's and grandfather's efforts to establish
the permanent sovereignty of the Banu 'Abbad dynasty over
Seville.
1. Al-Mu'tamid ruled from Rajab I4.6I/April-May IO69 to
Rajab lj.81|./March-April 1092. Mu f ,1 ib , p. 102;
Qaridat: Hist.Abb., I, p. 383.
2. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, pp. 303? 306; Rabat,
fols. lij-r., I5r.; Bodl. , fols. llpr., l6r.
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Al--Mu 'tarnid was therefore never faced with the
organised group opposition that threatened al-Qadl or the
numerous individual intrigues against al-Mu'tadid which
led to his recourse to violence and assassination. However,
al-Mu'tamid ruled against essentially the same background
as his two predecessors, which indicates that, since there
existed opposition to al-Qadl and al-Mu'tadid, al-Mu'tamid
would have been equally exposed to similar dangers as no
fundamental alterations had been introduced to the system.
However, opposition to al-Mu ftamid took a new form,
characterised by more discretion and subtlety. Unlike
his father, al-Mu'tamid did not adopt preventive policies
as a means of maintaining his rule. This may partially
explain why his minister Ibn-rAmmar influenced Seville's
policies to the point of being criticised by an outsider,
Prince 'Abd-Allah of Granada."'"
(2 ) External and Internal Causes for al-Mu 'tamid's
Loss of Power
The effects of the constant instability that dis¬
rupted Sevillan life during the reign of Banu 'Abbad
constituted a fundamental contribution to its final break¬
down. Constant warfare affected the development of the
Sevillan socio-economic system in that the latter had to
support costly military campaigns, which became unbearable
by their continuity and increasingly large scale. Other
1. Tib., pp. 78, 86.
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causes which contributed to this instability included such
long-term causes as paying tribute. Initially the result
of the struggles over the Cordoban Caliphate, Seville's
persistent instability became a cause of its decline when
it prevented the latter from adopting an independent course
to suit its needs. This instability is reflected in
almost every aspect of Sevillan life. Some examples are
the number of deaths in battle, including al-Mu 'tamid's
own sons Path and Yazld, for whom he weeps in several
verses."'" The sudden collapse of Seville is perhaps the
best indication of its weak foundations. The indirect
causes must, however, have been at work throughout the
century and the final collapse was only the natural culmina¬
tion of the existing state of affairs.
Al-Mu 'tamid's qualities of leadership were limited and
below the required standards for meeting the internal and
external dangers facing Seville, because he was not com¬
pelled to impress them upon his followers who unquestioningly
consented to his authority. Acknowledged as a leader by
birth, al-Mu'tamid found himself privileged as the highest
authority in Seville by uncontestable general recognition.
This indicates why he was rarely openly challenged and how
he was inadequately prepared to face the threat of Yusuf,
thus ending his reign.
1. Dhakh. , II: Hist. Abb . , I, p. yib; Qala 'id : Hist. Abb . ,
I, p. 1|8.
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His leadership lacked stimulus and vitality as it was
not deployed to increase the scale and intensity of his
support. Consequently he often found himself reacting to
internal developments, rather than stimulating policies,
not to mention inspiring them, as the charismatic element
that dominates fervent believers, and mobilises followers
on a mass scale, was lacking in him. The popular follow¬
ing for Banu Umayya was never fully exploited and diverted
to any particular Taifa leader and al-Mu 'tamid's popularity
remained incapable of promoting the degree of enthusiasm
that the legend of Hisham II had stimulated. Internally,
although al-Mu 'tamid was highly esteemed for aesthetic
and temperamental reasons, such as his poetic talent or
benevolent rewards, he was rarely feared politically.
Furthermore, the personal interest of al-Mu 'tamid was not
associated with that of his Sevillan subjects in that he
was their master and their champion, xvhile the notion of
territory was not exploited to promote a common conscious¬
ness and the Taifa state never developed into anything
resembling a nation.
Indicative of his weakness as a dynamic leader is al-
Mu 'tamid's unawareness of the plots, intrigues and
injurious machinations of his subordinate officials and
commanders, which were encouraged by his lack of initiative.
An illustrative example is that of Ibn-Rashlq's forceful
seizure of the fortress of Murcia (Mursiya), which he had
been appointed to govern for al-Mu 'tamid, a development
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that could have been diverted if the latter had maintained
stricter control over his commander. Instead, Ibn-Rashlq
cultivated strong local support which resulted in the
rejection of al-Mu 'tamid 's desire to designate his son, ar-
2
RadI, as governor over Murcia. The gravity of Ibn-Rashlq's
revolt is reflected in his recourse to the arbitration of
Yusuf, which clearly illustrates that the failure of the
plot was not so much due to al-Mu 'tamid's initiative as to
Yusuf 's refusal to offer him support.-^ Further, al-Mu 'tamid
had never had recourse to punishment as an exemplary warning
to potential rebels, assuming that his rule was "unanimously
accepted and unopposed.
Al-Mu'tamid 's credulous dependence on his commanders
during battles is a further indication of his weakness as a
leader. Unlike his more successful contemporaries, Alfonso
VI and Yusuf, who usually led their armies personally, al-
Mu 'tamid preferred to rely on subordinate commanders and
only participated when forced to, as was the case during the
Battle of az-Zallaqa, when al-Andalus fought for its survival
against Alfonso, or during al-Mu'tamid's defence of Seville
in I4.8I4./IO9I when Yusuf's armies had reached his doorstep.^
Al-Mu'tamid's lack of political perception and ability
to determine Seville's future was an essential element that
greatly contributed to its final fall. Al-Mu'tamid lacked
1. Tib., pp. 111-12.
2. ibid., p. 112.
3. ibid., p. Ill.
jq. ibid., p. 170; Dhakh. , II: Hist .Abb. , I, p. 3O3;
Rabat, fol. lip?.; Bodl. , foi . 12r.; Mu 'jib , pp.
llqO—1_|_2; A 'mal, pp. 179-80; Ihata, II, p. 119;
Wafayat, V, pT 3O.
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the degree of political insight that seems to have
characterised Prince 'Abd-Allah of Granada, despite their
common final failure to survive against the sweeping wave
of Yusuf's armies."'" Prince 'Abd-Allah's actions were
always approached from a theoretical angle and therefore
rationalised, despite his repeated failures such as his
refusal to offer Alfonso tribute money amounting to
20,000 mithqals (dinars), only to be compelled to increase
the sum by 10,000 dinars. In this example, 'Abd-Allah
was being rational when he excluded the possibility of al-
Mu/tamid's alliance against him, on the basis of their
O
common Islamic faith. It was consequently al-Mu'tamid
who failed to appreciate the long-term danger of support¬
ing Alfonso, because his action lacked a rational basis
and was instead influenced by his minister, Ibn-'Ammar.^
1. Tib., pp. 151+-59, 169-71.
2. Comparing al-Mu 'tamid' s and Prince fAbd-Allah's
qualities of political perception, one is
presented with the disadvantage of generally-
having to rely upon indirect knowledge of al-
Mu ftamid's political thinking, derived from
other sources excluding his poetry, which is
basically apolitical. On the other hand, Kitab
at-Tibyan furnishes us with Prince 'Abd-Allah's
most intimate political motives in detail.
However, both figures were contemporary Taifa
leaders who faced similar problems and situations
within a similar inter-related geo-political
context.
3- Tib., pp. 69, 75*
k' This motive is explicitly expressed (Tib.,
pp. 69, 82).
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While al-Mu 'tamid 's political decisions were often
based on the flattering counsel of intriguing ministers
and courtiers, including his beloved wife, I'timad, Prince
'Abd-Allah weighed every individual situation, calculating
possible results or developments and arriving at con¬
clusions that usually left room for manoeuvre."'" In
contradistinction to al-Mu 'tamid's relative passivity to
his subordinates, Prince 'Abd-Allah's possessive suspicion
of all his immediate officials deprived him of more
flexibility.^
His response to Musuf's open hostility to the Taifa
states following the siege of Aledo (Liyyit) in l|8l/1088
is perhaps the best illustration of the political
abilities and flexibility of 'Abd-Allah, as contrasted to
al-Mu 'tamid. The latter's strong resistance led to his
imprisonment at Aghmat, following his defeat, while Prince
'Abd-Allah foresaw the final outcome of any resistance to
Yusuf and preferred to negotiate his submission while
still in a negotiable position. AL-Mu'tamid' s pride
1. Although basically true, al-Mu'tamid's passion for
I'timad was romanticised and inflated by the minds
of later historians. On the other hand, Prince
'Abd-Allah's approach to political situations was
empirical, a fact that is explicitly stated in
his elaboration of his political philosophy. His
rationalisation of the decision to pay Alfonso
tribute money is typical of the way his mind
worked (Tib., pp. 122-27).
2. ibid., pp. 76-77-
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overshadowed his reason; Prince 'Abd-Allah analysed every
disadvantage, rationally concluding that he had little
chance of resisting the internal and external forces work¬
ing against him."*" In contrast to 'Abd-Allah's realism,
al-Mu'tamid was fully aware of the potential danger posed
by Yusuf, but decided to confront the worst, as he con¬
sidered himself to be legally and morally a justifiable
ruler.^
Prince 'Abd-Allah's realisation of the limitations
imposed upon him by the general political context in which
he operated contrasts with al-Mu 'tamid' s over-confidence
and exaggerated conception of his actual potential. Hence
Prince 'Abd-Allah's extreme caution in his political
engagements, regardless of their magnitude, as dis¬
tinguished from al-Mu'tamid' s inflated confidence, clearly
expressed on various occasions. The case of Prince
'Abd-Allah's approach to the rebelling fortress of Lucena
clearly illustrates his prudence. Openly challenged by the
1. Prince 'Abd-Allah defends himself against this
charge (Tib., pp. 127-29), although he cannot
be expected to have done otherwise considering
that he wrote his memoirs as a political
prisoner of Tusuf.
2. Al-Mu'tamid 's uncompromising attitude towards
Musuf's pressures, prior to the latter's military
campaign against Seville, clearly reflects a
strong urge on the part of al-Mu'tamid to defend
his survival, despite the extraordinary odds
against him. Even the involvement of Alfonso's
troops, who came to al-Mu 'tamid's assistance,
was incapable of preventing the al-Murabitun army
from forcing Seville to surrender.
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overtaxed inhabitants of Lucena, 'Abd-Allah's initial
reaction was instinctive as he thought of forcefully
1
crushing and punishing the leader, Ibn-Maymun. How¬
ever, when his commander, Mu'ammal, warned him of the
probable reactions to any violent repression, he agreed
to defuse the tension peacefully, despite his burning
2
desire to do otherwise. A comparable example was his
decision not to execute Ibn-al-Qulay ex because of the
"3
latter 's favoured position with lusuf. In both in¬
stances, Prince *Abd-Allah refrained from using power
as a preventive measure of repression, fearing possible
undesirable repercussions.
Unlike Prince 'Abd-Allah, who calculated his personal
relations with rebelling subordinates, or potential rebels,
al-Mu'tamid directed his subordinate officials mechanically
within the existing administrative framework or spon¬
taneously as a reaction to personal offences. For example
he reacted to rebels emotionally and at a level of personal
feeling, without seriously considering the effects of his
actions on potential rebels. The highly emotional
character of his reaction to the Murcia affair, when Ibn-









Al-Mu'tamid's response to the challenge of the two
revolts reveals his total lack of calculative thinking,
because both Ibn~-'Aimiar and Mu'ammal were permitted to
successfully mature as rebels and were not confronted
until they had actually posed a serious challenge to al-
Mu.'tamid's sovereignty over his territories, a challenge
which threatened to spread and this at a time when al-
Mu ftamid was exposed to unprecedented external pressures.
Politically naive, al-Mu 'tamid underestimated the
ambitions of his ministers and military commanders, pre¬
supposing their dedication and fidelity to his person to
be more solid than in fact they were. By contrast,
Prince 'Abd-Allah studied the probabilities of particular
situations and tried to predict the outcome of every
decision he made regarding rebels. For example, whereas
he executed the rebel Ibn-Taqnawt in order to give other
commanders a lesson, he sent his minister Simaja into
exile, permitting him to carry his treasure with him, so
as to foster his own image as a benevolent and forgiving
ruler."'" Another example was his calculating manner of
defusing the threat of his rebellious brother. Prince
'Abd-Allah raided the territories of Malaga as a punitive
measure against his brother, TamTm of Malaga, but suddenly
decided to halt his military expedition and to retire
to Granada, thus exploiting his limited military success
2
politically, without risking military defeat.
1. ibid., pp. 88, 98.
2. This intention is explicitly stated (ibid., p. 9^) *
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Negotiations are another criterion for contrasting
al-Mu rtamid and Prince fAbd-Allah, who stressed how al-
Mu 'tamid •unconsciously contributed to his own final
collapse. Their mutual negotiations concerning the
dominance over different fortresses, the common threat
posed to them by rebels, and their peace treaties, reflect
two contrasting temperaments and politicians. As a ruler,
Prince 'Abd-Allah always led his delegation personally,
unless he had a political motive for doing otherwise.
Hence his personal encounters witb Sisnando Davidez
(Shishnandu), Alfonso's Mozarab envoy, Alfonso VI himself
or the latter's military commander and representative,
Alvar Fanez (al-Barhanish), over tribute money.Although
on the one hand Prince 'Abd-Allah occasionally employed
envoys during negotiations with Alfonso VI, al-Mu 'tamid or
Yusuf, his instructions to them were usually followed, while
al-Mu 'tamid's envoy, Ibn-'Ammar, retained a semi-independence
when negotiating with Alfonso. For example Prince 'Abd-Allah
blames Ibn-'Ammar for his own friction with al-Mu'tamid, and
considers Ibn- 'Ammar's negotiations with Alfonso as dis¬
regarding Seville's interests and motivated by his personal
ambition. Further, al-Mu'tamid' s impatience as a
negotiator is clearly illustrated by his hasty response to
Alfonso's pressures on him following the latter's reduction
of Toledo in 1|78/1085. His anger at the rudeness of
1. These negotiations are respectively mentioned in
ibid., pp. 73-75, 133-3^-
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Alfonso's Jewish tribute collector led al-Mu'tamid to
execute him, an offence that would inevitably lead to
repercussions which he was in no position to afford."'"
Finally, al-Mu'tamid's reply to Alfonso's ultimatum that
Seville be unconditionally surrendered to him not only
illustrates al-Mu 'tamid's inability to accept his weaker
position vis-a-vis Alfonso and the absence of any attempt
to persuade Alfonso to adopt a more lenient position, but
2
reflects an abusive tone. On the other hand, it is
only fair to mention that, at this stage, Alfonso had
been determined to conquer al-Andalus entirely, regard¬
less of the price.
The apolitical surroundings of al-Mu 'tamid constitu¬
ted an institutionalised element of his life-style that
he inherited from his predecessor. For example, although
al-Mu 'tamid's artistic qualities were of primary importance
in determining the pattern of his palace leisure activi¬
ties, the latter were conditioned by many of his poet-
ministers who had served under al-Mu 'tadid (e.g. Ibn-
Zaydun) or experienced the influence of his ministers such
as al-Bizilyanl. The influence of poetry on politics is
clear from the role of Abil-Bakr Ibn- 'Ammar 's poetry as an
immediate cause of al-Mu 'tamid's final decision to kill his
old friend and minister. As a ruler, al-Mu'tamid was
1. Mawsh., p. 29•
2. The full text of Alfonso's letter and al-Mu 'tamid's
reply is reproduced in Mawsh., pp. 25-28; Duwal,
pp. 75-76.
3» Mu 'jib, pp. 125-29; A*mal, p. 187-
therefore essentially a conformist, working within the
existing conditions and system and performing his role as
a ruler. For example he conducted military expeditions,
because this was expected of a ruler as a sign of his
authority.
This factor is illustrated by considering some funda¬
mental aspects of al-Mu 'tamid's personality and character.
He was foremost a poet, then a ruler. His immediate
milieu was of the highest artistic standard and included
such prominent names in Andalusian literature as Abu-Bakr
b. 'Ammar, Abu-Bakr Muhammad b. al-Labbana and Abu-l-Walld
b. Zaydun. His intimate life also carried a romantic
dimension, as illustrated by the refined verses he ex¬
changed with his beloved wife, I'timad ar-Rumayqiyya,
from whose name he derived his own title, al-Mu 'tumid."*"
The wide circulation of al-Mu 'tamid 's exquisite poetry,
which extended beyond Seville's frontiers, contributed to
his popularity while, to a limited extent, serving as an
instrument for expressing his political position. Al-
Mu 'tamid used this medium to express his political views
and to describe political events and situations he had
witnessed. Hence his demand for clemency from his
father, following his defeat in Malaga, in the verses
— ctn' Sukhtuka qad zadanl saqarn
.
_ a 2
fa-b ath ilayya r-rida masih ',
1. Ihata: Hist. Abb . , I, p. 17i+.
2. Qala'id: Hist.Abb., I, p. 53-(TMour wrath has in¬
creased my suffering, so send me your approval to
act as my cure.1)
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his lamentations following the death of his sons, al-Fath
and Yazid, in the verses
'Hawa 1-kawkaban1 1-Fathu thumma shaqlquhu Yazid11
fa-hal ba 'da al-kawkaban"1 (sic) mina s-sabrl' /
his celebration of his triumph over Cordoba in the verses
"fc ct 9 (
'Khatabtu Qurtuba 1-hasna a idh mana at
a 2
man ja yakhtubuha bi-l-bldi wa-l-asall',
or the response to the attempt by Abu—Yahya Muhammad b.
Samadih of Almeria to mar his relations with Yusuf b.
• *
Tashufln, in the verse
'Ya man ta'arrada 11 yur!du masa'ati'.^
Although, judged by its end, al-Mu'tamid's reign was
a failure, he was perhaps the most successful Taifa king.
He was widely respected and gained widespread repute
throughout al-Andalus, but his long-term survival as ruler
over Seville would have required more than he possessed in
the circumstances. The internal factors that led to
political instability, and his own political temperament,
might not in themselves have produced Seville 's downfall
had the greater external threats, posed first by Alfonso
and then by Yusuf, not presented themselves.
1. ibid., p. 1|8. ('The two stars, al-Fath and his
brother Yazid, have set; can there be any
endurance after?')
2. ibid., p. Ip6. ('I sought the hand of beautiful
Cordoba as she refused those who demanded her
with swords and spears.')
3. ibid., p. 51- ('Oh he who has come my way
seeking to do me harm.')
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CHAPTER TWO
GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN SEVILLE
I. The Sevillan Political System
(1) The Taifa State as a Political System
(a) A Definition
The difficulties which result from attempting to define
the political system of the Taifa state of Seville arise
from its unique characteristics and a rare combination of
incompatible particularities. While resembling other
political systems, that of the Sevillan Taifa state varies
in many aspects and differs in its totality.
The fact that the Banu 'Abbad dynasty were the supreme
law-enforcing authority illustrates their sovereignty within
Seville's frontiers, which continued to expand until the
final confrontation with Alfonso VI. Seville was therefore
a state because its territories were legally defined and
effectively controlled generally and its inhabitants integra¬
ted culturally. Led by the Banu 'Abbad rulers, the
Sevillans conceived themselves as a political group out of a
necessity for self-defence and had a political system of
their own, the study of which is the object of this chapter.
On the other hand, this political identification was not
limited to natives by birth, as forced or peaceful immigra¬
tion from one Taifa state to another was a by-product of the
general instability characterising al-Andalus. Examples of
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immigrants to Seville include one of the greatest ministers
to serve under al-Mu 'tadid, the Cordoban Ibn-Zaydun, -while
al-Mu'tamid's court included the minister Ibn-^Ammar,
originally from Silves, and Ibn-al-Labbana from Denia.
The Taifa character of the Sevillan state indicates
the human power base of the political system, as al-Qadi b.
fAbbad was originally supported by and implemented his rule
through a Taifa or party. The creation of the Sevillan
Taifa state was itself the political expression of a group
integration and assimilation that sought to defend and
organise itself following the final collapse of the
Cordoban central authority. This group character of the
Taifa state persisted when the Taifa kings either ruled
through the support of groups or successively supported
variously conflicting political factions. Finally, the
royal dimension of the Taifa kings is superficial and
reflects the self-deception implicit in their outlook.
The Taifa state existed in several varieties. One of
the most powerful, Seville contrasted with many of the
weaker Taifa states such as Carmona and Algeciras, both of
which were subsequently integrated into Seville. While
Seville's machinery of government constituted a system
which at least to a minimum degree met the judicial,
administrative and political needs of the inhabitants of
Seville, who led a socially organised life in villages,
1. Dhakh., II: Hist .Abb . , I, p. 221; Rabat, fol. 2v.;
Bodl., fol. 2v.
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towns or cities, other Taifa states amounted to mere local
military rulers imposing their authority over small fort¬
resses and their surrounding areas.
Within the Andalusian context, the Sevillan system
was inward-looking, constantly striving towards self-
sufficiency. Its relations with other Taifa states were
generally hostile and its relatively large size, vigour and
power attracted talents from remote parts of al-Andalus.
This explains its apparent cohesion and success. However,
the Taifa was in essence a phenomenon that could not last,
because of its isolationism and self-enclosure. When a
Taifa state was not threatened, it was attacking another
neighbouring Taifa state as was the case of Seville through¬
out the Banu 'Abbad period. As the Taifa states were
usually not powerful enough to impose themselves on the
others definitively, their struggle to survive persisted
until Yusuf ended their moribund existence. Hence the
total lack of co-operation between most of the Taifa states
at the political level. However, communication between
Taifa states was never interrupted completely and rebels in
one Taifa state were often harboured by another, which they
used as a base for launching attacks against the former.
One such example was Ibn-Kabbab, who was given command by
Prince 'Abd-Allah of Arjona and Antequera, from which he
carried on hostile activities against al-Mu 'tamidThe
effects of this state of affairs on the political and
1. Tib., pp. 95-96.
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administrative apparatus were enormous, as the system
became progressively less able to fulfil the needs which
it had come into being to meet. The constant pressures
on the ruler meant that his primary, and sometimes his
only, objective was survival. Neither the ruler .nor the
system itself could endure indefinitely under such con¬
ditions, and this explains why the Taifa state was a
passing phenomenon.
Hie basis of the Taifa state was therefore constantly
on the verge of vanishing, and the history of the Taifa
states is one of continuing limited rehabilitation and
struggle for survival. It is within this context that
the political system of Seville must be conceived if it
is to be fully appreciated. Its sudden birth in i+lip/
1023, its development over a relatively brief period of
seventy years, its striking local character, despite its
many features of a state, its fragility in growth, its
constant subjection to internal instability and its in¬
ability to endure or respond to the external pressures of
Alfonso VI or Yusuf b. Tashufln, combined to determine
the fate and development of the political system of the
Taifa state of Seville.
(b) The Place of the Taifa State in Andalusian History
A new political system developed in Seville under
Banu 'Abbad which generally met the demands of the newly
established dynasty and reflected the political orientation
of Seville's role as a major Taifa state. Despite Seville's
- 77 -
considerable influence among the Taifa states, the
relatively small size of its political administration
could not compare with that of Banu Umayya, its prototype.
The latter nevertheless remained an essential ideal having
much influence on the structural mutations of Banu 'Abbad's
expanding political system at various levels of its com¬
ponent and subordinate subsections. Although originally
designed to perform functions for which Cordoba had
previously been responsible, the Sevillan bureaucratic
mechanism evolved in parallel with the material needs and
political ends of the Banu 'Abbad dynasty.
Hie creation of Seville 's political and administrative
structure may be explained by particular historical circum¬
stances : the disintegration of al-Andalus into a multi¬
plicity of Taifa states. The fact that it was based on
the model of that of Banu Umayya seems to imply the
forcible imposition of a fully developed Caliphal system on
a miniature state. Because of the incoherence of the
Sevillan system, several contradictions resulted from the
systematic application of the Banu Umayya model to the
Sevillan Taifa state.
The first contrast was in their size. While the
political system under Banu Umayya was developed for a
state that exercised sovereignty over all of al-Andalus,
Seville's territorial frontiers and limited population
required a simpler political system. Indeed, Seville
under the Banu Umayya Caliphate was only one province
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among the many other regions that were included within the
former's boundaries.
The second contrast was that of their needs. The
complex problems arising from the larger territorial
extent and population of the Banu Umayya Caliphate contrast
with the lesser needs of the Sevillan population. Despite
this, the list of officials given in Part II of Adh-DhakhTra
fx Mahasin Ahl al-Jazlra indicates that the number of
ministers who served in Seville under the Banu 'Abbad
dynasty seems to have amounted to at least twenty-seven."'"
The number of ministers was in fact certainly larger, as
this list was formulated with the intention of studying
these figures from the literary angle. Ibn-Zaydun is an
example of a minister who was excluded from the list,
because he is studied in a special, rather lengthy, section
2
by Ibn-Bassam. The large number of ministers seems to
indicate that the number of civil servants was enormous,
and such a huge bureaucratic mechanism could only have
constituted a heavy burden on the shoulders of the
Sevillans. The provincial needs of Seville as a province
of the Banu Umayya Caliphate had become the responsibility
of an internal autonomous bureaucratic administration whose
administrative ideas were derived from external criteria.
1. See Dhakh., II, where these are variously described as
al-katib, al-wazlr or dhu-l-wizaratayn.
2- Dhakh., I, vol. i, pp. 289-379; the greatest stress
is naturally on Ibn-Zaydun's poetry, but some useful
biographical information is included.
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The dependence of the Sevillan political system on
the existence of the Banu 'Abbad dynasty was of great
significance. A creation of the latter, the Sevillan
political system could not outlive its creators. The
relatively short period during which this political system
lasted was insufficient to enable further mutations of the
system and its final adaptation to Sevillan needs. Still
weaker was its ability to resist the impact of external
pressures. Hence the short-lived existence of the
Sevillan system.
The governmental system alone can hardly be said to
have determined Seville's role as a major Taifa state. At
most, it may be admitted to have permitted the latter's
development. It would be difficult to contend that the
Banu 'Abbad rulers were the slaves of their system, the
opposite being more likely to have been true. Rather than
a determinant factor, the political system must therefore
have furnished the setting and background, with the events
being freely determined by other factors. The importance
of the political system must therefore not be over-
stressed because of its fragility, its inflexibility as a
result of its huge bureaucracy, its alien character to the
Sevillan society and its inconsistency with Seville's
political capacity and needs.
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(2) Power within the Political System: the Ruler and
the Sevillans in the Context of the System
The political system's primary purpose was to protect,
preserve and, to the extent possible, fortify the ruler.
The status of the Sevillan leader was, like that of most
recognised leaders in Islamic history, legalised through
the bay 'a."*" Although the acceptance of the ruler's
establishment was in theory mutual as the consent of his
subjects was voluntary and implied the ruler's recognition
of his duties towards his subjects, the bay(a as applied
to the Banu 'Abbad rulers was in fact the legalisation of
al-Qadl's leadership through power and later the hereditary
succession of al-Muftadid followed by al-Mu'tamid. The
ruler's place in the government combined the roles of
supreme military command, foreign policy-making and
appointment and replacement of all state employees, in¬
cluding ministers. In practice, the ruler's authority
was such that he was not subject to Islamic law, as the
latter prescribes. His extreme absolutism enabled him
1. For a definition and elaboration of the concept of
bay 'a, see Muqad., II, pp. 5^8-50*
2. At-TurtushI presents the problem of the ruler-subject
relationship when he considers several different
aspects of the ruler (Siraj, pp. 81-85, 88-101, 19lj.-96,
207-9)* As the problem is approached on an abstract
plane, at-Turtushi conceives the ruler-subject
relationship ideally, concluding that it was based
on their mutual need for each other. The possibility
of conflict between the two is left in the background.
However, at one point, he does conceive the possibility
of an unjust ruler, without advocating the right of
the subjects to revolt (ibid., pp. 19(|-95)j see also
Tadhkira, p. 39*
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to actually execute any undesirable political or personal
foe without previous judicial proceedings, another position
not under the ruler's powers judicially.
Although theoretically in Islamic states a unity of
all powers exists so that religion and politics are in¬
divisible, it can be maintained that the degree of
manifestation or usurpation of political power varied under
different rulers. Practically, the Sevillan system
maintained no form of checks for supervising and balancing
the ruler's decisions and actions. His role as the
supreme authority is partly explained by the system's total
indivisibility and integration of pollers. More signifi¬
cantly, the ruler's decisions were often legitimised by a
legal body after the establishing of a fait accompli. This
legalisation was sometimes sought prior to the actual
implementation of a decision. For example, al-Mu 'tamid
sought the consent of the 'ularna' before his attempt to
crush Ibn-Rashlq's revolt in Mu.rcia."'" "Ultimately, the
ruler's degree of power determined his use or abuse of the
system, depending on whether he manoeuvred it ably or over¬
extended its capacity.
The physical inability and failure of the Sevillans to
challenge the powers enjoyed by the Band. 'Abbad rulers
lasted throughout the Taifa period. Backed by the army,
al-Qadl annihilated all the Sevillan leaders with the
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1
potential to threaten his position as ruler. .Al-Mu 'tadid's
tactics of eliminating his opponents through assassination
left the Sevillans with no leadership to oppose him. When
al-Mu'tamid succeeded al-Mu 'tadid as ruler over Seville, the4 '
Sevillans were no longer in a position to challenge one of
the most powerful Tahfa leaders in al-Andalus, who was
further supported by an organised administrative bureau¬
cracy. On the other hand, the Sevillans were not provoked
by al-Mu'tamid, although his political insight was limited,
while Seville's continued territorial expansion must have
increased popular support for al-Mu'tamid.
In the chaotic conditions of continuous inter-Taifa
strife, the Sevillans were restrained from revolting out of
fear of being annihilated. For example, the external
dangers to Seville during al-Qadl's rule included attacks
2
by Yahya b. Hammud. To revolt against al-Qadl during
Ibn-Hammud's attack would have been to invite the latter's
4
domination over Seville. Under such circumstances, the
attention of the Sevillan inhabitants was partially
diverted from internal issues in order to concentrate on
external perils. Once al-Qadl's army began its organised
campaigns against neighbouring Taifa states, which in¬
creased during the reigns of al-Mu'tadid and al-Mu 'tamid,
the Sevillan inhabitants were further absorbed by these
military expeditions.
1. Ehakh., II: Hist♦Abb., I, p. 221; Rabat, fol. 2v.;
Bodl., fol. 2v.
2. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 223; Rabat, fol. 3v.;
Bodl. , fol. 3v.
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However, Seville's offensive campaigns furnished the
population with a relative peace and internal security.
Seville's relative peace becomes particularly significant
considering the revolts, destruction and massacres which
throughout the eleventh century befell the inhabitants of
almost every other part of al-Andalus, including the
largest cities such as Cordoba, Valencia and Toledo. Under
Banu 'Abbad, the Sevillan population never experienced the
massacres that befell Cordoba during the successive
revolts of al-Mahdi, Sulayman and 'All b. Hammud."*" The
Sevillan city walls were never penetrated as were those of
Malaga by al-Mu'tamid himself. Neither was the Sevillan
administration weakened to the same degree as that of
Granada which was continuously subjected to the attacks of
al-Mu. 'tamid and Alfonso VI, enforced payment of annual
tribute to Alfonso, or interna.l rebellions. Although Seville
was forced to offer Castile tribute, and although Alfonso's
army occasionally organised military expeditions into
Sevillan territories, Seville remained one of the most
secure Taifa states.
Finally, the Sevillans were obliged to accept their
rulers for lack of a better choice. As there was no
organised group that sought power for the implementation
of a political programme, any alternative to al-Qadl,
1. For the revolts of al-Mahdl, Sulayman and 'All b.
Hammud, see for example: Mu * j ib, pp. 5-0-1, Ij.3,
49-50; Bayan, III, pp. 50-2, 59-60; fhakh., I,
vol. ii, pp. 79, 82.
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al-Muftadid or al-Mu/tamid would have implied their replace¬
ment by another authoritarian ruler who would only be able
to maintain power through his extermination of all potential
contenders. Within the Sevillan context, the possibility of
the emergence of a champion of the rights of the people was
unthinkable, as the ruler-subject relationship was conceived
and applied in terms of master and ruled. The Banu 'Abbad
rulers could therefore only have been overthrown by a con¬
tender with a stronger power base and sufficient physical
support, or alternatively through the latter's political
ability to win over elements of the power base of the Banu
'Abbad rulers such as the army or ministers. The Sevillans
were also unable to find an external champion. Furthermore,
they may have refrained from attempting to support another
leader as a result of their experience with al-Qasim b.
Hammud, who left them to establish himself in Cordoba on
two occasions prior to al-Qadl's establishment in Seville."'"
(3) The hajib and dhu-l-wizaratayn
The Sevillan bureaucratic hierarchy was of the type
described by some sociologists as one of degradation,
beginning with the ruler at the top and descending through
progressively lower bureaucratic strata. The actual ruler
excepted, the highest post in the echelons of the
bureaucratic hierarchy of the Banu 'Abbad dynasty was
1. Dhakh., I, vol. ii, pp. 12, l£-l6, 80-1, 83;
Bayan, III, pp. 122, 12lj.; Mu ' jib, p. 5>0.
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dhu-l-wizaratayn, followed by the ministers. The hajib was
originally an intermediary between the Caliph and the other
ministers under the Banu Umayya dynasty."1" However, the title
al-hajib implied great prestige under Banu 'Abbad as is
indicated by its adoption by al-Mu'tadid and al-Mu 'tamid for
2
themselves and their sons. During the period of Banu Abl-
'ibiir, the power enjoyed by the hajib amounted to that of
an absolute ruler, which explains the new connotation of the
term and its adoption by the Taifa leaders. With the
honorific development of the term hajib, the function of
intermediary between the ruler and the ministers came to be
designated as dhu-l-wizaratayn.
Both the meaning of the term and the functions of the
hajib varied during the Taifa period from what they had been
during that of Banu Umayya, and the intermediary period of
the Banu Abi- 'Amir is essential for explaining this change.
The office of hajib as an intermediary between the Caliph
and his ministers no longer existed during the Taifa period
1. This post was absorbed by the ruler either officially
or in practice. For example, al-Mu 'tadid adopted the
title and by implication the function of hajib. In a
letter, Ibn-Hayyan uses this title to address him
(Ehakh., I, vol. ii, p. 90). The title of hajib seems
to have been adopted by other Taifa leaders (Muqad.,
II, p. 609).
2. Jadwa, p. 80.
3. In Seville, Ibn-Zaydun and Ibn- fAmmS.r are examples of
ministers who were designated as dhu-1-wizS.ratayn.
Al-MaqqarT confirms that the minister who represented
the ruler during the Taifa period was known as
dhu-l-wizaratayn (Nafh, I, p. 202).
- 86 -
because, in practice, the Caliph who had previously been
recognised and accepted by all the parties in al-Andalus
ceased to exist. The Taifa leader conceived himself as
a Caliph within his limited territorial boundaries, but
his limitations as a ruler prevented him from meeting the
requirements of the Caliphate, basically because the Taifa
leader's powers, authority and influence were limited in
scale. Consequently, no Sevillan Taifa leader was
recognised as a Caliph, nor did he conceive himself as
such, a fact which is illustrated by the use of the title
al-hajib. However, the Taifa leader did not conceive
himself as a hajib alone, as is shown from his use of titles
similar to those used by the Cordoban Caliphs. Must we then
compare the Taifa leader to al-Mansur b. AbT- 'Amir who,
while using the Caliphal title of al-Mansur, retained that
of al-hajib, which was his official office? One striking
difference is that, unlike al-Mansur, the Taifa leaders did
not operate under the shadow of a living Caliph and the
authority of the type of Caliphs temporarily recognised by
some Taifa leaders, such as Hisham II and al-Murtada, was a
product of their own creation.
Was the Taifa leader given the title of hajib after he
gained full control over his Taifa state? Given that al-
Mu'tadid ended his recognition of Hisham II as the rightful
Caliph and that he is known to have adopted the title of
hajib, did al-Mu'tadid maintain the title after his renuncia¬
tion of the supreme authority of Hisham II? He probably
did, because Hisham II continued to be recognised by the
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Sevillan ruler until the latter part of his reign. The
contradiction which results from the simultaneous adoption
of the title al-hajib with other Cad.iph.al titles must
therefore be explained by the appearance of the office of
dhu-l-wizaratayn as a substitute for the previously known
hijaba, but even here several questions are raised regard¬
ing the nature, functions and responsibilities of the
dhu-l-wizaratayn.
The exact nature of the office of dhu-1 -wiza.rata.yn is
not altogether clear, and the following suggestions may
clarify the situation:
(i) The dhu-l-wizarata?7n may have been bearer of a double
office. This may have occurred in the following ways:
(a) Two different functions or branches of the office
existed simultaneously. Could more than one official be
called dhu-l-wizaratayn at the same time? For example, were
Ibn- 'Ammar and Ibn-Zaydun, both of whom served under al-
Mu ftamid, called dhu-l-wizaratayn together or was Ibn- 'Ainmar
not given the title until Ibn-Zaydun had died? In other
words, was there a multiplicity of ministers denominated
dhu-l-wizaratayn? What is certain is that Ibn-Zaydun
gained al-Mu 'tamid' s disfavour as a result of Ibn- '-Amraar's
manoeuvres, something the latter would not have succeeded in
doing without having at least equalled Ibn-Zaydun in rank.
(b) The same functionary was entrusted with two
different offices during two different periods of time
under the same ruler. For example, an officer may have been
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dismissed and then recalled to fill a new office or re¬
appointed to a new office, either of which would make him
the bearer of two offices. For example, Ibn-Zaydun was
imprisoned by Banu Jahwar and rejoined their service after
his release. Alternatively the same official may have
been charged with two or more offices of a different
nature. For example, as a minister Ibn- 'Aitmar performed
purely administrative functions, but he was also charged
with leading negotiations with Alfonso VI on various
occasions and participated in military campaigns. Ibn-
Zaydun served various Taifa leaders as a minister who was
basically charged with administrative affairs, but he also
led negotiations.
(c) Ihe same functionary was charged with two
different offices during two different periods of time
under two different rulers. The example may be cited here
of Ibn-Zaydun who worked as a minister under Banu Jahwar',
and then under al-Mu'tadid and al-Mu 'tamid b. 'Abbad.
(ii) The dhu-l-wizaratayn may have been the bearer of
one office whose role it was to be an intermediary between
the ruler and the other ministers. The case of Ibn- 'Ammar
and his unchallenged position under al-Mu 'tamid may again
be cited here.
The same personages have been intentionally chosen
for different possibilities to illustrate the difficulty
of identifying the functions of the dhu-l-wizaratayn. Any
specification of the functions and delimitation of the
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responsibilities of the dhu-l-wizaratayn during the Taifa
period is difficult, given the contradictions one en¬
counters. One can only conclude that the office of
dhu-l-wizaratayn must be conceived within the context of
the contradictions of the Taifa period generally. Our
understanding of the meaning of dhu-l-wizaratayn therefore
remains somewhat vague, as does that of the hajib.
(1|) The wazir
The multiplicity of the ministers (wuzara' ) in the
political system of Banu 'Abbad was possibly aimed more at
associating the latter with the authoritative character of
the Banu Umayya system than providing a response to local
needs. However, this must not be interpreted as a general
trend, as Prince 'Abd-Allah abolished the function of '
minister in Granada."'" Specialisation within the political
system of Banu 'Abbad is clear from the assignment of
ministers to separate offices such as that of al-mujalasa
wa-l-mushawara (counsel), at-tarsll (official correspond¬
ence), hisab al-mal (finance), etc.
To avoid attaching modern implications of the term to
the minister as he existed under Banu 'Abbad, the latter
should be specifically conceived within his actual geo¬
political context. The original term used to designate
the minister in the Taifa states seems to have been katib.
which may have changed to wazir as their autonomy became
1. Tib., p. 86.
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fully established. The two terms were often used synony¬
mously. In Part II of Adh-Dhakhlra, which presents the
biography and works of the major literary figures in
Western al-Andalus, the latter are described as al-katib,
al-wazlr, a^-adlb and dhu-l-wizaratayn. Some are described
by more than one of these terms. The simultaneous use of
al-wazlr al-katib implies either that the person who is
thus described occupied two different offices, or that the
same post was described variously by the two terms. Ibn-
Bassam refers to the following, employing both terms:
1.) Al-Wazlr al-Katib Abu- 'Amr al-Bajl."^
2.) Al-Wazlr al-Katib Abu-Muhammad b.' #
2'Abd-al - Ghafur Dhu-1 -Wizaratayn.
3- ) Al-Wazlr al-Katib Abu-l-Walld
'Assan b. al-MissIsl.-^
# » •
If.. ) Al-Wazlr al-Katib Abu- 'Abd-Allah
Muhammad b. al-Ayman.^
5* ) Al-Wazlr al-Katib Abu-Bakr b.
'Abd-al-'Aziz b. Sa'ld al-Batalyawsl.^
1. Dhakh., II: Rabat, fols. 63V.-68r.; Bodl., fols.
I4.9r.-S3r.
2. Dhakh. , II: Rabat, fols. 103r. -llpv.; Bodl. , fols.
87r.-97v.
3- Dhakh., II: Rabat, fols. I33V.-38V.; Bodl., fols.
lllpr.—l8v.
I|_. Dhakh. , II: Rabat, fols. l39P»-60r.; Bodl. , fols.
179v.-83r.




6.) Al-Wazlr al-Katib Abu-l-Husayn b. al-Jadd."^
7. ) Al-Waziir al-Katib Abu-Muhammad 'Abd-al-Majld
b. 'Abdun. ^
8.) Al-Wazlr al-Katib Abu-Bakr b. Sa'id al-ma'ruf
3
bi-Ibn-al-Qabturnu.
9.) Al-Wazlr al-Katib Abu-Baler b. Quzman.^"
10.) Al-Wazir al-Katib Abu-Baler b. Sawwar al-Ushbunl
The duties and functions of the minister under Banu 'Abbad
may consequently be defined as the administration of a speci¬
fic branch of Seville 's government and the implementation of
the ruler's orders internally and externally.
It was not really possible for the minister to attain full
professional efficiency, a fact which may be explained by
several factors. The weakness of the Sevillan minister was
basically the result of his limitations within the govern¬
mental structure. The conflict between the instructions he
was given and the social demands on his particular department
was often acute. Let us consider the case of the minister in
charge of hi sab al-mal. Although direct sources of informa¬
tion are not available, the consideration of a few aspects of
1. Bodl. , fols. passages missing from Rabat
ms.
DhaRh. , II: Rabat, fols. l6Lp?.-79r-; Bodl. , fols.
l83r.-98V.
3* Dhakh. , II: Hist. Abb. , III, p. 5>0; the passages on
Ibn-al-Qubturnu are missing from Rabat and Bodl. mss.
Bhakh., II: Rabat, fols. l85v.-89r.; Bodl. , fols.
211v. -llpv.
Ehakh. , II: Rabat, fols. l89r.-92r.; Bodl. , fols.
21i|v. -l6v.
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the general situation in Seville will indicate the
precariousness of the situation of the 'minister of finance'.
Hie continuous internal instability resulting from wars with
V
other Taifa states, the maintenance of a relatively large
army for defensive or offensive purposes, the tribute money
imposed by the Christian kings and the luxurious life-styles
of the Sevillan rulers were conditions that the minister was
not in a position to control politically, despite their
drastic financial consequences. Hie heavy weight of these
pressures on the bayt al-mal left the minister with no
alternative but to approach the Sevillan population primarily
as a source of income through taxation. Thus sheer survival
became the predominant concern of the department of hisab al-
mal, conceived as an integral part of the struggling govern¬
ment. As a result, the department of finance was in an
inadequate position to fully respond to the social needs of
Seville, much less to take positive steps to improve its
financial situation.
Another fundamental governmental department was that of
the dTwan al-a'mal wa-l-.jibay&t. Its functions included
tax-collecting, maintaining a balance between the state input
and output and maintaining the army financially. This
department, which has sometimes been subdivided into several
branches, was directed and sometimes co-ordinated by an
2
officer known as an-nazir. The office of an-nazir was
« *
1. Muqad., II, pp. 613-17.
2. ibid., pp. 613-1^4-.
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highly technical and specialised, but politically the nazir
under Banu Umayya and the Taifa states enjoyed great power,
because his office was administratively independent of the
ruler.^ However, this power carried no direct political
implications, although the diwan al-a'mal wa-l-jibayat
supported the governmental system financially and constitu¬
ted a financial basis for the ruler's political power. In
Seville, this department was probably charged with tax
collection which, along with booty, constituted a major
source of income for the Sevillan government.
The consideration of the minister's role as a personal
counsellor to the ruler during the mujalasa leads to the
same conclusion regarding the limitations on the minister
as does an analysis of the structural composition of the
Sevillan government. The mujalasa seems to have been adopted
as a formality in which the Sevillan ruler centred as the
focal attraction to whom all attention was directed, and which
generally included ministers whose task it was to advise the
ruler. However, these sessions often consisted of poetic-
offerings and competitions, as the Banu *Abbad rulers were
2
poetically inclined. The ministers, many of whom were
poets, attempted to entertain the ruler through their poetic
excellence, with a particular stress on madh. Indeed, they
1. ibid., p. 616.
2. Almost all the poets of Seville have left madh on one
or more of the Banu 'Abbad rulers, e.g. Ibn- 'Ammar,
Ibn-al-Labbana and Ibn-Zaydun.
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■were not even expected to offer political counsel unless
this was explicitly demanded by the ruler, usually during
periods of peril. The function of counsellor in Seville
was therefore an anachronistic vestige of the Banu Umayya
Caliphate. Moreover, the administration of the Taifa state
of Seville did not require specialised advice as did the
larger and more complex Banu TJmayya Caliphate. The Banu
fAbbad rulers consequently did not need the mu.jalasa for
administrative or technical reasons, but as a prestige-
giving formality that contributed to the propagation of
their image as rulers.
(5) The katib
The minister in charge of the diwan ar-rasa'il, known
as al-katib, and the minister of kitaba, known as katib
az-zimam (two offices which were sometimes indistinguish¬
able), were even more dependent on the ruler. Nor were
these offices always distinguished from others. Firstly,
the office of katib was not essential for the functioning
of government, which explains why it was not always adopted,
particularly by what Ibn-Khaldun describes as 'primitive '
governments."^" The essential limitation of the katib was
his direct and total dependence on the ruler. Having no
personal powers to initiate policies, he was generally
restricted to the administrative role of implementing the
ruler's orders. The katib 's allegiance and subordination to
1. Muqad., II, p. 6l8.
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the ruler were not only recognised, but recommended and
advocated."'" Yet it was basically from his support of the
ruler that the katib derived his own strength. Ibn-Khaldun
quotes 'Abd al-Hamid's Risalat al-Katib, where the katib 's
indispensability to the ruler is expressed when the latter
2
is portrayed as the king's hearing, sight, tongue and arms.
In Seville, this office was adopted by the Banu 'Abbad
rulers as is attested to by the fact that most of the
ministers who served under Banu 'Abbad and whom Ibn-Bassam
studies in Part II of Adh-Dhakhlra, carried the title al-
3katib.^ The excellent intellectual background of the katib
in Seville is reflected in the high literary quality of the
letters of al-Mu.'tadid and al-Mu 4tamid.In particular,
Ibn-al-BizilyanI, whom al-Mu 'tadid designated as katib in
l|i|3 /10£l, excelled in the literary field.^ Although in
1. ibid., II, p. 620.
2. ibid.
3- The number of ministers referred to as al-katib by
Ibn-Bassam reaches at least eleven (in Part II of
Adh-Dhakhlra).
Lf.. See for example al-Mu ftadid's letter to other Taifa
leaders explaining his motives for having decided
to kill his son (Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, pp. 22U-
56; these passages are missing from Rabat and Bodl.
mss. ). See al-Mu'tamid 's answer to Alfonso's
ultimatum (Mawsh., pp. 26-28).
5. Dhakh., I, vol. ii, p. 139*
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terms of political power the katib was only able to in¬
directly influence the ruler's decisions and policies, the
prestige of his post was in some cases only superseded by
that of the ruler himself."'" However, the katib was liable
to criticism when his weaknesses were publicly exposed, and
even his association with the ruler proved incapable of
p
protecting him from attacks.
The katib az-zimam belonged to a category that was in¬
ferior to the katib, while remaining among the top govern¬
mental officials. His position vis-3.-vis the ruler was
equally insecure.
The official in charge of awqaf was perhaps allowed
more flexibility to fulfil his function than his colleagues.
While directly aimed at the promotion of Seville's spiritual
and social welfare, the administration of awqaf was an
almost apolitical office which did not affect the ruler 's
policies. On the other hand, the promotion of social
welfare indirectly contributed to the general propagation
of the ruler's image. Despite his limited political power,
the minister of awqaf enjoyed great prestige in al-Andalus
because, socially, the office contributed to relieving the
distress of the needy and, religiously, it was supported by
the 'ulama', judges and the pious generally. Because of
the widespread support for this branch of government, the
ruler found it politically advantageous to grant it his full
1. Muqad., II, pp. 620-21; Nafh, I, p. 202.
2. Nafh, I, p. 202.
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encouragement. Despite the lack of direct information
regarding the exact nature and administration of awqaf in
Seville, the political role of the Sevillan mosque, which
was supported by the awqaf, was significant. Furthermore,
the department of this specifically Islamic socio-religious
institution is known to have existed throughout al-Andalus.
For example, in Granada, Frince 'Abd-Allah b. Buluggln
refers to the sahib al-ahbas Ibn-Salmun,"'" and Ibn-Hayyan
refers to an unidentified corrupt official who abused the
2
property of the awqaf, possibly in Cordoba.
The minister's limitations were increased by a direct-
interference with his work. His vulnerability and the
instability of his office reinforced his need to intrigue
as a necessary condition for the preservation of his post.
In Seville, where the ruler's power was generally efficiently
imposed on the ministers, the latter intrigued against one
another, striving to secure the favour of some of their
colleagues and to eliminate others. Examples of two
ministers who plotted against a third were Ibn- 'Ammar and
Ibn-Martin, who were successful in manipulating al-Mu 'tamid
r>
into ending his favour to Ibn-Zaydun and his son ar-Raqib.
On the other hand, Abu-l-Hasan 'All b. Hafs had been
executed by al-Mu'tadid because of the intrigues of Abu-1-
Walid Ibn-ZaydHnIntrigue against ministers was also
1. Tib., p. 117.
2. Dhakh., I, vol. ii, p. 102.
3• Dhakh., I, vol. i, p. 355'
1|. Hula, I, p. 2^1.
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practised by members of the court, as is illustrated by
I'timad's plots to minimise the favour shown to Ibn- 'Ammar
by al-Mu'tamid.
In conclusion, the Sevillan minister was not provided
with general guidelines, nor was he left to work out the
details freely and imaginatively. Instead, he was subjec¬
ted to the ruler's constant authority, to which he had to
conform as a condition for survival. The minister's pre¬
occupation with his superior's immediate satisfaction over¬
shadowed his ability to fulfil his duties adequately. This
was particularly true during the reign of al-Mu'tadid when
the ministers lived under terrible strain and witnessed the
assassination of several of their colleagues. The terrified
state of mind that characterised the minister under al-
Mu'tadid is exemplified by Ibn-Zaydun's relief following
the former's death.Under al-Mu'tamid, the minister
enjoyed more security with the ruler, although some suffered
from the disfavour of other ministers who were endowed with
excessive powers, like Ibn- 'Ammar.
Despite their handicaps and limitations, the ministers
enjoyed widespread prestige under Banu fAbbad. Their
relationship with the Sevillan masses was determined by
their occupational role. Professionally, the minister
constituted the essential link between the ruler and ruled.
Although the people had no say in their appointment, the
humble origins of some of the ministers may ultimately have
benefited the merchants and lower echelons. On the other
1. Hulla, II, p. l\-3 •
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hand, the political alienation of the indigenous elite
(al-khassa) is indicated by its disproportionately small
share in the government. The Banu 'Abbad rulers found
the ruling class to be reliable because of its non-Sevilian
origin. This is particularly true of the ministers. For
example, immediately upon his establishment as ruler, al-
Qadl b. 'Abbad appointed an unknown Sevillan to head his
government."*" An examination of names of ministers who
served under Banu 'Abbad indicates that many originally
came from various other parts of al-Andalus. The place of
origin of several literary figures and ministers of Western
al-Andalus was adopted as part of their names. Examples
include the following:
1.) Al-Wazir al-Katib Abu-fUmar al-Bajl
2[from Beja].
2. ) Al-Adlb Abu-Muhammad 'Abd-al-Jalxl al-Murs!'
#
[from MurciaJ.-^
3.) Al-Katib Abu-l-Hasan Salih b. Salih
ash- Shantamarl [from Santa Maria].
1. Ihakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 223; Rabat, fol. 3v*j
Bodl., fol. 3v•
2. Ehakh., II: Rabat, fols. 63V.-68r.; Bodl., fols.
U9r.-53r.
3* Ehakh. , II: Rabat, fols. ; Bodl. , fols.
133v. -l+7r.
1|. Qaakh. , II: Rabat, fols. 200v.-3r.; Bodl. , fols.
l57v.-6lr.
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1+. ) Ash-Shaykh al-Adlb Abu- 'Urnar b. Fath
al-Batalyaws! [from Badajoz]."*"
5.) Al-Adlb Abu-'Umar lusuf b. Kawthar
ash-Shantarlnl [from Santarem].
6.) Al-Wazlr al-Katib Abu-Bakr b. Sawwaq
al-Ushbuni [from Lisbon].^
The author of the work which records the names and
titles of the above-mentioned figures is himself universally
—.-.-known as 'All b. Bassam ash-Shantarlni [from Santarem]. Tne
adoption of a laqab indicating the bearer's place of origin
could only have served a practical purpose away from the
person's place of origin, and this indicates a great
mobility throughout eleventh-century al-Andalus. The
ministers serving under Banu 'Abbad therefore generally had
a sophisticated intellectual background, but were politi¬
cally servile to the ruler. As many were originally from
other parts of al-Andalus, their political contacts in
Seville were perhaps limited and their security was ulti¬
mately dependent on the ruler. Hence the ministers, like
the army, were a fundamental element supporting the ruler.
The power of the latter was such that he was able to approach
them individually, which discouraged the formation of
1. Dhakh., II: Rabat, fols. 206v.-7r.; passages
missing from Bodl. ms.
2. Dhakh., II: Rabat, fols. 207r.—*7v.; Bodl.,
fol. 220v.
3. Dhakh., II: Rabat, fols. 208r.-l7n.; Bodl.,
fols. 221r.-28r.
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coalitions and revolts against him. The ruler and his
ministers therefore thrived on each other's support and
their attitude towards their Sevillan subjects was con¬
ceived less within the context of their duties towards the
Sevillans than vice versa.
t
The contrast within the governmental structure between
as-sayf and al-qalam was intended to distinguish between
those functions which involved physical duties and others
of a more intellectual and administrative nature."'"
Certain functionaries in Seville such as al-katib clearly
fall under the category of al-qalam, while the army
pertains to as-sayf. However, others such as the wazlr
are more difficult to classify, since the term designated
- different functions, and Ibn-Khaldun only confused the
issue further by considering the wazlr on the same footing
2
as ahl as-suyuf. Applying the dichotomy to the reign of
Banu 'Abbad, it is difficult to discern a neat pattern
that illustrates the extent to which ahl as-suyuf and
ahl al-aqlam dominated the Ssvillan political scene, as
both were consistently active. It is nonetheless certain
that, together, the two categories were superseded by the
Banu 'Abbad rulers, which confirms Ibn-Khaldun's conception
that '...as-sayf and al-qalam are both an instrument of the
ruler (sahib ad-dawla) on which he relies for the implemen-
3








(6) The sahib ash-shurta and the wall or 'amil
The police prefect, who was known as al-hakim in the
Maghrib and al-wall among the Turks, was officially designa¬
ted as sahib ash-shurta and commonly referred to as sahib
-i : ° •
q
al-madlna or sahib al-layl in al-Andalus. Under the Banu
Umayya dynasty, the functions of sahib ash-shurta were sub¬
divided into sahib al-kubra and sahib as-sughra, specialis-
2
ing in the affairs of al-khassa and al- amma respectively.
Despite his unpopularity, the powers of sahib ash-shurta
in al-Andalus were such that he could order executions,
although this was exceptional and usually fell under the
3
responsibility -of the qadi. Because of its influence and
power, the post of sahib ash-shurta in Seville was compar¬
able to that of the minister. His responsibilities
included the maintenance of the city 's internal security and
assuming full command of the city during the ruler's absence.
An urban office, the duties of sahib ash-shurta were limited* * . «
to the Andalusian cities, particularly the larger ones,
while the fortresses fell under the administration of
governors. A2.th.ough the sources do not contain much detail
regarding this post in Seville, Lablb was designated as
sahib al-madina by Prince 'Abd-Allah in Granada.^" As
Seville was larger than Granada, the need for security must
1. Muqad., II, p. 625; Nafh, I, p. 2O3.
2. Muqad., II, pp. 625-26.
3. ibid.; Nafh, I, p. 203.
Ij.. Tib. , p. 135*
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have been even greater, thus requiring such an office. The
existence of the office in Seville is confirmed, by a
reference to a sahib ash-shurta who had served under al-
» • *
Mu'tamid and at whose house in Aghmat the disgraced daughter
of the imprisoned al-Mu'tamid later used to beg. The
powers of the sahib al-madlna were limited in Seville, some¬
times to the extent that he was unable to pursue his duties
successfully. An example of such a situation was the
imprisonment by the sahib al-madlna, 'Abd-Allah b. Sallam,
of a Sevillan who created trouble in the market-place in
I4.62/IO69. The explosive popular reaction to this arrest
forced the sahib al-madxna to request the assistance of al-
Mu 'tadid, who was then in Cordoba, and the latter sent him
his son Siraj ad-Dawla accompanied by Alama' and ministers.-^
This incident clearly illustrates the unpopularity of the
sahib al-madlna in Seville and his subordination to the
• t
ruler.
The wall or *amil (governor) over fortresses was an
important office in the government of Seville, because the
city's large territories contained numerous fortresses
which constituted a co-ordinated network for the implementa¬
tion of military control over different parts of the Taifa
state. The number of 'ummal increased with Seville's
acquisition of more fortresses, each of which required the
1. Wafayat, V, p. 35 .
2. Dhakh., I, vol. i, p. 354*
3. ibid.
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appointment of a 'amil to direct the affairs of the in¬
habitants of the fortress (ahl ath-thughur) in the name of
the Taifa ruler. The 'amil presented a delicate problem
for the ruler, even though his powers and status were often
less than those of the wazlr. Unlike the higher govern¬
mental officials who generally operated from within the
palace, the 'amil was physically separated from the ruler
by distances that were sometimes considerable. As the
Sevillan Taifa state increased territorially to include
Algeciras and Cordoba, the problem of an effective
administrative and political control over the 'amil
attained new dimensions. The threat of the transfer of
the allegiance of the local inhabitants of the fortress
to the 'amil through their day-to-day relationship with
him threatened to erode the Taifa leader 's authority over
the fortress. The popularity of the *amil within his
fortress sometimes made it impossible for the ruler to
interfere in the former's internal affairs. For example,
in Granada, several of his 'ummal, such as Mu'ammal who
was in charge of Lucena and Kabbab b. Tamit who was in
charge of Arjona and Antequera, not only disregarded the
authority of Frince fAbd-Allah but incited their subjects
to revolt."^" Even the powerful Taifa state of Seville did
2
not escape two successive revolts in Murcia. However,
Seville was comparatively safe from the disintegration of
1.
2.
Tib., pp. 95-100, 136-38.
ibid., pp. 100-2.
- 105 -
its fortresses. Besides their strength and wealth, one of
the basic causes for the strong attachment of fortresses to
the central authority was the 'family' policy adopted by the
Banu 'Abbad rulers. That al-Mu 'tamid was incorporated into
his father's service is indicated by the former's command
over the Sevillan army during the siege of Malaga."'" How¬
ever, it was during the rule of al-Mu 'tamid, when Seville
attained the peak of its territorial expansion, that he
extended the 'family' policy most. For example, a basic
motive for al-Mu'tamid's desire to depose Ibn-Rashlq, his
'amil over Murcia, was to replace him by his more reliable
son, ar-Radi. Al-Mu'tamid charged his sons with highly
responsible duties in important cities like Algeciras,
Seville and Cordoba, as well as others of lesser importance.
The general allegiance of the Sevillan 'ummal to the Banu
'Abbad rulers is symbolised by the positive contribution of
al-Mu 'tadid's 'amil over Sedona, 'All Hisad, in persuading
the former's son, Isma'll, to end his flight from Seville
O
and to return home. However, the 'amil always remained
a potential rebel in Seville as he did throughout the
Andalusian Taifa states. The unreliability, spirit of
independence and fragile ties of the 'amil with the central
authority of the Taifa state were unveiled on an un¬
precedented scale when Yusuf's armies swept away one Taifa
1. Ehakh., II: Hist. Abb . , I, p. 301? Rabat, fol. 13r».;
Bodl., fol. 12r.; Bayan, III, p. 2 7lp.
2. Tib., p. 112.
3- Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, pp. 256-69; these passages
are missing from Rabat and Bodl. mss.
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state after another. Fortresses throughout al-Andalus
offered 351suf little resistance, often joining his troops
against their previous Taifa leader."*"
(7) The Nature and Role of Official Propaganda
Official propaganda and spying were both nourished
during the Banu 'Abbad period, with the ultimate objective
of protecting the ruler and promoting a personality cult.
Religion was exploited as a means for propagating the
ruler's image, legitimising and almost sanctifying it.
The titles al-Qadl, al-Muftadid bi-Allah and al-Mu'tamid
'hla-Allah all bear religious connotations. However, it
was through the political manipulation of the socio-
religious institution of the khutba that the Banu 'Abbad
rulers were able to entrench their image among the
populace. The minbar became the official propaganda
platform during al-Qadl b. 'Abbad's reign. This state of
affairs persisted during the period of al-Mu'tadid, who in
1|5'1/1059 ordered the khutba to no longer be given in
2
Hisham II's name.
The role of poetry as a means of political propaganda
in Seville is undisputed, but the degree of its impact
upon the common Sevillan is not certain. Politically, the
1. For example, Nu'man, who had previously served as
commander under Prince 'Abd-Allah b. Buluggln,
joined Pusuf b. Tashufln's ranks and conquered
several fortresses in Granada (Tib., pp. 138-39,
144, 148).
2. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 2^0; Rabat, fol. 9r.;
Bodl., fol. 8v.
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madh (eulogy) of the ruler contributed to the poet's
material or occupational advancement, and fulfilled a
political role. While the highly developed literary
quality of the poetry produced under Banu 'Abbad was al¬
most certainly too sophisticated and culturally alien for
the taste of the majority of the Sevillans, there was an
enormous poetical output by the numerous court poets in
Seville, particularly under al-Mu/tamid. Poetry often
served as an asset that indirectly contributed to the
popularity of the Sevillan poet-minister. Poetry as a
means of exalting al-Mu 'tamid continued to be produced
even after the latter 's death, as is illustrated by the
verses of Ibn- 'Abd-as-Samad and others.
Hoivever, the political role of Sevillan poetry was
perhaps most effective as a means of promoting the ruler's
image among other Taifa leaders. The encouragement and
promotion of poetry in the courts of the most powerful
Taifa states such as Toledo, Badajoz and others, created
platforms for literary expression which also served the
political end of giving certain Taifa states a better
reputation for their literary production than others,
thus creating competition. For example, the reputation of
Ibn-al-Aftas was promoted throughout al-Andalus through
his exaltation in Ibn-'Abdun's dlwan. Considering that
Seville was par excellence the haven for poets and
considering, too, that al-Mu'tadid and al-Mu ftamid were
among the most highly regarded Andalusian poets, the image
of Seville as a producer of the best Andalusian poetry of
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the century must have greatly impressed literary minds
throughout al-Andalus, thus complementing the former's
image as a leading Taifa state.
(8) Conclusion
The complex governmental system -which existed during
the Banu 'Abbad period weighed heavily on the Sevillans,
because it constituted a machinery the huge size and over¬
extended branches of which rendered the administration of
simple matters difficult. Rather than government being
a means of administering Seville's affairs in their
various dimensions, the government under Banu 'Abbad ex¬
panded to become a burden that the Sevillans were forced
to bear politically and financially.
The question remains concerning the validity of the
Sevillan governmental system, not only in size and form,
but in essence. Was the system unworkable or was it
badly applied? Any answer is likely to involve a
certain degree of value-judgement, because the value of
any particular political system is usually judged in
comparison to another that is real or conceived. To
minimise this dilemma, let us simply consider those
aspects of the Sevillan political system which were
actually dominant and those which had the potential for
improving the system. As has been shown in this chapter,
the ruler's dominance over the entire political system was
excessive. However, other aspects of the system seem to
have been abused. Had the bay 'a. been based on merit
- 109 -
rather than heredity, had the socio-religious institutions
of the khutba and the waqf been free from political
manipulation, had the higher governmental officers had
more contacts with the Sevillan population, and had the
interests of the Ssvillans been considered as an end of
governmental policies rather than a condition for the
system's survival, the government of the Taifa state of
Seville would have been otherwise. However, the ultimate
answer concerning the validity of the Sevillan system is
inherent in the answer to whether the existence of the
Taifa state, in which the political system developed, was
itself justifiable.
The Sevillan governmental system resembled that of
Banu Umayya and the al-Murabitun in different ways, but
remained unique in many respects. The parallel between
the political and administrative structures of government
under Banu 'Abbad and Banu Umayya may be extended to their
substance, as the former possibly inherited much of the
latter's actual human and technical resources. The
Sevillan bureaucracy must have drawn a large proportion of
its personnel from previous civil servants of the Cordoban
Caliphate. The persistent tumult and indiscriminate
massacres in Cordoba, following the fall of Banu Abi-'Amir
and Banu Jahwar respectively, brought about a massive
exodus of technical skills of which Seville (which enjoyed
a relative peace under Banu 'Abbad) must have claimed a
significant share. This recruitment of manpower that
- 110 -
Cordoba had once attracted is further discerned in the army,
which constituted the backbone of the political regime of
Banu 'Abbad. At a high administrative level, Cordoba
furnished the courts of al-Mu'tadid and al-Mu'tamid with an
#
invaluable asset in the person of Ibn-Zaydun, not to mention
others.
If the administrative vestiges of Banu Umayya constitu¬
ted essential elements in the political and administrative
system of al-Qadl and al-Mu 'tadid, the system matured to
form that of al-Mu ftamid. The systematic administrative
development under al-Mu ftamid had been so conditioned by the
previous stages that he found himself unable to alter its
general course. However, despite its fateful end, the
administrative bureaucracy under al-Mu 'tamid developed to
support the largest and most powerful Taifa state in al-
Andalus. It was perhaps the last vestige of an authentic
Andalusian bureaucracy, because, following the fall of the
Taifa states, the destiny of al-Andalus was determined from
across the Strait. With the triumph of the al-Murabitun,
the administrative organisation in al-Andalus entered upon
a new course, being gradually moulded on the Maghribi
pattern, as is expressed in the following text:
'Amma mamlakat al-Muslimln fl al-Andalus fa-la
yakhfa annaha fl ma'na bilad al-Maghrib. Wa
fl kathir min al-awqat yamlikuhum muluk al-
Maghrib al-Aqsa fa-bi-d-darura anna tartlbahum
jarl 'ala tartlb bilad al-Maghrib. '
1. Subhj. V, p. 271, ( 'As for the kingdom of the Muslims in
al-Andalus, it is well known that it is in a sense [part
of]the Maghrib. At many times the kings of Morocco rule
them and it necessarily follows that their administra¬
tion depends upon that of the Maghrib.')
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The Sevillan Army
(1) The Ssvillan Army's Corn-position
and its Ethnic Elements
The ethnic variety in the composition of the army under
Banu 'Abbad is indicative of the objectives it was designed
to fulfil. The basic and most striking feature of the
Banu 'Abbad army was its solid allegiance and support for
the ruler and its total detachment from any other source of
power. Although al~Mu 'tamid was generally acceptable to
his Sevillan subjects, al-Mu'tadid had been insecure even
with his own son, while al-Qadl had had to rely on his army
almost entirely when confronting local Sevillan leaders.
Hence, from the beginning of the Banu 'Abbad dynasty, al-
Qadl needed to rely on an amy that was highly disciplined
and unsympathetic to any local elements. Thus it would
very probably need to be of foreign composition or, at any
rate, largely so.
If the racial composition of the armies in other parts
of al-Andalus led to the prevalence of a majority group and
its leadership within the army, the ideological orientation
and leadership of the Sevillan army under the Banu 'Abbad
were always determined by the ruler from the top. If a
group allegiance of any kind existed within the Sevillan
army, then it must have remained suppressed because material
gain constituted the basic motivational factor for the amy's
firm unity and coherence. Furthermore, the army's morale
was regularly high as Seville's military record of success
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lasted throughout the Barm 'Abbad period. There was no
sign in the army of the type of atmosphere of fear and in¬
security that reigned in the Sevillan court among the
ministers. Nor are there any traces of intrigues or plots
by the army, which was fully disciplined. The Sevillan
army's unreserved loyalty to the Sevillan ruler was at no
time threatened by tribal solidarity or an allegiance to
external leaders or groups. Obedience to the Sevillan
rulers was assured throughout by the pragmatic political
decisions of the respective Banu 'Abbad rulers, and the
army, on which they relied heavily, particularly for the
promotion of foreign policy, remained active on a regular
and progressive basis.
The ethnic variety in the army also served to prevent
internal dissidence and to ensure the army's unity. Al-
Mansur b. Abl-'Amir had reorganised the Andalusian army
which had been subdivided on a tribal basis into groups
known as the junudHe did away with the strong allegiance
of the junud to their tribal leaders by introducing large
1. The changes al-Man§ur introduced to the Andalusian
army described by Prince 'Abd-Allah are as follows :
(i) An ethnic diversification of the army's com¬
position was undertaken with the object of crushing
any one rebellious group by the remaining groups
acting together. (ii) Al-Mansur's army was
further strengthened by the acquisition of more
soldiers, particularly Berbers from the Maghrib.
'Abd-Allah states that the Berber leaders, including
his grandfather, Badis, joined al-Mansur's ranks
because of their strong faith and desire to combat
the Christian king (Tib., pp. 16-17). A regular
tax that al-Mansur imposed on the local Andalusian
population, whose members refused to participate in
his battles, was used to maintain the Andalusian
army (Tib., pp. 16-18).
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numbers of mercenaries, particularly Berber soldiers from
the Maghrib, where he had previously served as commander
during the reign of al-Hakam II. The Banu 'Abbad army
was unlike that of Banu Umayya or al-Mansur in several
respects. There is no sign in our sources of any tribal
allegiance to the commanders, and if any one group pre¬
dominated numerically in the Sevillan army there is no
indication of repercussions resulting from this imbalance.
The different racial factions within the army did not
constitute tightly-knit groups. The ethnic mixture of
the army, which is reflected not only in the recruitment
of foreign mercenaries and slaves but in the composition
of the Sevillan society, prevented any cohesive revolt
by the army as a whole, making any attempts at revolt, by
individual groups within the army, perilous and easy to
crush.
The Berber element does not seem to have constituted
an important part of the Banu 'Abbad army. The domina¬
tion of the Taifa state of Seville by Banu 'Abbad was
fundamentally dependent on ending the supremacy of the
foreign rule of BaxLU Hammud. The incorporation of the
Berber troops into al-Qadl Muhammad b. 'Abbad's army,
following his success over Banu Hammud, would therefore
have presented him with several problems:
(i) Could the solidly-built allegiance of the Berber
soldiers towards the Banu Hammud rulers be diverted by al-
Qadl b. 'Abbad? The military success of the Banu Hammud
rulers, in both Seville and Cordoba, suggests otherwise.
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(ii) Could the ambitions of the Berber military
commanders, which al-Qadl b. 'Abbad exploited to confront
the leadership of Muhammad b. Hammud, be checked within the
Banu 4Abbad army ?
(iii) Could their ethnic-political ties with external
Berber leaders in the Maghrib, or other parts of al-Andalus
such as Malaga, be restrained from forming into a serious
threat to the Banu 'Abbad rulers? In other words, could
al-Q,a£I b. 'Abbad recruit the very soldiers who failed to
prevent his establishment as ruler over Seville? It is
well established that the Sevillans successfully resisted
the Berber contingents of al-Qasim b. Hammud following his
expulsion from Cordoba."*" Furthermore, the Berber con¬
tingents under the command of his son, Muhammad, were
2
expelled from Seville by the Sevillans. The possibility
that the Berber contingents might change their loyalty to
another party is shown by the fact that, after al-Qasim
and his son Muhammad b. Hammud were defeated, al-Qasim's# # '
troops joined Yahya b. Hammud of Malaga.
(iv) Could the Berber troops be accepted by the
Sevillan inhabitants as a part of the Banu 'Abbad army,
having been rejected as the pillar of the Banu Hammud
regime? The record of the Berber troops as being partly
1. Dhakh., I, vol. ii, p. 17; Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I,
p. 221; Rabat, fol. 2v.; Bodl., fol. 2v.; Bayan,
III, pp. 133-34; Mu *jib, p. 3>1; Hula, II, p. 36.
2. ibid.
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responsible for the plundering of Cordoba doubtless gave
the Sevillans sufficient reason to fear a similar fate."1"
The Banu 'Abbad rulers strengthened their firm grip
over the army by appointing their sons as military com¬
manders. Al-Mu'tadid's reliance on his sons for military
purposes did not solve his problems relating to the leader-
2
ship of the Sevillan army. However, al-Mu 'tamid 's sons
fulfilled this function more satisfactorily and he was
able to rely on the military leadership of several of his
sons more successfully, appointing them as both military
commanders and governors.
What groups composed the army under Banu 'Abbad?
Although it is impossible to determine the exact proportion
of the ethnic composition in the Sevillan army, there.are,
nonetheless, indications of its multiracial composition.
The Banu 'Abbad army seems to have drawn its strength from
1. The Banu Hammud rulers were loathed by the Cordoban
citizens, whom they ruled harshly. 'All b. Hammud's
tyranny finally led to his assassination (Ehakh♦, I,
vol. i, pp. 80-81). His brother, al-Qasim, was
overthrown for the second time in 515/1023, and his
army plundered the surrounding areas of Cordoba
before heading for Seville (Bhakh., I, vol. ii, pp.
16-17).
2. For example, the refusal of al-Mu'tadid's son,
Isma'll, to command the Sevillan army in an attack
against Cordoba led to the tragedy of the latter's
assassination by his father. On the other hand,
al-Mu'tadid sent his son Muhammad, later al-
Mu'tamid, at the head of the Sevillan army during
a siege against Malaga and, having failed to
capture it, Muhammad b. 'Abbad begged for his
father's forgiveness in verse (Qala'id: Hist.Abb.,
I, P. 53).
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two categories of emotionally, ideologically and politically
1
uncommitted soldiers: mercenaries and slaves.
Alienated from the Sevillan inhabitants and highly in¬
secure in a foreign land, the mercenaries and slaves thrived
on the continued strength of the Banu 'Abbad rulers on whose
safety their very existence depended. Because the dependence
of the ruler and the army was a mutual affair, the Banu
'Abbad rulers offered their military commanders rewards such
as the command over fortresses they had subjected, while
soldiers were professional and received regular salaries, a
state of affairs that was first introduced by al-Mansur b.
Abl- 'Amir.
If power and success explain the Sevillan army's general
unity and cohesion, there were nevertheless at least two
examples of revolts during the reign of al-Mu'tamid: those
of Ibn- 'Ammar and Ibn-Rashiq. They were not, however,
1. Al-QadI b. 'Abbad is described as having lavishly
used his enormous wealth to strengthen his army
by purchasing slaves and mercenaries (Dhakh., II:
Hist.Abb. , I, p. 221; Rabat, fol. 3^-1 Bodl.,
fol. 3r.; Bayan, III, pp. 196-97; Hulla, II,
p. 38; A'rnal, p. 178). This is the most direct
reference to the Sevillan soldiers which enables
us to assess their ethnic background. The
Christian soldiers of Alfonso 's army also par¬
ticipated in battles along with the Sevillan
army, but the proportion of Christian, soldiers
within the Sevillan army is uncertain.
2. Prince 'Abd-Allah b. Buluggin presents a detailed
account of the two revolts and analyses both the
political ambitions and the psychological motiva¬
tions (from his point of view, which is particu¬
larly hostile towards Ibn- 'Ammar) of the two
rebels (Tib. , pp. 79-82, 110-2, 1) •
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caused by any feelings of 'asabiyya, but consisted of the
doings of two privileged officials whose gains within the
Sevillan political system aroused their ambitions which
materialised in their attempts to break away from the
Sevillan Taifa state and to lead Murcia as an autonomous
region. Pour factors explain the limited implications
and failure of these revolts. Firstly, the distance
between Murcia and Seville made it possible for Ibn- 'Anmar
and, later, Ibn-Rashlq to attempt a break away from Seville,
but despite the difficulties of transportation and com¬
munication the Sevillan army was successful in crushing the
first revolt and containing the other. Secondly, these
two attempts were organised outside the mainstream of the
Sevillan army, which indicates that the latter remained
strong, coherent and loyal to the Sevillan ruler even at
times when factions of the army revolted. This forms a
total contrast with Prince 'Abd-Allah.'s army, as many of
his commanders at times behaved independently, retaining a
merely nominal allegiance to him. Thirdly, Ibn- 'Amman and
Ibn-Rashlq were refused support by the only two armies that
superseded and outmatched the Sevillan army. Alfonso
refused Ibn- 'Anmar his support against a Taifa leader whom
he had pledged to defend or, at any rate, not to harm, in
return for his tribute money."*" lusuf b. Tashufln also
refused Ibn-Rashlq his assistance, considering such a
2
revolt to be illegal and unjustified. Furthermore,
1. ibid., p. 70.
2. ibid., p. 111-12.
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one of the factors that permitted Ibn-Rashlq to retain his
control over Murcia at this point \<ias his threat to join
forces with Alfonso at a time when the disunity of the
Taifa leaders was clearly expressed even as they besieged
Aledo. Whether intentionally or not, lusuf succeeded,
through his position vis-A-vis Ibn-Rashlq, in temporarily
deceiving the other Taifa leaders into believing that he
did not intend to meddle in their internal affairs, much
less to conquer them. Considered within the context of the
ethnic groupings, we find that Tusuf, a Berber, refused to
support a rebel against al-Mu'tamid, xjhile Alfonso, a
Christian, refused to support another rebel against his
Muslim ally. These two cases can serve to stress the
inter-racial and inter-religious alliances that existed in
al-Andalus, even though Alfonso and, later, lusuf turned
against al-Mu'tamid for other reasons.
Finally, the loyalty of the Sevillan army to al-
Mu 'tamid, even towards the end of his reign, x^as clearly
illustrated in its fierce stand against the attacks of
Yusuf's commander, Amir Sir."'" Al-Mu 'tamid confronted
lusuf's army to the bitter end, unlike other Taifa leaders
such as 'Abd-ALlah b. Buluggln, who negotiated his oxjn
2
surrender to the al-Murabitun. Al-Mu.'tamid did not find
«
himself in such a disadvantageous position, because he had
engaged in a policy of favouring and promoting his sons as
1. ibid., p. 170.
2. ibid., pp. 13>l-5>9.
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military commanders."'" For example, Al-Hulal al-Mawshiyya
presents him discussing with his son, ar-Rashxd Abu-l-Hasan
fUbayd-Allah, what policy to adopt vis-4-vis Alfonso VI,
and the question of whether to seek the assistance of lusuf,
when the Castilian king adopted an aggressive policy towards
the Taifas generally following the fall of Toledo in ip78/
1085. An even more striking illustration of the Sevillan
army's determined resistance to the al-Murabitun is that,
even after his defeat and imprisonment in Aghmat, al-
Mu'tamid received news of the death of his son, 'Abd-al-
Jabbar, who was mortally wounded by an arrow while defending
Arcos against the al-3Yhxrabitun. 'Abd-al-Jabbar '3
ministers continued the resistance until the entire fortress
was starved into submission.^"
(2) The Organisation of the Sevillan Army
The Sevillan army consisted of three types of soldiers,
foot-soldiers, archers and cavalrymen, each of whom carried
different types of weapons and fulfilled different- but
d
complementary functions during battles. The foot-soldiers
1. For example, his son, ar-Radl, was sent to replace
Ibn-Rashlq as commander over Murcia, although he
failed to do so (Tib., p. 112).
2. Mawsh., pp. 31-32.
3. Qala' i d: Hist .Abb . , I, pp. 6)4.-65.
ij.. ibid., p. 65.
5. At-TurtUshl gives some insight into the organisation
of the'armies in al-Andalus and describes the
role of the archers, cavalrymen and foot-soldiers
as well as the manner in which attacks were organised
using all categories (Sira.j, pp. 303-9).
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employed, lances, shields and swords, the archers bows and
arrows, and the cavalrymen rode horses and protected them¬
selves with mail, using swords to fight. The cavalry
formed the backbone of the army and was often decisive in
determining the outcome of battles.
Seville, which was generally on the offensive, was
faced with the problem of overcoming the type of obstacle
created by the limited defensive warfare of other Taifa
states. Only the area within the city walls or fortresses
was defended effectively by the Taifa leaders, while the
agricultural plantations and fields were exposed to the
plundering of dissident governors, adventurers, other Taifa
leaders or the Christian kings. Siege was laid to cities,
following the classical pattern, and protective measures had
to be overcome by the besieger.
Being limited in terms of its duration and the
relatively small numbers of men involved (which could
generally be counted in hundreds ), warfare in eleventh-
century al-Andalus was a slow if continuous process. For
example, the period it took to carry through a siege
differed, ranging from months to years. A variety of
measures were adopted to protect cities or fortresses.
Prince 'Abd-Allah provides useful information on how fort¬
resses were rendered self-sufficient and equipped to offer
resistance over months or even years. Heavy walls and
1
cisterns were constructed to protect cities and fortresses.
1. Tib . , p. 120.
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Flour mills were fitted and food stocks collected from
villages in surrounding areas, enabling resistance for a
period of more than a year."^" Different types of weapons
and armament were used, such as swords, shields, bows,
arrows and ballistas (ra ' 'ada ).
The role of armies in al-Andalus varied. Although
battles did occur on a classical model whereby two
organised armies met in a battlefield, warfare was more
commonly carried out in a disorganised, multifarious and
.inconsistent manner. No particular rules were followed,
and deceit and surprise attacks almost constituted the
rule rather than the exception. People who knew a city
or a fortress from the inside were employed by the party
laying siege to it. For example, Ibn-Adha informed the
combined armies of al-Mu 'tamid and Alfonso VI of the
vulnerable parts of Granada, when Ibn- 'Amman reached an
agreement with Alfonso regarding the city's subordination.
Alfonso's success in annexing Toledo was also dependent on
the knowledge of the city which he had obtained as a guest
of Ibn-Dhl j—n-Nun.
War in eleventh-century al-Andalus is full of example
of treason, deceit, and surprise attacks, whether during
important battles or in the less significant day-to-day
relations between enemies or even allies. Al-Mu'tamid's
1. ibid.
2. ibid.
3. ibid., p. 69.
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assassination of two Taifa leaders in his palace bath has been
mentioned previously. Alfonso's irregular attack against
the Muslim forces during the Battle of az-Zallaqa is
another illustration that indicates the use of deceit as a
manner of dealing with the enemy."'"
However, for a better understanding of the Sevillan
army's role and behaviour, it must be conceived within the
context of the general military situation in al-Andalus.
Unlike the warlike societies of the Christian North on the
one hand and the Maghrib on the other, Andalusian society
was not militarily oriented. We find for example that,
during the period of al-Mansur b. Abi-'&nir's military
expeditions against the Christians, the Andalusian peasants
refused to fight in his army and were instead required to
2
offer a share of their harvest in return for protection.
1. Alfonso had agreed with Musuf not to initiate the
battle until Monday. However, Yusuf did not
trust the Castilian king and ordered the larger
part of the Andalusian army to remain ready for
any fighting on Friday. Alfonso in fact began
his advance against the Andalusians on Friday
at the time of mid-day prayer, thinking that
the entire Andalusian army would be engaged in
prayer. lusuf's men then initiated a counter¬
attack from behind, and the Battle of az-Zallaqa
commenced (Mu 'jib, p. 13^4-i Rawd, pp. 90-91)*
2. Hrince 'Abd-Allah describes the Andalusian
peasants as claiming to be unable to participate
in al-Mansur 's battles on the pretext of having
to work their lands, but according to 'Abd-Allah
they were not a warlike people. They agreed,
instead, to offer a regular tax or share of
their harvest to support the army (Tib., p. 17).
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In contrast, the Christian societies of Northern Spain
were on a constant war footing during the eleventh century.
The name of Castile is thought to be derived from the
numerous castles in the area which were meant to defend
their inhabitants against any attacks. The military
aggression of the feudal Christian societies reached its
peak during the last quarter of the eleventh century.
Alfonso's increasing military aggression against the Taifa
states was constantly supported and promoted by the nobles
and knights in his court. Other Christian leaders, of
whom the most renowned is the Cid, were militarily active
against the Taifas. On the other hand, we have the al-
Murabitun whose nature as fierce fighters enabled them to
rise from being desert-dwellers to become masters of the
Maghrib and al-Andalus. However, this is not to state
that the army had no place in Andalusian society. Although
not as militarily inclined as the Christians and the
Moroccans, the Andalusians were forced by the division
of al-Andalus during the eleventh century to build and use
their armies, either against the aggression of the Christian
kings and knights, or against other Taifa leaders. Within
al-Andalus, the army was used by the more powerful Taifa
leaders to increase their territory and to acquire booty
by attacking other weaker Taifas. The army's role in the
Taifa states was not limited to the defence of the Taifa
state's political system and society, but where confronta¬
tion with the increasingly menacing Castilian kingdom was
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concerned the Taifa states were in no position to defend
themselves individually, while their peaceful reunification
was not even possible under the umbrella of Musuf b.
p
Tashufln. The place of the army in Andalusian society
was limited, because of the role of agriculture and commerce
which stimulated the economy. War was not necessary for
the survival of the Taifa states, although it was fully
exploited by the political and military leaders for their
own benefit. The army in the Taifa states was in the final
analysis unable to fulfil the function of protecting the
'Taifa economies from the effects of plunder by external
forces. Consequently, as the plunders continued, and
decreased the society 's productivity, the army's demands in¬
creased and the result was that the burden of crippling
taxes could no longer be supported by the societies of- the
Taifa states.
III. The Religious and Legal Establishment
(1) Malikism in al-Andalus
(a) Tne Socio-political Foundations of Malikism
in al-Andalus
The MalikI rite of law was first introduced to al-
Andalus by Malik b. Anas's direct disciples Ziyad b. 'Abd
ar-Rahman, Qar 'us b. al- 'Abbas and al-Ghaz b. Q,ays,
1. Prince 'Abd-Allah, himself a participant in the siege
of Aledo, describes how Tusuf found it impossible to
reconcile the differences between the various Taifa
leaders (such as al-Mu'tamid and al-Mu'tasim of
Almeria, 'Abd-Allah and his brother Tamlm, etc.).
(Tib., p. 113•)
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followed by others."'" By the eleventh century, Malikism,
which had been declared the official rite in al-Andalus by
the Caliph Hisham b. 'Abd ar-Rahman b. Mu 'awiya b. Hisham
2
b. Malik b. Marwan in 170/786, became firmly established,
despite the limited competition of other schools of fiqh
_ O
such as Hanafism, Hanbalism and Dawudism. Malikism was
therefore adopted in Seville during the eleventh century,
as was the case throughout al-Andalus. The socio-political
foundations of Malikism in al-Andalus explain its ideo¬
logical triumph best. Given the full support of the
state, Malikism became the privileged rite par excellence
from 170/786 and continued to enjoy this status throughout
the Taifa period, to the point of arousing protest by
those who adhered to other schools, for example 'All b.
Hazm. ,
1. Tartib, I, p. 26.
2. ibid., p. 27. During the third to the fifth
centuries A.H., Malikism flourished definitively
or temporarily in Hijaz, Basra, Egypt, Ifrxqiya,
al-Maghrib al-Aqsa' (Morocco 5, al-Andalus, Sicily,
the Sudan (West Africa), Persia, Yemen, Syria
and parts of Khurasan such as Qazwln, Abhar and
Naysabur (ibid., p. 65).
3« ibid., p. 27. The rite of Abu Hanxfa reached the
Maghrib and al-Andalus to a limited degree during
its earlier phases of expansion (ibid., p. 65)-
Shafi 'ism was applied in al-Andalus from the third
century of the Hijra to a limited extent (ibid.,
p. 66). Among the other rites of lesser importance
which competed with Malikism in al-Andalus was that
of al-Awza'x, which was extinguished as early as the
third century of the Hijra (ibid., p. 66). Dawudism
or the Zahirl school was also among the schools which
appeared in al-Andalus. However, despite its re-
vitalisation by 'All b. Hazm, Zahirism was still in
its formative period during the eleventh century. It
may therefore be concluded that eleventh-century
justice was monopolised by Malikism during the period
of the Taifa states, to be strengthened further under
the shadow of the al-Murabitun.
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While the role of the state in the propagation of
Malikism in al-Andalus cannot be denied, this by itself
was only one of a number of factors which together
contributed to its success. The development of the
'ulama' as a powerful class that defended and assured
the general application of Malikism was significant. The
elevated degree of political influence obtained by this
class through its monopoly of justice was only made
possible by a great popular support at the grassroot
levels. That the judicial branch recruited its personnel
from all social strata is indicated by the wide avail¬
ability of free education in al-Andalus. The popular
support for Malikism in al-Andalus is reflected in the
unprecedented energy and dynamism that characterised its
advocates throughout the Taifa period, thus expressing the
type of popular enthusiasm for the Malik! rite that no
political autocracy could realise alone.
Al-Qad! 'lyad ([|_76/1083-51|i|/llli9) presents the
following list of Andalusian authors who composed works
relating to 'the virtues of Malik, his merits and
biography '
1.) Al-Qad! Abu 'Abd-Allah at-Tustar! al-Malik!.
2.) Abu-l-Hasan b. Fihr al-Misr!.
# «
3.) Abu-Muhammad al-Hasan b. Isma£il ad-Darrab.• « * •
l|o ) Al-Qad! Abu-Bakr Ja'far b. Muhammad al-Faryabi.
£.) Abu-Bishr ad-Dawlabi.
6.) Abu-1- 'Arab at-Tam!m!.
































Abu- 'illaqa Muhammad b. Abi-Ghassan.
Abu-Ishaq b. Sha'ban.
Az-Zubayr b. Bakkar al-Qadl az-Zubayrl.
Abu-Bakr Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Yaqtinl.
Abu-Nasr b. al-Hubab al-Hafiz.
* * * *
Abu-Bakr b. Razuya.
Al-Qadl Abu 'Abd-Allah al-Barkanl.
Abu-Muhammad b. al-Jarud.
»
Al-Hasan b. 'Abd-Allah az-Zubaydl.





Abu-Muhammad b. Salih al-Abharl.
* *
Abu-Bakr al-Labbad.
Abu-Muhammad 'Abd-Allah b. Abl-Zayd.
Abu-'Umar b. 'Abd al-Barr al-Hafiz.
* •
Al-Qadl Abu-Muhammad b. Nasr.
# • •










Abu-Marwan b. al-Asbagh al-Qurashl an-Naqlb-x. 1
The superb quality and large number of Andalusian
advocates of Malikism ace matched by the latter's consistent
domination of Andalusian justice throughout the two
centuries preceding the eleventh. Prom the list of Malik!
1. The full list of authors on Malikism is given in
Tartib, I, pp. 9-12.
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jurists and authors presented above, we find that whereas
for example az-Zubayr b. Bakkar al-Qadl az-Zubayrl and
Ibn-al-Imlm at-Tutllx^ died in 256/869 and 238/852 respec¬
tively, al-Qadl Abu-l-Walid al-Baji died two centuries
la.ter in i|7^-/108l.
The abundance of MalikI literature produced during
the ninth and tenth centuries indicates that the eleventh-
century Andalusian jurists, including those of Seville,
must have benefited from a large number of sources, com¬
plemented by others produced in the Orient, Medina, Yemen,
Egypt and Africa. The output of Malik" works by
Andalusian and MaghribI jurists continued throughout the
eleventh century, culminating in the twelfth with al-Qad.1
'iyad's monumental Tartib al-Madarik wa Taqrib al-Masalik
li-Mafrifat A 'lam Madhhab Malik, which furnishes a bio-
bibliographical dictionary of MalikI fulama' and jurists
to the twelfth century, when the puritanically inclined
al-Muwahhidun began their suppression of Malikism and
1. Tartib, I, p. 10; Wafayat, II, pp. 311-12;
Dibaj, p. 116.
2. Tartib, I, p. 10; Dibaj , pp. l5^-~56.
3- In his Tartib, al-Qadl fIyad classifies the MalikI
ulama* he studies into classes (tabaqat) apparently
in accordance with their intellectual capacities and
judicial status. The figures within each class are
in turn grouped together according to their place of
origin under the headings: Ahl al-Madlna, Ahl al-
Yaman, Ahl al-Maghrib, Ahl Misr, Ahl Ifrlqiya and
Ahl al-Andalus .
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persecuted Malik! jurists in the Maghrib and al-Andalus.
Because al-Qadl 'lyad. is known to have exhausted the major
Malik! works to the twelfth century for his Tartlb, the
latter may be considered to implicitly reflect the in¬
fluence of many of the sources used in eleventh-century
al-Andalus. The first volume consists of an apologetic
study of Malik and Malikism. Malik's belief in the
priority of ahl al-Madlna is documented in a letter by Malik
to al-Layth b. Sa'd. Al-Qadx 'iyad devotes several of
his subsections to a defence of the priority that ought to
be accorded to ahl al-Mad"na, as this principle is an
element that is specifically Malik!.
The intellectual fertility of Malik! scholars is
further illustrated by the abundance of Malik! literature
that was produced or circulated in eleventh-century al-
Andalus. The Muwatta' of Malik b. Anas and notes by his
disciples known as the Mudawana (e.g. Mudawanat Ibn-al-
Qasim.) were essential sources among the Malik! jurists in
al-Andalus and the Maghrib. There are also examples of
Sevillans who produced studies on a variety of subjects
such as the rite of Malik, renowned Malik! jurists or
Malik's al-Muwatta'. Ibn-Bashkuwal studies the following
Sevillan authors:
1. The full text of the letter is reproduced (Tartib, I,
p. 1+3). As if to confirm the plausibility of Malik's
contention regarding ahl al-Madlna, the text of al-
Layth b. Sa'd's reply is also given (Tartib, I, p.
wo.
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Abu- 'Umar Ahmad al-Qadir al-UmawI
* i
(d. 1+20/1029 ) •1
Abu-l-Qasim Isma *11 b. Muhammad b. Harith
0 •
(37-7/987-1+21/1030) .2
Abu-'Uthman Sa'ld b. Yahya at-Tanukhl
(b. 1+26/1031+ - d. at c. 70).3




Abu-l-Hakam al-'As! b. Khalaf al-Muqri'
(d. 1+70/1077).6
Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Lakhmi al-Bajl
(356/966-1+31/1039).7
Al-Umawi is the author of At-Tahqlq fx Sifrayn and
Al-Muhtawa (in 5 vols.) (Sila, I, p, 1+1+).
Ibn-Harith is the author of Ai-Intiqa* fl Arba'at
As far (ibid., p. 101+).
At-Tanukhi is the author of works on the aira'at
and other subjects (ibid., p. 211+). ~
ibid., p. 279•
This figure is the author of many works including
the following: Al-Iqlid fl Bayan al-Asanld,
Kitab al-Hulliya wa Siraj al-Bughya f 1 Ma 'rifat
Asanld al-Muwatta', Kitab Lisan al-Bayan 'airnna
fl Kitab Abi-Nasr al-Kilbadhl min al-Aghfal
wa-n-Nuqsan, and Kitab al-Minhaj fl Rijal
Muslim b. al-Ha.i ,i a.i (ibid., pp. 282-83).
Al-Muqri' is the author of Kitab at-Tadhkira
fi-l-Qira'at as-Sab' and Kitab at-Tahdhlb
(Sila, II, p. 1+27).
ibid. , p. 1+95*
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However, the Sevillan MaiIkI fug aha * probably relied
most heavily on the works of other Andalusian scholars,
which exceeded anything produced in Seville. The Cordobans
were without doubt the most fertile and profound
Andalusian authors, and their works had a great influence
throughout al-Andalus and beyond."'"
(b) Malikism: Its Basic Tenets and General
Characteristics
Like the other Sunni rites, the school of Malik b. Anas
is fundamentally based on the Qur'an and the hadlth as its
basic sources, although the MalikI school is distinguished
by its acceptance of other principles. These were created
by Malik as part of his school, and they were later applied
by his disciples and followers. The following constitute
the essential sources and principles in order of priority:
1. ) The Qur 'an.
2. ) The hadlth and sunna.
3. ) A'mal ahl al-Madina.
[4. ) Al-masalih al-mursala.
Malikism is among the most conservative and traditional
Sunn! rites. The rite is extremely strict and demands a
rigid reliance on the Qur'an and the surma. However, the
1. For the biography and enumeration of the works of
some of the most prominent Cordoban jurists, see
Sila, I, pp. 298-300, 3O9-II, and Sila, II, pp.
1445, k^k, 581-82, 6I4O-I42.
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principle of a*mal ahl al-Madlna is perhaps what makes
Malikism most particularly fundamentalist.
The adoption as a model of the actions, teachings,
behaviour and examples of the inhabitants of Medina (ahl
al-Madxna), who are presumed to have been closest in time
and spirit to the Prophet, is a tenet in Malikism that
compares in importance with the role of i.jtihad and i jma'
for Hanafism and Hanbalism respectively. This is not to
state that i jma * and i jtihad are rejected by Malikism, but
their application is more limited. Several polemical
justifications for the importance of amal ahl al-Madina
are presented by Malik, such as the fact that ten thousand
companions of the Prophet lived and died in Medina."*" The
example of ahl al-Madlna is in some instances given
2
priority over a hadlth. The enumeration by Malikl
jurists of several hadlths, collected by such prominent
figures in the field as Malik b. Anas, Abu-Hurayra and
even the extremely meticulous and selective al-Bukharl,
has served to support and justify the premise regarding
the particular attention that should be directed to a fmal
ahl al-Madlna.The following hadlth, collected by Malik,
is only one example of the type mentioned:
1. Tartib , I, p. l\.6.
2. ibid., pp.
3- For example, al-Qadl 'iyad cites several quotations
to support the priority of a 'mal ahl al-Madlna
(ibid. ).
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'Allahumma barik lana fl thimarina wa barik lana fl
Madinatina wa barik lana fl sina fina wa muddina.
#
Allahumma inna Ibrahim 'abduk wa khalxluk wa
nabiyyuk wa innl 'abduk wa nabiyyuk wa innahu da 'ak
11-Makka wa innl ad'uk li-al-Madlna kama da'ak li-
Makka.
The various hadlths cited by al-Qs.dI 'lySd to stress
2
the privileged status of ahl al-Mad~na are taken from
Malik's al-Muwatta' and other Oriental, Maghribl and
Andalusian sources that the Malik! jurists of Seville
probably utilised during the reign of Banu 'Abbad.
The concept of i.jma' (consensus) as understood by
Malik! scholars differs from the conception of other rites
of fiqh in that the latter conceive it with a greater degree
of independence. It is perhaps unfair to attempt to com¬
pare the closeness of the two positions to the two basic
sources, the Qur'an and the hadith, because both groups
have their particular arguments for illustrating that they
conform most to the spirit of the basic sources. In the
final analysis, the fundamental difference between the
Malik! scholars and other Sunn! schools is that the former
1. ibid., p. 32. ('May Allah bless our fruits and
bless our city [Medina] and all that is measur¬
able. Oh Allah.' Ibrahim is your servant,
khalll and prophet. And equally am I your
servant and prophet. He had prayed for Mecca
and I am praying for Medina as he did for Mecca
and more.')
2. ibid., pp. 3I-36.
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relate their conception of i.jma * to the principle of ahl al-
Madlna, thereby relying on naql (transmission of hadlth),
whereas the latter exercise i.jtihad in its literal sense.
Al-QadI fIyad defines ijmac as '...idafat an-naql wa-1- 'amal
ila al-jamif min hayth lam yanqul ahad minhum wa-la 'arnil
bi-ma yukhalifuh. '
Besides the ijma* ahl al-Mad~na which is traced back
directly to the Prophet, there is the i.jma* ahl al-Madlna
through i.jtihad (free judgement) or istidlal (demonstration).
The first category has been unanimously accepted by Malik!
jurists and even by some adherents to other rites, but there
2
has been much controversy over the second category.
The ijmaf ahl al-Madlna which is traced back to the
Prophet through naql al-jama/a 'an al-jama/a (the trans¬
mission from group to group) is itself classified into two
types: (i ) the direct transmission of legislation (shar *)
from the Prophet, (ii) the transmission of that practice
which is recorded as having been witnessed by the Prophet
"5
without being either condemned or approved by him.-'
1. Tartib, I, p. 57. ('The ascription of an-naql
(tradition) or al-'arnal (action performed by the
Prophet) to the community such that there is no
agent who transmits or acts in a contrary manner. ' )
2. ibid., pp. 47-59-
3. For specific examples of each type, see ibid.,
p. 48 •
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The consensus of ahl al-Madina which is based on
ij tihad (free judgement) presents the following three
possibilities when the parallel is drawn with the khabar
al-ahad (one way transmitted tradition):"*"
1. ) When i.jma' ahl al-Madlna conforms to a khabar
al-ahad, the ijriia' is strengthened as there is no
2
collision between the two.
2. ) When i.jma* ahl al-Madlna conforms to one
khabar al-ahad, but contradicts another, the former is
■given priority.^
3. ) When i.jma* ahl al-Madlna contradicts the
khabar al-ahad which is alone available for a specific
case, priority is given to the former provided that it
is based on a tradition of the Prophet. On the other
hand, if i.jma* ahl al-Madlna is based on ijtihad, the
khabar al-ahad is preferred to ijma* ahl al-Madlna.
However, in the case of two contradictory samples of
khabar al-ahad, the one from Medina is given priority
over any other.^
1. The khabar al-ahad is the weakest type of tradition.
The second type is the khabar al-mashhur (a tradi¬
tion with more than one transmission, but which is
doubtful because of an interruption in the trans¬
mission). The third type is the khabar al-
mutawatir (a tradition that is transmitted from one
.jama'a (group) to another, without interruption).
2. ibid., p. 51.
3. ibid., p. 52.
If.. ibid.
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It is argued, that the criterion of naql al-jama'a 'an
al-.j ama *a (transmission from group to group) is a deter¬
minant factor of the authenticity of particular cases and
that the word of the majority should be given preference.
The heavy reliance on naql al-jama'a 'an al-jama'a arises
from the consideration that the transmission of the
Prophet's actions or teachings by a group is an assured
means for determining the authenticity of the transmission,
as groups are less likely to voluntarily introduce error
or falsification than individuals are. Some Shafi 'is
who opposed Malikism contested the validity of the
criterion of naql al-jama'a 'an al-jama'a and, more
particularly, they rejected its limited application to
ahl al-Madlna, contending that the inhabitants of other
regions such as Kufa and Basra, where companions of the
Prophet are known to have lived, are equally trustworthy."*"
However, the defendants of Malikism reply that only in
Medina did a sufficient number of companions exist to
( c 2
guarantee the naql al-jama'a 'an al-jama'a.
The domination of Malikism in al-Andalus was, to a
great extent, due to its ability to adapt to the changing
Andalusian conditions and its success in confronting
newly-developed problems that had not been known to
1. ibid., p. Ij-9.
2. ibid., pp. lj.9-50.
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Andalusian society. New methods were developed within the
Qur'anic sphere which made possible a technical treatment
of problems specific to newly-developed social conditions.
It is therefore by complementing the more basic sources
and thus enabling the MalikI rite to cover a more compre¬
hensive area that the principle of al-masalih al mursala
(priority for the public interest where the basic sources
are silent) furnished Malikism with sufficient realism and
flexibility to survive as an active force.^ Although the
principle of al-masalih al-mursala was only applied after
consideration of the more fundamental sources, the MalikI
jurists increased their recourse to the principle for
newer types of cases. The principle of al-masalih al-
mursala has been subdivided into darura or haja,
tahslniyya and sadd adh-dhara 'if.
Avoiding theological matters, the impact of this
principle was particularly felt in materialistic matters
of daily life. The application of al-masalih al-mursala
ranged widely, from social affairs such as family organisa¬
tion (e.g. marriage or divorce) to financial affairs in
commerce or industry and to administrative problems relating
to the organisation of civil or military personnel within
the political system.
1. The principle of al-masalih al-mursala is, for
example, applied by Malik himself to solve the
problem relating to the exchange of ripe and
green dates (see Mudaw., X, p. 90).
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(2) Justice in Seville under Banu cAbbad
(a) The Origin of the fuqaha' and Judges in Seville
Sevillan justice does not compare with that of Cordoba
either in the prestige and quality of its judges or in the
production of judicial works. The achievements of the
Cordoban judges during the tenth century ensured their con¬
tinued leadership in al-Andalus during the eleventh century,
a trend which is clearly reflected in the biographies of
jurists and scholars reproduced in an-Nubah!'s Kitab al-
■Marqaba al- '"Elya (known as Kitab Qadat Qurtuba) or Ibn-
-Bashkuwal's Kitab as-Sila, where the numbers and excellence
of the Cordoban jurists exceed those of any other Andalusian
city. The proximity of Seville to Cordoba made contact
between the two easy, so while Cordobans worked as judges in
Seville, Sevillans sought their education with renowned
Cordoban jurists."'" On the other hand, the status of
Sevillan justice during the eleventh century was notably
higher than that in most of the other Andalusian cities.
Biographers of the Andalusian fuqaha' and judges cite a
significant number of Sevillan figures, contrasting with a
handful from other cities such as Malaga or Granada.
1. For example, the Cordoban Abu-l-Mutarrif 'Abd-ar-Rahman
b. Ahmad b. al-Kubaysh worked as qadl in Seville (Sila,
I, p. 30^4-) - Examples of Sevillans who sought their
education in Cordoba are numerous, and include Abu-1-
Qasim Isrna *11 b. Ahmad b. Harith (377/987-I(.21/1030)
(ibid., p. lOlq), and Abu- 'Urnar Ahmad b. Muhammad al-
Lakhmi (d. 1+28/1036) (ibid., p. 48). However,
Sevillans did not limit themselves to Cordoba in
seeking knowledge. For example, 'Abd-Allah b.
Isma fIl b. al-Harith (Ij.07/l0l6-i|78/1083) studied under
two hundred and sixty-five teachers in al-Andalus
(ibid., p. 275).
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The manner and extent of the Malik! rite 's actual
application in Seville differed little from other parts of
al-Andalus during the reign of Banu 'Abbad. When al-Qadx
Muhammad b. Isma'll b. 'Abbad assumed the function of ruler,
it must be presumed that he appointed another administrator
to occupy his previous post of qadl, for it would have been
virtually impossible for him to carry out his political
functions while retaining judicial obligations.
Every Andalusian qadl was also a faqxh, given the
solid religious training and background in Islamic law that
were required of every judge. The influence of the fugaha'
in Sevillan justice was therefore great, as was their role
in determining the maintenance of its orientation towards
Malikism. The following are examples of fuqaha' (described
as min ahl Ishblliya or Ishblli or asluh min Ishbiliya) who
were contemporary with Banu 'Abbad:
1.) Abu-1- 'Abbas Ahmad b. Muhammad b. al-Hajj
b. Yahya (d. 1|15/102l|.).1
2.) Abu- 'Umar Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Umaw!
(d. 1|20/1029).2
3.) Abu-l-Qasim b. Ahmad b. Sa'ld al-Umawl
al-Muktib (332/963-i;28/1036 ).3
If.. ) Abu- 'Umar Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Lakhml
(d. I428/IO36).11-
1. Sila, I, pp. 39-^-0.
2. ibid., p. I4.il-.
3. ibid., p. I4.7.






















Abu-Bakr Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Qaysl as-Sabtl
(d. 429/1037 ).1
Abu-l-Qasim Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Fizazl
(370/980-435/1043).2
Abu- 'Umar Ahmad b. Muhallab al-Bahranl
0 0
(381/991-449/1057).3
Abu- 'Abd-Allah Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Khulani
(418/1027-508/1114 ).l+
Abu-l-Qasim Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Qaysl
(436/1044-520/1126).9
Abu- Ja f£ar Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Lakhml
(d. 533/1138).6
AbU-Ishaq Ibrahim b. 'Abd-Allah b. Abl-Qabus
(351/962-413/1022).7
Abu-Ishaq Ibrahim b. 'Abd-Allah al-Ghafiql
al-Lakhmi (d. 425/1033).8
Abu-Ishaq Ibrahim b. Ayman
(d. 460/1067).9














15. ) Abu-l-Qusim Isma *11 b. Muhammad al-Harlth
(377/987-421/1030).1
16.) Abu-l-Qasim Isma'll b. Muhammad al-Hadraml' 4 4 4
(d. 429/1037).2
17.) Abu-l-Qasim Asbagh b. 'isa al-Yahs! al-'Abdarx
(333/944-418/1027).3
18.) Abu-Qasim Asbagh b. Rashid al-Lakhml
(d. 440/1048).
19. ) Abu-l-Hasan Asbagh b. Sayyid
(d. c. 450/1038).^
20.) Abu-l-Qasim Thabit b. Muhammad al-UmawI
(338/949-426/1034).6
21.) Abu-Marwan Ja (£ar b. Ahmad al-Lughawl
Ibn-al-Ghasila (357/967-438/1046).7
22.) Abu-1- 'Asl Hakam b. Ahmad al-Bahranl at-Taliql
(355/965-426/1034).^
23.) Abu-Muhammad Hajjaj b. Yusuf al-Lakhml
Ibn-az-Zahid (d. 429/1037).9
24.) Abu-l-Walld Khalid b. Muhammad al-Adlb
(d. 436/1044).10
1. ibid., P- 104.
2. ibid.
3- ibid., P. 109.
4. ibid., PP . 109-10.
5. ibid., P. 110.
6. ibid., P- 124.
7. ibid., P. 127.
8. ibid., P- 147.
9. ibid., P- 149.
H O • ibid., PP . 176- 77.
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25.) Abu- 'Uthman b. Yahya at-Tanukhl
(d. 426/IO34).1
26.) Abu- fAnp Sa'id b. 'Ayyash al-Qoda'I al-Malikx
(fl. c. 453/1061).2
27.) Abu- 'Uthman Sa 'id b. 'Ubayda al-'Absi
(365/975-459/1066).3
28.) Abu-'Umar Sayyid b. Aban al-Khulanl
(d. 440/1048, at c. 87).^"
29.) Abu-l-Fath Sa'dun b. Muhammad az-Zuhri'
* 4
(d. 440/1048, at 80).5
30. ) Abu-l-Hasan Shurayh b. Muhammad ar-Ru'aynx
al-Muqri ' (451/1059-559/1163 )•6
31. ) Abu-l-Hasan Tahir 6. 'Abd-Allah al-Qaysx
(d. 450/1058).7
32. ) Abu-Muhammad 'Abd-Allah b. Mohammad al-Lakhmx
(d. 442/1050).8
33.) 'Abd- Allah, b. Isma'II b. al-Harith
(407/1016-478/1085).9
34.) Abu-Mohammad 'Abd-ALlah b. 'AH al-Bajx
al-Lakhml (d. 478/1035).^9
1. ibid., P- 214.
2. ibid., PP . 217-18.
3. ibid., P. 218.
4- ibid., P- 223.
5. ibid., PP . 224-25.
6. ibid., PP . 229-30.
7. ibid., P- 235.
8. ibid., P. 265.
9. ibid., P. 275-
10. ibid.
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35« ) Abu-Muhammad 'Abd-Ailah b. Muhammad al-Ma 'afirl'4 1
(d. 493/1099 K1
36.) Abu-Muhammad *Abd-Allah b. Isma fIl
(d. 497/1103).2
37.) Abu-Muhammad 'Abd-Allah b. Ahmad b. Sulayman
(444/1052-522/1128).3
38.) 'Abd-ar-Rahman b. 'Abd-Allah al-Hadrl al-Adlb'
) '
Ibn-Shibraq (d. kl8/1027).
39* ) Abu-l-Mutarrif 'Abd-ar-Rahman b. *Abd-al-Wahid4 * r* 4
al-Judhaml (d. 418/1027).
ij-O. ) Abu-l-Qasim 'Abd-ar-Rahman b. Ibrahim
al-OhaTiql (d. 434/1042).6
I).1. ) Abu-l-Walld 'Abd-al-Malik b. Sulayman al-UmawI
(356/966-^29/1037). 7
42.) AbU-Marwan fAbd-al-Malik b. fAbd-al-'Aziz
al-Lakhml Ibn-al-Bajl (447/1055-532/1137 ) •8
J4.3. ) Abu-l-Asbagh 'Abd-al- 'Aziz b. 'All al-Lakhml
al-Bajl (d. 473/1080).9























55. ) Abu-l-Hasan 'All b. Muhammad al-Ansari'# » 0
(395/l00l;-l|56/1063).l
I4-6 - ) Abu-l-Hasan 'All b. 'Abd-ar-Rahman at-Tanukhi
Ibn-al-Akhdar (d. 515/1120).2
57.) Abu-l-Asbagh isa b. Ahmad as-Sabbay
(fl. c. 519/1028).3
58.) Abu-l-Qasim 'Abbas b. Yahya al-Lakhml
(350/98l-ij.26/103^.)
59.) Abu-l-Hakam al-'Asl b. Khalaf al-Muqri'
(d. 1/70/1077).^
50.) Abu- 'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. Khazraj al-Lakhml
(d. 519/1028).6
51. ) Abu- 'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. Sulayman al-Qattanl
(fl. c. 519/1028; d. in his 60's).3
52.) Abu-Baler Muhammad b. Marwan al-Ayadl
(d. 589/1095, at 86).8
53.) Abu-l-Qasim Muhammad b. 'Ubayd-Allah al-Barinanx
al-Mu'ammar (330/951-525/1032).^
55. ) Abu-Bakr Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Ash'arl
Ibn-Abl-Muqni' (d. 526/1035)."^
1. Sila, II, pp. 395-
2. ibid. P- 505.
3- ibid. P. 512.
5. ibid. P. 520.
5. ibid. P- •r--OJJ"
6. ibid. PP . 585-85.
7. ibid. PP . 585-86.
8. ibid. PP . 587-88.
9. ibid. P« 590.
10. ibid.
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55-) Abu-'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Lakhml* *
-
al-Bajl (356/966-431/IO39).1
56.) Abu-l-Qasim Muhammad b. Isma'll b. 'Abbad
al-Lalehml (d. 4-33/1 04l).^
57.) Muhammad b. Thabit al-Umawi
(d. 435/1043).3
58.) Abu- 'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. 'Abd-Allah al-Lalehml
Ibn-al-Ahdab (357/967-473/1080).^
59.) Muhammad b. 'All ad-Urnaw1
(d. 422/1030).^
60.) Abu- 'Abd Muhammad b. 'Umar al-FarisI
/•
Ibn-Abl-Hafs (375/985-459/1066).
61.) Abu-Baler Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Qaysi
(d. 464/1071).7
62.) Abu- 'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Qays!
(a. 469/1076).8
63.) Abu-Zayd Muhammad b. Muhammad al-HimyarT
(fl. c. 484/1091).9
64.) Abu-Baler Muhammad b. 'Umar az-Zubaydi
(d. 501/1107).10
1. ibid., P- 495.
2. ibid., PP . 495-96.
3. ibid., P- 498.
4. ibid., P- 500.
5. ibid., P. 503.
6. ibid., P. 913.
7. ibid., P. 518.
8. ibid., PP . 518-19.
9. ibid., P. 527.
H O • ibid., PP . 536-37.
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65.) Abu- 'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. Abl-l-'Afiya
an-Nahwl al-Muqri? (d. 509/1115).^"
66.) Abu-Muhammad Musa b. Muhammad al-LakhmX
al-Mallah (371/98l-c .1^3/10^1) .2
67.) Abu-'Abd-Allah Marwan b. Sulayman al-GhafiqX
(3^5/956-^18/1027).3
68. ) Abu- 'Abd-al-Malik Marwan b. Hakam al-Qurashl
(386/996-i|62/1069 ).^
69.) Abu- 'Amr Mu'ad b. 'Abd-Allah al-BalawI
(3i|2/953-^l8/1027).^
70.) Abu-1-Padl Muhajir b. Muhammad al-Adlb
(d. i|51+/1062, at 68 ).6
71.) Abu-Tammam Muwaffaq b. Sa'ld as-Sulaml
ash-Shaqqaq (d. I|.26/1035> in. his 50's).
72. ) Abu-l-Hasan Mubarak Mawlly Muhammad
b. 'Amr al-Bakrl (d. lj.19/1028, in his 50's).
73.) Abu- 'Urnar Nizar b. Muhammad al-Qaysi az-Zayyat
(d. l|26/103i|).9
7i|. ) Abu-1-'Abbas Walld b. Sa 'id al-HadramX
al-Jabbab (d. 419/1028, at 55).10
8
1. ibid., P- 5i|0.
2. ibid., P« 575.
3. ibid., P. 581.
k- ibid., PP . 582 <y\CO
5. ibid., P. 59i.
6. ibid., P* 594-
7. ibid., PP . 599 -600.
8. ibid., P. 600.
9. ibid., P. 606.
10. • ibid., P. 609.
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Other f•uqaha' and judges originally from other part
of al-Andalus lived in Seville under Banu 'Abbad and
presumably worked there. Seville furnished many with
opportunities that were not to be found elsewhere, thus
attracting equally well-established figures in the
intellectual and judicial domains as in the political.
This flow of human potential to Seville was accompanied
by Sevillans visiting other parts of al-Andalus and the
(
Orient. Ibn-Bashkuwal presents the following list of
fuqaha' and judges as having lived in Seville (sakana
Ishbiliya) during or close to the period of Banu 'Abbad:
1.) Abu-1-Qasim Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Adlb al-Fardi
• « i
Ibn-at-Tunayzl (d. 1+16/1025 or 1+17/1026)."*"
2.) Abu-Bakr Ahmad b. Adham
(b. 357/967, fl. c. 1+25/1033).2
3.) Abu-*Umar Ahmad b. Khalaf al-Lughawx an-Nahwl
ad-Darlr (381/991-1+1+9/1057 ).3
1+. ) Abu- '"Omar Ahmad b. 'Abd-Allah al-Umawi al-
Muktib Ibn-an-NiyasI (d. 1+50/1058, in his 80
5.) Abu-l-Qasim Khalaf b. Sa'ld al-Azdi
Ibn-al-Manfukh (fl. c. 1+03/1012).^
6.) Abu-l-Qasim Khalaf b. Muhammad al-Qays! al-
r
Qurtubi al~Warraq (d. 1+37/101+53 at c. 70).
1. Sila, I, p. 38-
2. ibid., p. 1+5-
3. ibid., p. 57.
1+. ibid., p. 61.
5. ibid., p. 162.
6. ibid., p. 168.
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7.) Abu.- 'Uthman Sa'ld b. 'Abd-Allah al-Azdl
al-Firrishl an-NahwI (d. 1+29/1037)."'"
8.) Abu-l-Qasim Salamab. Umayya at-Tujlbl al-Imam
(365/975-^2/1050).2
9.) Abu-Sa'ld Simak b. Ahmad al-Judhami al-Wa'iz
• #
(370/980-14.3/1051).3
10.) Abu-Muhammad 'Abd-Allah b. Muhammad al-Judhami
Ibn-al-Bizilyanx (391/1000-1+1+5/1053 )
11.) 'Abd-Allah b. Sa'ld ar-Ru'aynl Ibn-al-Mamuni
(fl. c. U51|/1062).^
12.) Abu-l-Mutarrif 'Abd-ar-Rahman b. Maslama
al-Qarashl al-Malaqi (369/979-1+1+6/1051+).8
13.) Abu-1-Q.asim 'Abbas b. Ghayth al-Hamdanl
(335/946-l;26/l03i+).7
Ik.) Abu-Bakr 'Ayyash b. al-Khalaf al-Muqri'
(d. 510/1116).8
15.) Abu-Tammam Ghalib b. Muhammad al-Hawwarl
al-Ushbu.nl (376/986-1+1+0/1 01+8 ). ^
16.) Abu-l-Hasan Kamil b. Ahmad al-QadisI
Ibn-al-Af tas (d. I+3O/IO38).
1. ibid. P- 216.
2. ibid. P. 220.
3. ibid. 225.
k- ibid. P- 267.
5. ibid. pp. 268-69.
6. ibid. pp. 320-21.
7. Si la, II, pp. 1+19-20.
8. ibid. P- lj.28.
9. ibid. pp. 1+31-32.
10. ibid. P' 450.
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Abu-*Abd-Allah Muhammad b. Khattab al-Ayadl'
1
(fl. c. 419/1028).
Abu-Bakr Muhammad b. Mughlra al-Qurashl
(349/960-425/1033).2
Abu-l-Walld Muhammad b. 'Abd-al-'Aziz
0
al-Khushanl Ibn-al-Mu 'allim (354/965-431/1039).^
Abu- 'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. Mas'ud al-Umawl
(354/965-431/1039).^
Abu-'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. 'isa al-Umawl
al-Muktib al-Mu'ammar (349/960-545/1053)^
Abu- 'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. 'Abd-Allah al-Khulanl
0
(d. 448/1056, at 76).°
Abu- 'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. 'Abd-ar-Rahman
7
b. Shibrln (d. 503/1109).
Abu-Bakr Yahya b. 'Abd-Allah al-Fihri
(d. 507/1113).8
1. ibid., p. 485-
2. ibid., p. 489.
3. ibid., p. 494-
4. ibid., p. 494-
5. ibid., PP. 504-5.
6. ibid., p. 507.
7. ibid., P- 538.









(b) The Administration of Justice :
the qadl and his Subordinates
The multiplicity of qudat in Seville indicates that
the jurisdiction of one qadl varied from that of another.
For example, the qadl al-jama/a was perhaps the most
influential. However, it is important to discuss the
general nature of the qadl 's jurisdiction in Seville, the
limits of his powers and the extent of their application.
The extent of the qadi's jurisdiction in eleventh-
century Seville was contained within the limits set by
the MalikI rite of lav; and was comparable with that in al-
Andalus generally. The qadl was directly nominated by
the ruler, but to what extent his authority was subject to
the ruler's control is not a simple question to answer.
The actual authority of the qadl varied tremendously at
different periods and in different places, and depended
upon the personalities of both the ruler and the qadl.
Consequently, it is fruitless to attempt to determine the
specific authority of the Sevillan qadl by drawing parallels
with qudat belonging to other places or times. In theory,
the authority of the qadl is the ultimate source of judicial
power, but it is questionable whether the Sevillan qadi's
position was superior to that of the Banu 'Abbad rulers,
given the magnitude of their political control. It is
doubtful whether the Sevillan qadl was even in a position
to challenge the ruler; even if he was, it is unlikely
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that he exercised this right."'" On the other hand, apart
from, the ruler, the jurisdiction of the qadl was un¬
challenged within the limits of the areas under his capacity.
Both the strength and the weakness of the judicial branch
were derived from its practical position as a part of the
political system, within which it operated and the limits
of which it did not exceed.
The declared object of the Sevillan qadl was to
guarantee justice in the area under his jurisdiction, and
to defend the wronged and the weak who sought his arbitra-
2
tion. Despite the qadl's declared impartiality, which
was usually applied in practice, he was influenced by the
human and social factors which limited his absolute
independence. The qadl was, for example, subject to
pressures from the ruler and other social groups such as
the fuqaha' or his assistants (a'wan), which is possibly
why the ideal qadl was advised to dissociate himself from
"5
them in order to maintain his impartiality. The qadl's
assistants in Seville seem to have numbered at least ten,
but he relied on up to four other fuqaha', two of whom
constituted the majlis al-qada' and the majlis al-jami',
and occasionally on the advice of ministers.^" The
1. Some Malikl jurists recommended that the qadl
should act with restraint vis-sl-vis the ruler,
stressing the benefits of harmony and concord
between the two (e.g. Risala, pp. q-5)•
2. ibid., p. 7.
3- ibid., p. 8.
ibid., p. 9.
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assistants in other departments such as the that of sahib al-madina
♦ »
or al-hakim were indirectly under the qadi's authority.
The impartiality of the qadi towards the common
Sevillan was subject to his human limitations, namely the
qadi 's distrust of the common man as a result of his class
origin. The qadi was sometimes privileged socially and
financially influential. For example, the Andalusian
jurists recommended wealth as a condition for a successful
1
qadi. This argument was based upon the questionable
premise that the wealthy are automatically less likely to
be tempted through greed than the needy.
Was al-Qadl Muhammad b. 'Abbad's attitude towards
Sevillan justice affected by his political interests as a
ruler? In other words, did he interfere in affairs
formally under the qadi 's responsibility? Considering
his previous record as a qadi who was acceptable to the
Ban.u Hammud rulers if not the Sevillans generally, and
despite his experience in the field, the state of Sevillan
justice is not clear following al-Qadi Muhammad b. 'Abbad's
establishment as ruler. Although his brutal elimination
of political contenders reflects little consideration for
justice, his sense of pragmatism would force him to
guarantee justice to the extent of containing any internal
social unrest with the potential of threatening his
position as ruler. Considered within the context of its
1. ibid.
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relationship with the ruler's security, the fate of
Sevillan justice was similar under al-Qadl b. 'Abbad, al-
\
Mu 'tadid and al-Mu'tamid.
0
Other officials besides al-Qadi Muhammad b. 'Abbad
0 *
had occupied the post of qadl in Seville under Banu
Hammud,"'" but when the Banu 'Abbad rulers came to power they
invariably appointed officials to the post of qadl them¬
selves. The terms used to describe the appointment of
Sevillans to this post vary (e.g. ustuqdiya Ishbiliva,
ustuqdiya bi baladih, tawalla-l-qada'bi-Ishblliya). The
following Sevillans were appointed as qadl in Seville:
1.) Abu-l-Qasim Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Qaysl
(536/1055-520/1126) .2
2.) Isma'll b. Muhammad b. 'Abbad al-Lakhml
4
(d. 510/1019 ) .3
3.) Abu-l-Hasan Shurayh b. Muhammad ar-Ru'aynl
al-Muqri ' (551/1059-559/1163)
5» ) Abu-l-Qasim Muhammad b. Isma'll b. 'Abbad
al-Lakhml (d. 533AOij.1)
1. The Cordoban Abu-l-Mutarrif 'Abd-ar-Rahman b. Ahmad
0 0 0
Ibn-Kubaysh (d. I4.O9/IOI8) was designated as qadl in
Seville during the fitna (Sila, I, p. 101;). Ibn-
Kubaysh may have occupied the post of qadl at the
same time as Isma'll b. 'Abbad who occupied the post
until 510/1019.
2. ibid., p. 80.
3* Sila, I, p. IO3.
5- ibid., pp. 229-30*
5- Sila, II, pp. 595-96.
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5») Abu-l-Qasim b. Ahmad b. Mundhir
(d. 520/1126).!
6.) Abu-'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. Shibrln
«
(418/1027-505/1111)-2
7.) Abu-Bakr Muhammad b. al-'Arbl
(468/1075-543/1148).3
It is probably the multiplicity of qudat in Seville
which made it possible for non-Sevillans to occupy the post.
This plurality is evidenced by the distinction from other
qudat of qadi al-jama'a in Seville, as in other parts of al-
Andalus.^ For example, Abu- 'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. 'Abd-ar-
Rahman b. Shibrln (d. 503/1109), originally from Murjiq in
q
the Taifa state of Seville, was appointed qadi in Seville.
On the other hand, Sevillans occupied the post of qadi in
other parts of al-Andalus or the Maghrib. For example,
Abu-Muhammad 'Abd-ALlah b. Isma'll (d. 497/1103) worked as
qadi in Aghmat in Morocco, Abu-Marwan 'Abd-al-Malik b.
'Abd-al-'Azlz al-Lahhml b. al-Baji (447/1955-532/1137) was
1. Bughya, p. 3&5«
2. Bughja, p. 357.
3* Kharida, II, p. 220.
4. For example, Abu-l-Hasan Shurayh b. Muhammad ar-
Ru'ayni is referred to as 'Qadi al-Jamil'a bi-
Ishbiliya' (Kharida: Hist.Abb., I, p. 383)*
5. Sila, II, p. 538.
6. Sila, I, p. 279-
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appointed qadi in Martin in the G-harb,^" while al-Mu 'tamid
appointed Abu-Bakr Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Qays! as qadi in
2
Cordoba.
The relations between the Sevillan qadi and other
fugaha* were significant. For exanqple, it was recommended
that the qadi should have fuqaha' to assist him in super-
vising the bayt al-mal. The mushawir fi 1-ahkam was
employed to offer the qadi counsel and assistance. The
following fuqaha' are known to have occupied the post of
mushawir in Seville:
1.) Abu-1-Q,asim Khalaf b. Sa'ld al-Azdl b. Manfukh
(d. 503/1012).[|"
2.) fAbd-Allah b. Isrna*11 b. Harith
(507/1016-576/1083)
3- ) AbH-Zayd Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Himyarl
(fl. c. 585/1091).6
1;.) Abu-Bakr Yahya b. 'Abd-Allah al-Fihrl
(d. 507/1113).7
1. ibid., pp. 357-58.
2- Sila, II, p. 518.
3• Risala, p . 10.
Sila, I, p. 162.
5. ibid., p. 275-
6. Sila, II, p. 527.
7. ibid., p. 635.
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It was possible for the same faqlh to occupy a purely
religious office and a judicial one. Abu-l-Hasan Shurayh
b. Muhammad ar-Ru'aynl al-Mxqri' (451/1059-559/1163) was
charged with the khutba and occupied the office of qadl in
Seville, but it is not clear whether he was charged with
the two functions simultaneously. Others in Seville were
2
charged with leading prayers alone.
The khuttat ar-radd was a purely judicial office which
Abu-l-Asbagh 'Abd-al-'Aziz b. 'All al-Lakhml al-Bajl
(d. 473/1086) is known to have occupied in Seville. The
functions of this office, which seems to have been particular
to al-Andalus as it is not known to have existed in either
the Maghrib or the Orient, are not very clear. However, it
is not probable that this office was higher than that of the
qadl, even though it appears to have been basically aimed at
furnishing the citizens with a higher recourse if displeased
with the qadl's verdict.
!• Sila, I, pp. 229-30-
2. The following are described as having occupied the
office of sahib as-salat in Seville: Abu-Ishaq
• —# . » mmmm * I i ■ ■ ■ *
Ibrahim b. 'Abd-Allah b. Abl-Qabus (351/962-413/
1022) (Sila, I, pp. 93—94)5 Abu- 'Uthman Sa'id b.
'Ubayda al- 'Absi al-Muqri' (365/975-442/1050)
(ibid., p. 218); Abu- Uthman Sa'id b. Yahya at-
Tanukhi (365/975-459/1066) is described as
' ...al-Imam bi-l-masjid bi-Ishblliya... ' (ibid.,
P. 214).
3. ibid., p. 353.
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The judicial system in eleventh-century Seville was
generally healthy and fulfilled its basic functions despite
the disruptive political conditions of the time. This
conclusion on the state of justice in Seville should partly
be attributed to the Malik! rite of law which was adopted
throughout al-Andalus. The Malik! rite was rigorous, but
it tolerated the existence of independent Christian and
Jewish systems of law for the non-Muslim members of the
Andalusian community. Although Malikism in al-Andalus was
by no means tolerant in an absolute sense, critics have
perhaps exaggerated its intolerance, inflating the latter
out of all context with the reality of the historical, period
concerned. The MalikI rite has often been accused of
intolerance and reaction, but some of the most prominent
non-Malik! jurists lived, wrote and worked under the shadow
of Malikism as the official rite in the Maghrib and al-
Andalus. The burning of Ibn-Hazm's works has been indica-
ted as an example of MalikI intolerance. Yet the real
cause of the pressures exerted on the encyclopedic Zahir!
scholar was political and should, in the final analysis, be
attributed to his uncompromising hostility to the Taifa
system per se. Daring a period when political persecution
1. Ibn-'Abbad is described as having burned Ibn-Hazm's
works (Dhakh. , I, vol. i, p. 15-3 )> and the event is
further documented by Ibn-Hazm's verses expressing
his indignation (ibid., p. li-j-lp). Given that Ibn-
Hazm's death in 556/1063 preceded al-Mu 'tamid 's
accession to power in 5-63/1070, the ruler in
question was either al-Mu 'tadid b. 'Abbad or al-
Qad! b. (Abbad.
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was practised on a large scale by the Taifa leaders, the
case of Ibn-Hazm does not stand out as being extraordinary.
Furthermore, despite his fundamental disagreement with
Malikism, Ibn-Hazm was very much a part of the religious
establishment by his background, as is indicated by his
Malik! teachers and his dedicated students. On the
other hand, the great philosopher and jurist, Ibn-Hushd,
who was a free thinker and did not conform strictly to the
Malik! dogma, was a product of the twelfth century, during
which Malikism was still dominant. Finally, the role of
Malikism as a unifying factor should not be underestimated,
particularly during the eleventh century, a period when the
combined political, economic and social forces of dis¬
integration were totally released and the unity of the
judicial system in al-Andalus was one of the few forces
which contributed to social integration within the Taifas
and the final political unity of al-Andalus under the
banner of the al-Murabitun.
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CHAPTER THREE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE IN SEVILLE
I. The Economy of Seville
(1) Seville and the Resources of al-Andalus
The economic potential of eleventh-century al-Andalus,
conceived as a complete entity, formed a sharp contrast with
both the Northern Christian states and the Maghrib. Al-
Andalus comprised the most fertile and productive areas of
the Iberian peninsula, stretching along the Guadalquivir in
the West and including areas of Valencia and Saragossa in
the East, all of which were largely cultivated through
irrigation.
Seville's abundant raw materials and the richness of
its natural resources are a good indicator of the basic
strength of its economic potential. The Andalusian society
was basically agricultural and relied heavily on agriculture
for its basic needs. The importance of the rural areas as
producers of agricultural resources was therefore great.
Despite the high degree of urbanisation in Seville, the
countryside had an important role to play. The exploitation
of the rural areas in the Sevillan Taifa state is indicated
by the remarkably large number of its inhabitants. ALthough
statistics are not available, the large number of villages
in Seville was significant, even though the number of twelve
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thousand Indicated by al-Maqqarl is doubtless an exaggera¬
tion."*" Following the general pattern in al-Andalus, the
Sevillan rural areas were mainly based on an economy of
subsistence, but given the commercial importance of cities
like Seville, the rural-urban relationship was probably
quite well developed. The rural areas were largely self-
sufficient in wheat, which constituted an essential element
of nourishment, while products like olive oil were derived
from the abundant growth of olives. Contact with important
cities like Seville was doubtless facilitated by the avail¬
ability of a reasonable communications network and stimula¬
ted by the need for exchanging locally-produced agricultural
2
commodities for other articles which were needed. How¬
ever, the agricultural resources of Seville only attain
their full significance when considered in relation to' the
general situation in al-Andalus. Al-Andalus was considered
to be a major producer of olives, almonds, pomegranates,
plums and bananas, while fruits which are typical of cold
climates were grown in the North, not to mention fruits
which were particularly plentiful in al-Andalus such as
special varieties of figs which were grown in Seville alone,
■3
known as at-tin al-Qutl and at-tln as-sufrl. There were
1. Nafh, I, p. 210.
2. Transportation within all pants of the Taifa state
of Seville was only a matter of days (Subh, V, p.
225).
3- Nafh, I, p. 186.
- 161 -
products derived from plants - for example, scents, and
spices like saffron."'"
Minerals were a major natural resource in al-Andalus-,
where different regions specialised in the production of
particular minerals. Without being specific, Ibn-Sa'Td
mentions that 'the seven minerals' were available. Copper
was found in different parts of al-Andalus, silver was
extracted from_the regions of Cordoba, and the sand of
2
Toledo was transformed into glass in Niebla (Labia).
Marble, too, was extracted in various parts of al-Andalus.
For example, white and reddish marble was available in
Cordoba, and marble of lesser quality, such as black marble,
existed in other parts. Even though gold was imported
from the Orient and Africa through the Maghrib, some mining
zones were to be found in the Iberian peninsula. Like
agriculture, mining was more developed in al-Andalus than
in the Maghrib; and, besides minerals, other materials and
products such as wood and dyes, particularly red dyes, were
plentiful
Industry flourished in many parts of al-Andalus, with
each region specialising in particular products and
complementing the needs of others. For example, Murcia
1. ibid., p. 185.
2. ibid., pp. 186-87.
3• ibid., p. 187.
1)-. ibid.
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specialised, in the production of golden embroidery, carpets,
golden decorated beds, scissors, knives and arms; Almeria
and Malaga specialised in golden embroidery, pottery and
glassware; Granada produced a special colourful silk cloth
known as al-muballad.^" Shiny, colourful tiles known as
az-zullayjl, which were made in al-Andalus, were exported to
2
the Orient. Bows, arrows, decorated saddles and reins
and the ironware produced in Seville were particularly
famous, as were those of the Christian North.
This picture of the state of affairs in al-Andalus,
which is based on a later source that quotes Ibn-Sa'ld
heavily, also corresponds to the conditions during the
eleventh century. Firstly, both the vegetation and the
animals which inhabited al-Andalus during the eleventh
century were generally the same as they were four centuries
later, because the climatic conditions did not vary and no
major natural phenomenon occurred. Secondly, the minerals
and other industrial products described in our source were
widely employed during the Taifa period and even previously,
during the period of the Banu Umayya dynasty. By the
eleventh century some of the most splendid Andalusian
palaces and architectural wonders, such as the great mosque
of Cordoba, had already been built, with a large consumption
of gold, silver, etc. which served decorative purposes.
1. ibid.
2. ibid., pp. 187-88.
3- ibid., p. 188.
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Considering more particularly whether Seville was as
dynamic and developed, during the eleventh century, as is
indicated by al-Maqqarl, one is inclined to arrive at a
positive conclusion. The political and economic power of
Seville in relation to the other Taifa states, the high
standards of living in the palaces of Banu 'Abbad, the
important role of the Guadalquivir in commerce, irrigation
and entertainment, and the fame of Seville as one of the
major Andalusian cities, were well established during the
eleventh century.
However, despite the economic potential of al-Andalus,
the political instability that characterised the Taifa
period affected economic conditions disastrously in two
ways. Firstly, the political divisions hindered economic
co-operation. The acuteness and magnitude of this
political conflict between the Taifas, which were often
expressed militarily over a period of more than seventy
years, were worsened by its persistence. Secondly, opposed
to the political instability in al-Andalus was the stability
of Alfonso VI's kingdom of Leon and Castile, which permitted
the latter to reap the fruits of the economies of the Taifa
states by pressuring them individually.
The economic progress of al-Andalus was a major
material factor that stimulated the greed of Alfonso VI
and, later, Yusuf b. Tashufln. The political stability
of the kingdom of Leon and Castile and that of the Maghrib,
which contrasted with the unprecedented instability of the
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Taifas, together made the latter an easy prey. Consequently
economic factors, as a major stimulating force, must be
constantly borne in mind during our more detailed analysis
of the political relations of eleventh-century Seville with
other political entities.
(2) The Urban Economy of Seville
While the topography and local culture and history of
Seville produced a unique identity that was unequivocally
its own, Seville shared common features of social organisa¬
tion with other Islamic cities. It was one of the most
important Andalusian urban centres, and, given the scale of
the development of cities in eleventh-century al-Andalus, it
grew into one of the most important cities in the Mediterra¬
nean world, and has been described as such by medieval
travellers."*" Its geographical and climatical conditions
favoured its expansion and continuous growth. Its mild
climate, its solid and beautiful buildings and its splendid
2
river were the object of praise in both prose and verse.
Its villages were not only numerous, but heavily-populated,
with markets, beautiful houses and such facilities as public
baths. The rich soil of the areas surrounding Seville was
adequately cultivated and remained green through irrigation
during all four seasons.^ The cultivation of olive groves
1. Nafh, I, p. 151.
2. ibid., p. ll|9•
3• ibid., p. l£l•
i|. ibid. , p. 150.
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was so extensive in Seville that a traveller crossed an area
of twenty-five miles under the shade of olive trees. With
the facilities of the Guadalquivir as an important medium of
commercial transportation, and with well-organised markets,
the Sevillan merchants were enriched, largely through trade
in the locally-produced olive oil.*'"
The preponderance of Seville as an important urban
centre during the period of Banu 'Abbad increased con¬
tinuously. This can be seen even more clearly when its
status as a centre of great urban activity is considered
before and after the rule of Banu 'Abbad. Cordoba had
been the undisputed capital of al-Andalus par excellence
during the tenth century, and Seville, though an important
urban centre, did not approach Cordoba in any way. How¬
ever, by the end of the eleventh century, Cordoba had been
ravaged repeatedly. Possibly no other Andalusian city
suffered the kind of sackings that befell Cordoba either
in the number of times they were repeated or in their
magnitude. The armies of al-Mahdi, Sulayman, 'All b.
Hammud, al-Qasim b. Hammud, Ibn-Hii-n-Nun and Ibn- 'Abbad
all had a share in causing the gradual decline of Cordoba's
importance during the eleventh century. By contrast, the
increasing military and political strength of Seville saved
it from similar plunders, as did its formidable wall, which
al-Qasim b. Hammud failed to penetrate, and the Guadalquivir,
1. ibid.
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which flowed through the city, serving as a natural barrier.
The other important Andalusian urban centres were unable to
reach the magnitude and pace of growth reached by Seville,
for a variety of causes. For example, although to a lesser
extent than Cordoba, Toledo and Valencia suffered siege and
occupation at the hands of Alfonso VI and the Cid respec¬
tively. Other cities like Granada, Malaga, Carmona or
Algeciras did not have the potential to compete with Seville
as important urban centres, and were further weakened by the
attacks of the Sevillan armies. Saragossa was capable of
defending its autonomy against its Christian neighbours and,
unlike the other Taifa states, the armies of the al-
Murabitun, but its geographical location and topography were
not as favourable, agriculturally and commercially, as those
of Seville. Finally, Seville's predominance as one of the
greatest Andalusian urban centres following the fall of Banu
'Abbad is demonstrated by its adoption by the al-Murabitun
as their capital in al-Andalus, while maintaining their
original capital in the Maghrib, Marrakech. Seville's
growth continued, reaching its peak under the al-Muwahhidun.
The greatest weakness of the Sevillan economy during
the Banu 'Abbad period was that it operated in an atmosphere
of stability that was artificial. Like most other Taifa
states, Seville bought its peace from Alfonso VI by offering
him an annual tribute. The disadvantages of this tribute
were twofold: on the one hand, it was a permanent tribute
and, on the other, the tribute money was usually paid on
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Alfonso's terms.^ The effects of this burden on the
Sevillan economy were various. It was weakened progress¬
ively as Alfonso's army became capable of causing in¬
creasingly greater damage, and taxes were increased to meet
tribute demands, thus affecting the capacity of the Sevillan
economy to operate at its maximum. In short, the economy
was oriented towards insecurity and dependence. The amount
of tribute money that was given to Alfonso to buy peace
could have been used to secure peace by strengthening the
army and rendering it capable of its defensive duties.
Furthermore, the longer the period during which Alfonso
received tribute, the more remote the possibility became of
putting an end to it, because Alfonso's army was streng¬
thened not only by Seville's tribute money but by that of
other Taifa states such as Granada, Toledo and Valencia.
In other words, the weakening of the Sevillan economy was
in inverse proportion to the strengthening of Alfonso's
economic capacity, which grew every year.
It is difficult to determine or even estimate the
value of money during the Taifa period, because of the
contradictions one encounters. We find, for example, that
the rewards which al-Mu'tamid gave poets reached as much as
500 mithqalsThe 20,000 mithqals Frince 'Abd-Allah was
1. For example, *Abd-Allah complains of the dilemma
of having had to pay Alfonso tribute (Tib., p.
76).
2. Qala 'id, pp. 9-10.
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T_
to pay Alfonso exceeded this by fifty times. The 30,000
p
mithqals he finally offered were only sixty times greater.
So either the tribute money was little, when compared with
the rewards given to some poets, or the latter were paid
out of all proportion to what they deserved.
The amount of the tribute money which Seville offered
Alfonso is an indicator of the capacity of the Sevillan
economy and the size of its total revenue. The amount of
tribute money imposed on Seville increased every year, but
the lavish pals.ce spending continued. A continued in¬
crease in taxation, and booty derived from attacks against
other Taifa states, were the way to meet the weight of
Alfonso's increasing tribute. The portion of Seville's
revenue which should have been reserved for the creation
of a powerful army to face the permanent threat of Castile
was instead given to the latter in the form of tribute
money. Rather than removing the threat, the tribute con¬
tributed to it as Alfonso's army became increasingly more
powerful, partly through the tribute money, and its
demands became greater accordingly.
Was the amount of tribute money imposed on Seville by
Alfonso VI more than it could bear? Certain cases of
negotiations between al-Mu 'tamid's minister Ibn-fAmmar and
Alfonso VI seem to indicate the contrary. For example,
1. Tib., p . 69 •
2. ibid., p. 75.
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Ibn-'Ammar promised Alfonso %0, 000 mithqals for his military
assistance against Prince 'Abd-Allah of Granada."*" It was
only because Alfonso was able to negotiate an annual tribute
of 30,000 mithqals with Prince 'Abd-Allah that he refused
2
Ibn- Ammar's offer. In his negotiations with Alfonso,
Ibn- 'Ammar did not demand any money and his sole preoccupa¬
tion seemed to be to gain control over Granada, as is
indicated by his renunciation to Alfonso of all possible
_ q
monetary and material booty. The prestige that accom¬
panied any conquest, particularly of an important city like
Granada, is clear, but it seems unlikely that Ibn-'Ammar's
position was adopted because Seville was not in need of a
greater income. If this was the case, the situation had
changed by 1+7Q/108%, because the annual tribute had become
such a heavy burden on the Sevillan economy that al-
Mu'tamid sent Alfonso debased money as tribute. This was
bluntly refused by Alfonso's Jewish envoy, Ibn-Shalxsh,
which led to al-Mu'tamid ' s assassination of the latter and
the beginning of his open conflict with Alfonso.
Money was debased during the Taifa period and re¬
vitalised following the conquest of al-Andalus by tlje al-
Murabitun, which makes any comparison of figures over the
eleventh century difficult to sustain. The irregularity
1. Tib., p. 69.
2. ibid., p. 75*
3• ibid., p. 72.
1|. Mawsh. , p. 29-
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of prices is astounding, for 500 dinar's was the price for
participating in an attempt to overthrow a ruler or for
composing a pleasing poem."'" Yet Tamlrn of Malaga, Prince
*Abd-Allah's brother, sent the Qadi b. Sahl only 50
mithqals for his support in an attempt to discredit 'Abd-
Allah's favour in the eyes of Yusuf b. Tashufin, and
although the sum was returned to Tamlm the basic reason was
2
not financial. However, the irregularity of prices is
most bewildering in the case of the city of Guadix (WadI
Ash), second only to Granada in the Granadan Taifa state,
which was administered by a commander, 'All, during the
reign of Prince 'Abd-Allah's father, Buluggln, and produced
an annual income of 15,000 dinars. When the Jewish
minister, Abu-Yusuf b. Naghralla, was charged with its
administration, the income increased by more than five-
•3
times, attaining 100,000 dinars.J Given the significant
1. A Sanhaja shaykh named Firqan was offered a bribe
of 500 dinar's in exchange for his participation
in a plot by Yiddlr to overthrow Badis of Granada
(Tib., p. 32)' Before surrendering Granada to
Yusuf b. Tashufin, Prince 'Abd-Allah was exposed
to the pressures of Yusuf's commander, Gharur,
who forced him to pay occasional sums of money
ranging from 500 to 1,000 dinars (ibid., p. 115).
Ironically, an equal sum of 500 mithqals was the
price of al-Mu'tamid's reward for verses which
pleased him (Qala'id, pp. 9-10).
2. Tib . , p. 116.
3. ibid., pp. 38-39.
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degree of political power that governors were given by the
Sevillan rulers, it is possible that their control over the
financial administration of fortresses was equally free
from supervision and that they made corresponding profits.
The large sum of 150,000 mithqals, plus 500 bushels of
grain for his soldiers, was the amount imposed by Alfonso VI
on Ibn-Dhl-n-Nun for the latter's reinstatement as ruler
over Toledo."'" Contrasting with this large sum was the
gold amounting to 16,000 mithqals which was what Prince
'Abd-Allah was allegedly left with following his surrender
p
to Tusuf's troops.
II. The Social Structure
(1) Social Stratification and Mobility
The cosmopolitan features of the population of the
Taifa state of Seville produced a variety of elements that
were at times loosely and, at others, firmly held together,
despite differences of geographic or ethnic origin such as
lineage, clan or religion. Like that of other Andalusian
cities, the Sevillan population comprised a variety of
ethnic backgrounds. Many of the inhabitants of Visigothic
Spain had accepted the new mode of existence under Muslim
1. Tib., p. 77.
2. ibid., p. 156. However, Prince 'Abd-Allah may
have minimised the amount he was left with, con¬
sidering that he wrote his memoirs as a prisoner
of Yusuf b. Tashufln.
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rule, and a large number of the Sevillans had ancestors from
the pre-Islamic period. There was also in Seville the Arab
element, the influence of which was strongly felt politically
and culturally. Finally, there was the Berber element, which
was not as influential in Seville as in other Taifa states
such as Granada, Malaga, Carmona or Algeciras. There seems
to be no evidence of other groups such as the saqaliba, who
were very influential in other parts of al-Andalus, for
example Cordoba during the Banu Umayya period and Denia
during the Taifa period. However, one must not overstress
the variety of races in Seville, because these were fused
together over the years. The saqaliba and Berbers were
numerically insignificant in Seville, so the question of
their conflict with the Arab-Hispanic group does not even
present itself. Furthermore, intermarriage in Seville was
common and there is no sign of conflict on a racial basis.
On the contrary, tolerance xvas a general feature of
Andalusian society. Not only was intermarriage common
among Sevillan Muslims, regardless of their racial origin,
but Christian and Jewish communities were tolerated and
protected in accordance with the Islamic prescriptions.
Racial differences were further minimised by the adoption
of Arabic as an official language and a general attitude
of openmindedness that was nourished by contact with the
'outside world' through commerce and education.
The racial approach has been used most widely for
studies of Andalusian society, particularly during the
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Banu Umayya period, but without going into a criticism of
this approach it must be stressed that its validity for
analysing eleventh-century Sevillan society is nil, since
there is no evidence of racial conflict as a dynamic social
force. Economic and ideological factors affected the
social structure of Seville most, and these are clearly
reflected in it. Such criteria as wealth, occupation and
prestige conditioned the social status of groups in
Seville, but the latter were not permanent and static, as
is indicated by the high degree of mobility that charac¬
terised Sevillan society under Banu 'Abbad.
The social structure of Sevillan society was
horizontal, as wealth was unevenly distributed, but to
determine the exact class division of society without
imposing preconceived theories is a problem of an
altogether different nature. It is difficult to specify
the character of the hierarchical stratification, partly
because of the numerous contradictions one encounters and
partly because of the multiplicity of internal clashes,
general instability and gradual social erosion in Seville,
despite a healthy external appearance. The complexity
of the issue increases when the question is presented
1. See, for example, E. Levi-Provengal's classic
Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane (3 vols.),
Paris-Leiden, 195>Oj or Pierre Guichard's more
recent work Al-Andalus: estructura antropologica
de una sociedad islamica en Occidente, tr. into
Spanish by Nico Ancochea, Barcelona, 1973-
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regarding the existence and nature of class frictions within
Sevillan society. In other words, it is difficult to speak
of class conflict when class consciousness did not exist on
a wide scale.
The stratification of Sevillan society during the
Taifa period reflects the latter's general social, economic
and political evolution. Prior to the accession of Banu
'Abbad to power, Sevillan society was similar to that in
Cordoba and other Andalusian cities, where birth was an
important factor in safeguarding the political and economic
influence of the khassa as a dominant urban social class.
* *
It was basically through the support of the most influential
Sevillans that al-QUdl b. 'Abbad was able to establish him¬
self as ruler over Seville. However, as has been shown in
Chapter One of the present thesis, al-Qadx b. 'Abbad did not
hesitate to eliminate his most influential partners
immediately after he had overcome the dangers posed by
Muhammad b. Hammud and his army inside Seville and by
al-Qasim b. Hammud and his army coming from Cordoba. The
social effects of al-Qadl's elimination of the most
influential Sevillan figures were twofold. Firstly, the
court was not challenged by a powerful competing group.
In the case of the Banu 'Abbad rulers, this also meant
that their legitimacy as rulers would remain unchallenged
and uncontested internally. Secondly, the Sevillan middle
class was able to play a more constructive role. The term
'middle class' must be used with caution here, without
carrying modern implications and more because of the lack
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of a better term. The historians of the time did not think
in terms of middle class and therefore gave it no name, but
several factors indicate the existence of middle-class
elements in Seville. The climate of instability during the
Banu 'Abbad period was accompanied by a state of upward
social mobility which could only occur in a state of social
class permeability. Finally, taking occupation, income,
wealth or birth as criteria, we find that a large social
stratum does not fit neatly with either the most influential
class (al-kh&ssa) or the 'amma, which included the workers
» » *
and peasants. The 'ajmma was, of course, conceived of
by the Andalusians, and the word has been commonly employed.
Finally, the scarcity of information on the middle and
lower classes makes it impossible to satisfactorily answer
many of the questions that sociologists would tend to
present.
The rate of upward vertical social mobility in Sovillan
society was apparently great, although the inherited
traditional institutions and privileges remained, to a great
extent, intact. The improvement of the social status of
individuals was implemented through various channels. A
basically religious educational system, which was both free
and general, trained and prepared the personnel required for
every branch of administration, thus preventing the develop¬
ment of a caste society with birth as the basic criterion
for the division of social groups. The possibility of
improving one's social status existed either by working
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through the judicial branch, for example as qadl, through
literary skills, by composing poetry for the ruler's court,
or through purely political offices such as that of the
wazlr. The numerous examples of non-Sevillans who
obtained high offices in Seville and have been cited in
other sections of the present work, such as the ministers,
fuqaha' and qudat, are a good illustration. Their very
situation as non-Sevillans nullified the possibility of
their ameliorating their social status in Seville through
heredity, while their adaptation to Sevillan conditions
illustrates the fact that upward vertical mobility was
common and that acquired skills constituted an important
factor in the improvement of social status, in terms of
both prestige and income. However, heredity was
important, in that the political system was monarchical.
Both heredity and consanguine status were influential
factors in determining the privileges of the Banu *Abbad
rulers and their subordinate officials. One such example
was the minister, Abu-Bakr Muhammad b. Zaydun, whose
influential father, Ifru-l-Wizaratayn Abu-l-Walld 'Abd-ar-
Rahman b. Zaydun, almost certainly had some influence in
the nomination of his son to such a high office."'"
1. Following in his father's footsteps, Abu-Bakr
b. Zaydun attained eminence in the Sevillan
court, and was chosen by al-Mu'tamid as his
envoy to accompany the group representing
other Taifa leaders which was sent to officially
demand Zusuf b. Tashufln's assistance against
Alfonso VI following the fall of Toledo (Hulla,
II, p. 99).
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Despite the upward mobility in Seville, the factors
of insecurity and instability contributed to its limited
ratio of downward vertical mobility. For example, al-
Qadl b. 'Abbad's political contenders, including the group
of eminent Sevillan figures who supported his leadership
against the Banu Hammud rulers, lost their privileged
social status after al-Qadl b. 'Abbad's establishment.
Al-Mu'tadid eliminated many a privileged Sevillan, and
even al-Mu 'tamid stripped his governor Ibn-'Ammar of all
political power, with its social implications. In all
these examples, the loss of social status was a by-product
of political elimination. However, considering the net
direction of vertical mobility in Seville (the ratio of
those moving up to those moving down), the upward vertical
mobility seems to have been greater, partly because of
Seville's prosperous commerce and agriculture which were
the backbone of its economy.
(2) The khassa
Given the minimal impact of the traditionally well
established Sevillan families, and the sudden rise to
power of the Banu 'Abbad rulers, it could be concluded
that the ruler came not only to attract but also to promote
the newly influential members of society. It was therefore
under the shadow of the ruler that the new dlite developed.
The ruler's court in Seville represented the ultimate in
luxurious standards of living and exuberant life style.
While it embodied and symbolised the centre of political
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power, the court was an important ideal for society as a
whole. Despite its isolation and total detachment from
the reality of Sevillan society, and despite the parasi¬
tical character which was a fundamental condition of its
existence, the court contributed to shaping the hopes of
the famma for ameliorating their social status and
position, and of the khassa for preserving and increasing
theirs. Gaining access to and acceptance in the ruler'
court was, for many, the only channel for attaining an
income and power that their social status would normally
not permit them to obtain through any other means. Two
contradictory features predominated in the court: its
distinction from normal life in Sevillan society, and it
dependence on the latter for material support and human
potential.
The ruler's court was a world of its own in more
than one way. It was alienated from society in its
practical aspects by its entertainment, prestige,
utopianism and isolation. The contrast with the prac¬
tical problems of society was sharp, and its distinction
from society was characterised by several factors:
1.) The ruler was the central figpre in the court,
and the organisation of the court's activities was
essentially directed towards pleasing and entertaining
him. The ruler decided the dates, nature and magnitude
of the celebrations or sessions he held in the court,
and his presence and leadership x^ere required.
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2. ) The court was alien to the social reality of
Seville in its very essence. An unrealistic reproduction
of the Cordoban court of Banu Umayya, the Sevillan court
was meant to be associated with the latter's reputation
and prestige.
3.) The ruler's court was physically isolated from
society. The court's activities excluded the participa¬
tion of society as a whole, as the court was considered
to be above society.
1|. ) The court furnished society with an unrealistic
ideal, nourishing the hopes of the (amma without pro¬
viding concrete solutions.
However, the court maintained links with society
superficially and to a limited extent. It was from
society that its personnel was recruited. Recruitment
of any interesting figure was not limited to Seville but
extended to individuals from different parts of al-
Andalus. Perhaps the most privileged officials in the
court were poets. Not only were the latter duly paid
for their poetical abilities, but they were also employed
in political offices. The courtiers were not limited to
a certain class, and were recruited from different social
strata according to their abilities. Al-Qadl b. 'Abbad
and al-Mu 'tadid had poets in their courts, but al-
Mu'tamid's court xc&s particularly known as a centre for
attracting poets. Examples are both numerous and varied.
The poet Abu-l-Hasan b. al-Yasaf, who composed verses on
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Umm 'Ubayda, received five hundred dinars from al-Mu 'tamid
and x^as designated governor of Lorca."*" Abu-l-Hasan 'AIT
b. 'Abd al-Ghanl al-Husrl al-Qayrawanl visited al-
Mu 'tamid's court for a short period and composed poetry
2
for him. Passing through Tangier on his way to Aghmat
as Yusuf's prisoner, al-Mu 'tamid offered Abu-l-Hasan al-
Qayrawanl his last 3® mithqals for verses he composed on
that occasion.-^ Abu-l-Mus'ab b. Muhammad b. Abl-l-Furat
* »
al-Qurashl emigrated to Seville when the Christians
conquered Sicily, and impressed al-Muctamid with a poem
composed during their first meeting in Ij.65/1072.^" Ibn-
Hamdls personally narrates the account of his first
arrival in Seville where he remained unnoticed and became
frustrated to the point of thinking of leaving. He
suddenly received a message from al-Mu'tamid in which-he
was asked to see the ruler. He rode to al-Mu'tamid's
court where he was seated beside the ruler and examined
in his poetical capacity. Complementing al-Mu 'tarnid's
verses satisfactorily, Ibn-HamdTs had bestox^ed upon him
his due reward (.ja'iza saniyya).^ Al-As 'ad b. Balita's
Qala*id, pp. 9-10.
2. fhakh. , IV, vol. i, pp. 192, 203—ip•
3. Doakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 313J Rabat, fol. l8v.;
Bodl., fol.l7r.J Ihata, II, p. 112.
i|. Kharida, II, p. 102.
5. Diwan I.H., p. 5^-3 •
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verses praising al-Mu 'tamid are another testimony."'" ihe
best-known poets in al-Mu 'tamid's court were perhaps Ibn-
'■Ammar, Ibn-al-Labbana and Ibn-Zaydun. Although these
poets received rewards for their poetry, the attachment of
many of them to the Banu 'Abbad dynasty was not basically
motivated by material gain, as is illustrated by their
eulogies (ritha') of the Banu 'Abbad rulers. For example,
upon the death of al-Mu'tamid, several poets gave him his
last farewell in verse. Abu-Bakr b. 'Abd-as-Samad is
• #
known to have chanted poetry over al-Mu'tamid's grave in
Aghmat. Abu-l-Hasan 'All al-Husrl al-Qayrawani is
another poet who composed ritha' on the occasion of al-
Mu 'tamid's death, ^ as did Ibn- 'Abdun^" and Abu-Muhammad
b. Hamdls as-Siqilll.^ More than two hundred and fifty
years after the death of the Sevillan king, the famous
minister and poet, Ibn-al-Khatlb, visited al-Mu'tamid 's
grave in 76l/l35>9 and composed verses of eulogy in his
honour.^
1. Dhakh., I, vol. ii, pp. 297-98.
2. The verses in question are referred to or re¬
produced in several sources (e.g. Dhakh., II:
Hist.Abb., I, p. 307; Rabat, fol. ljyv.;
Bodl. , fol.llpv.; Ihata, II, p. 120; A 'mal,
p. 192; Wafayat, V, p. 21). The verses are
wrongly attributed to Ibn-al-Labbana in Kamil,
VIII, p. 177.
3* Dhakh., IV, vol. i, p. 211.
[(.. Dhakh. , I, vol. ii, p. 31^*
5. Dhakh., I, vol. ii, p. 313«
6. A 'mal, p. 191.
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Poets were frequently sent as ambassadors on
diplomatic missions. For example, Zuhayr of Almeria sent
wa-zlr Abu-Ja'far b. 'Abbad to Cordoba, accompanied by
his secretaries, the poets Ibn-Burd, Abu-Bakr al-Marwanl,
Ibn-al-Hannat and at-Tubni.^" Al-Mu 'tamid received a
• ♦ » #
mission from al-Mu'tasim of Almeria which was headed by
the poet Abu-l-Asbaq b. Arqam, accompanied by Abu- 'Ubayd
2
al-Bakrl and Abu-Bakr b. Sahib al-Ahbas. The missions
• • *
of al-Mu'tamid himself were frequently headed by Ibn-
'Ammar, and Ibn-Zaydun is also known to have headed
diplomatic missions.
The description of the Ssvillan palaces and life in
the ruler's court, as reproduced in contemporary poetry,
clearly reflects the splendour and luxury of the former.
It is equally clear from this poetry that this life style
deeply impressed the courtiers, particularly the poets,
thus stimulating their imagination and sensitivity.
This court poetry has a particular significance for the
historian, because it describes the psychological
atmosphere that reigned in the court and the nature of
human relations within the court. Most important,
however, is its value as contemporary historical evidence,
having formed an integral part of this life style.
1. Dhakh., I, vol. i, p. 261.
2. Qala' i d, p . 8.
3* Dhakh., I, vol. i, p. 290.
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The Banu 'Abbad rulers enjoyed life in several
palaces, the names and description of which have been
preserved in contemporary poetry. The wazlr Abu-Ja'far
b. Ahmad composed verses personifying the two palaces
when al-Mu'tamid left al-Mubarak for al-Mukarram. It
was in al-Mukarram that al-Mu 'tamid bid Ibn- 'Ammar
farewell as governor over Silves (Shilb). Al-Mukarram
is believed to have been the more recent and, transformed,
remains as the present Alcazar of Seville. The al-Wahid
and az-Zahl palaces, the latter with its dome, are
•3
personified in verse. Palaces such as az-Zahir and
az-Zahl are described with their gardens, fountains,
fertile land, etc.^"
The splendour of the palace halls was romanticised
by the imagination of poets. Sa'd as-Sa'ud in the az-
Zahl palace was the name of one of the most attractive
halls in Seville. Ibn-Zaydun compares another hall,
at-Tawriyya in the al-Mubarak palace, to the stars.^
1. Dhakh. , III: Hist .Abb. , I, pp. II4.I-I4.2, footnote
i|06.
2. Qala'id, p. 5«
3- Qala'id: Hist.Abb., I, p. 61.
[(.. Qala' i d, p. 25.
5. ibid.
6. Dlwan I.Z., p. 158.
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However, the entertainment of the Sevillan ruler and
his courtiers was not limited to the palaces. The
Guadalquivir was exploited not only for transportation and
irrigation, but also for entertainment. It was this
river that formed the setting for al-Mu 'tarnid 's first
encounter with I'timad ar-Rumayqiyya when they exchanged
verses and started their romance."'" The Manzalat al-Punt
was a site near Seville that was covered with flowers in
2
springtime. The beauty of Seville was deeply engraved in
■3
the memory of many.
(3) The 'amma: the Middle and Lower Classes
The 'HLmma is the Andalusian term used to designate
the least privileged majority, as opposed to the khassa.
The characteristics of the Sevillan 'aroma during the Taifa
period were similar to those in other parts of al-Audalus,
even though conditions in Seville differed in certain-
respects. For example, life in eleventh-century Seville
was generally more peaceful and stable, and the city was
among the more prosperous. On the other hand, the firm
control which the Banu 'Abbad rulers exercised served to
prevent any major popular recourse to violence as a means
of expressing frustration. The basic meaning of the term
1. Nafh: Hist.Abb., II, pp. 225-26.
2. Diwan I.Z., pp. 112-13.
3. See, for example, Ibn-'Ammar's nostalgic
l'ament for the city (Qala'id, p. 87).
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'amma designates the underprivileged, but a fairly success¬
ful middle class flourished in Seville which was not given
a name by the Andalusians. The middle class did not
organise itself to promote its interests as a social force
because of a lack of consciousness, which was overshadowed
by an overall collective awareness of belonging to one
community. The presence of the Sevillan middle class was,
however, strongly felt at various levels. The interests
of the middle class at times overlapped with those of the
khassa, and differences between classes were minimised by
social mobility. The actual existence of a Sevillan
middle class is indicated by the overall superstructure of
the political and administrative apparatus. The fairly
complex administration needed to run affairs in Seville
required the recruitment of a large personnel. Given.
Seville's political and commercial importance, a bureau¬
cracy of some size was needed. The political bureaucracy
which backed this highly organised system also required a
trained staff, and the presence of the middle class was
strongly felt in the ruler's court, as in the entire
political and economic structure. Owners of large and
small businesses and industrial enterprises, state
officials, and small land-owners combined to furnish the
bulk of Seville's middle class, and this must therefore
be constantly borne in mind when we consider social change
and continuity in Seville.
The famma proper consisted of two types, the rural
and the urban underprivileged social strata. It is
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difficult to determine which of the two was better off, as
both were underprivileged. However, rural conditions were
perhaps worse than those in the cities where industrial and
commercial prosperity benefited the tamma to a limited
extent. In the country, the governors enjoyed total power
and the pinch of taxes was felt to a greater extent, which
sometimes stimulated rebellion against the Taifa leaders."^"
The political unreliability of the rural inhabitants of
some Taifas such as Granada was an expression of their dis¬
content with the general state of affairs. It was also
the rural areas which, because they were not as well
protected as the urban areas by the army and the city wall,
experienced the greatest degree of suffering as a result of
attacks by plundering expeditions. In Seville, however,
the faroma were passive and did not express their discontent
by revolting, as was the case in eleventh-century Cordoba
where the tumultuous masses exploded whenever the political
2
climate made it possible.
There was a strong contrast with the wealth the Taifa
rulers enjoyed, and this must have sharpened the contrast
1. The major cause of the Lucena rebellion in the
Taifa state of Granada was overtaxation (Tib.,
p. 131).
2. Cordoba suffered most from numerous confronta¬
tions between different groups. The violence
began in lj.00/1009 after Abd-ar-Rahman b. Abl-
'Amir was overthrown (Bayan, HI, pp. 66-87),
and continued until the establishment of
Banu Jahwar in 1|22/1030, when peace was
restored (Bhakh. , I, vol. ii, pp. Illj.-l5).
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in the distribution of wealth, thus creating a certain
degree of awareness among the 'amma of their miserable
conditions. However, even though generally poor and
exploited, the Sevillan 'amma did not resort to massive
violence. Apart from isolated incidents in the market-
1 2 c
place, and cases of theft, the Sevillan tamma accepted
their fate. On the other hand, the welfare of the rulers
and the khassa perhaps contributed to kindling the hopes
of the jMia, some of whom were able to improve their
living conditions. For example, the army was an
attractive choice for some, especially when the Sevillan
army's successful expeditions are remembered.
Within the famma there were several groups. For
example, the slaves may be included in this category.
It is difficult to decide whether the condition of the
slaves was better or worse than that of free men. In
some cases, the slaves seem to have had a fair opportu¬
nity to manifest their skills and capabilities. For
example, they formed part of the Banu 'Abbad army, in
which case they enjoyed conditions similar to those of
their fellow-soldiers. As in the case of I 'timad
ar-Rumayqiyya, the concubine who was talented could
1. For example, see Dhakh., I, vol. i, p. 291-
2. Houses in the urban areas of al-Andalus were
often the object of attack by thieves,
particularly at night (Nafh, I, p. 203).
3. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 221; Rabat,
fol. 3^.; Bodl., fol. 3r»
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improve her condition. Al-Mu 'tamid 's daughter, Buthayna,
was sold into slavery folio-wing his deposition, but she
managed to marry her master, a Sevillan merchant's son,
when she revealed her identity. However, these isolated
cases do not reflect the general conditions of slaves,
just as the rise of some poets like Ibn- 'Amrnar and Ibn-
Wahbun from total poverty to al-Mu 'tamid's court is not a
true reflection of the opportunities that the 'amma had to
improve their conditions. It must also be asked whether
the Christian and Jewish minorities formed part of the
^amrna. Just as there were Christians and Jews who were
well off, others were probably in the same state as the
Muslim 'amma. Their chances were similar to those of
the 'amma generally. For example, there was no religious
condition for joining the army."'" Finally, despite the
general state of the Sevillan 'amma, it was not worse than
that of the *amma in other parts of al-Andalus, because
at least for some members of the Sevillan *amma there was
an opportunity for a limited improvement of their living
conditions as a result of the general prosperity and
power of the Sevillan Taifa state.
1. Daring the eleventh century, there have been cases
of Muslims joining Christian armies as mercenaries
and vice versa. This is not surprising, consider¬
ing that entire Muslim armies sometimes joined
forces with Christian armies against other Muslim
armies, while Muslim armies supported Christian
armies against other Christian armies. Examples
include the Sevillan army's alliance with Alfonso
VI against 'Abd-Allah of Granada (Tib. , pp. 69-
72) and Alfonso's efforts to restore Yahya b.
EhT-n-Kun to power (ibid., p. 77).
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Although the Sevillan 'amma were the least privileged
class, their impact as the basis of the entire socio¬
economic structure was significant. As an important
centre, Seville relied heavily on the 'arrima for manual work
such as loading and unloading cargoes, and transportation.
The famma perhaps participated in commerce at the lowest
level, providing salesmen with privately-produced agricul¬
tural products or hand-made articles. It was also the
'amma who performed domestic duties for the more privileged
members of the community. The ruler's court was served
and maintained by the 'anuria. Tne entire weight of the
political system was supported by the 'gmma, who constituted
the bulk of the Sevillan army and the lowest ranks of the
administrative apparatus. The equality of all members of
the community before the law was guaranteed, even though
members of the Sevillan 'amma were less privileged in the
social system of which they constituted an integral part.
The role of the 'amma was therefore of essential importance
as the most solid column which supported Sevillan society,
but, despite the contrast in living standards and conditions
with the Sevillan khassa, their conditions were not worse
than those of the {amma in other parts of al-Andalus or the
peasants in the Christian North.
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III. Social Change and Continuity
(1) Family and Personal Relationships
In spite of the weak documentation, it is clear that
the family unit constituted the central nucleus of social
organisation in Seville. The role of the family in
Sevillan society was of the greatest significance in
shaping the beliefs, attitudes and values of the individual.
Members of the Sevillan Muslim, Christian and Jewish com¬
munities were fully integrated in the family regardless of
their income, social status or group affiliations. The
Sevillan family was patriarchal, as the father was generally
responsible for maintaining the other members. It was the
father who made important decisions concerning the family as
a whole, which explains the high degree of respect he
received from the other members, although the implicit
influence of women was often significant. In the case of
an extended family, it was also the male members who
enjoyed the greatest degree of prestige. However, if the
role of the woman was limited in terms of her participation
in politics or public administration, her place in the
family was of utmost importance. Both the status and the
responsibilities of the woman increased as she grew older
and became more fully integrated socially. The role of
women in the family was similar in eleventh-century Seville
regardless of the denomination or racial background of its
members. At the court level, women exceptionally had a
great influence. Although not as powerful as Subh,
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Hisham II's mother, had been during the reign of al-Mansur
b. Abl-'Amir, al-Mu'tamid's wife was quite influential.
Much more of a public figure than any woman in the court of
'Abd-Allah b. Buluggln, for example, I'timad influenced al-
Mu'tamid's relations with his minister Ibn-'Ammar, whom she
disliked. Her participation in public life is evidenced
by an inscription which commemorates the construction of a
1
minaret in Seville in I4.72/1079 and bears her name. How¬
ever, considered within a wider spectrum, the role of the
woman in Sevillan society is badly documented, although
her influence within the family is clear, since she ran the
household.
As an agent of socialisation, the family had a strong
influence on the individual psychologically, and its impact
was lasting because it preceded that of other agents such
as the educational system. After his formative period and
maturity, the individual became involved in wider social
activities, but ties with the family always remained strong.
The individual's transition from the sphere of a protective
family to society was therefore gradual, and varied in
pattern and scope from one social stratum to another. To
cite an extreme example, the upbringing of al-Mu 'tarnid in
his father's palace was aimed at preparing him for the
throne, while the child of a Sevillan peasant was obviously
brought up in a much simpler environment. Given the fact
1. E. L^vi-Provenqal, Inscriptions arabes d'Espagne,
Leiden-Paris, 1931, p. ^-0-
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that our information on the family is limited, this being
mainly due to the fact that it was a purely private concern,
it is difficult to draw a parallel between the Sevillan's
behaviour inside and outside his family circle. However,
if the transition was sharp and abrupt for particular
individuals, it was generally smooth, as the family was a
basic unit of Sevillan society.
The nature of human relations in Seville was identical
to that prevailing in other parts of al-Andalus, because the
social forces that determined the latter's development were
identical and because it was linked by powerful ties
politically, educationally and socially. Human relations
in Andalusian society were direct and complex, and personal
ties were unusually close and highly developed. An intense
social life was a striking feature of Andalusian society,
which was a consequence of the existence of numerous
channels of socialisation. The extended family, the
mosque and the market-place were institutions that rendered
human contact unavoidable and widespread. Furthermore,
celebrations of an official, religious or purely social type
together contributed to an increased group participation and
mass socialisation. The individual was therefore fully
integrated into society as a whole, while maintaining his
specifically individual and group characteristics.
The clashes and contradictions of human relations in
Andalusian society were both a stimulating force and a
factor of stagnation. Personal relations were extremely
- 193 -
honest at times and unusually hostile at others. On the
other hand, personal ties reached an extremely high level,
not only because of purely material interest but also for
purely emotional reasons. It was, for example, possible
to find life-long fidelity. Passionate love sometimes
2
took forms that were both extreme and totally irrational.
We have other examples from Cordoba of individuals whose
passionate love caused the deterioration of their physical
3
appearance, to the point of presenting a pitiful sight.
Change of attitude in sentimental relations sometimes took
the form of verbal aggression.^" However, most contradictory
1. A concubine belonging to a rich lady had an affair
with the latter's relative and was flogged for it,
without ever admitting her fault (Tawq, p. 139).
The daughter of al-Qadx Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Yahya
wept for the death of her husband until she died
(ibid., p. 168). Even when beaten, a concubine in
the house of a certain Muhammad b. Ahmad ar-Raklza
refused to sing, have sexual relations, etc., out
of fidelity to her previous owner (ibid., p. 198).
2. 'Ammar b. Ziyad was enchanted by the beauty of a
concubine he dreamt of, and it took Ibn-Hazm's
rational arguments to convince him of the absurdity
of an attachment to an imaginary figure (ibid., pp.
83—8ip)«. There is the example of a lover who expressed
his passionate love by writing a letter to his beloved
in blood (ibid., p. 111). Most extreme are the examples
of Yahya b. Ahmad b. Abx- 'Abduh and Muhammad b. Yahya
b. Jadxr who became mad when the concubines they loved
were sold (ibid., p. 2lj.O).
3. Ibn-Hazm cites an anonymous example (ibid., p. 68).
On a social occasion the Jewish doctor, Isma'xl b.
Yunus, detected a lover from his deteriorated facial
expression (ibid., p. 8l). A Cordoban woman loved a
youth with such passion that she had to be 'cured'
(ibid., p. 239).
1|_. Ibn-Hazm narrates the story of how he forgave an
intimate friend who told others of the former's secrets
when their relations deteriorated (ibid., pp. 196-97).
Muhammad b. Walld b. Muksir al-Katib, another close
friend of Ibn-Hazm when his father was a wazxr, treated
« ■ .. ■■ i.-'
Ibn-Hazm indifferently when they met years later. Ibn-
Hazm'then criticised him for his attitude in a letter
and received a similarly sharp reply (ibid., p. 197).
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was the example of a pious woman who did. not feel her
personal integrity was affected when she helped a youth
by arranging a secret meeting for him with a concubine or
young girl."'" There were also non-sentimental individuals
p
of whom Ibn-Hazm cites an example."
Romanticism was an aspect of the practical social life
in -Andalusian society. For example Abu-Tusuf b. Harun,
known as ar-Rumadl, followed a girl from Bab al- 'Attarln to
a bridge where he expressed his love for her before she
disappeared forever. Mus'ab 'Asim b. 'Amr was attracted
by a woman who completely distracted him from writing a
letter.^" Romanticism also existed in forms that, far from
b
being chivalrous, were unpleasant to others.
1. ibid., pp. 139-40.
2. ibid., p. 69.
3. ibid., pp. 89-90. Ibn-Hazm himself narrates his
everlasting impression of a sixteen-year-old girl
he saw in his father's house as a youth and with
whom he was unable to talk (ibid., p. 248).
4« ibid., p. 122.
5. One such example was that of Muqaddam b. al-Asfar,
who regularly attended prayers in a mosque and
stared at a youth, arousing the latter's anger to
the point of being beaten by him. Totally un-
offended, Ibn al-Asfar found great pleasure in
the affair (ibid., pp. 129-30).
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Libertinism was in practice well-known, at least among
the khassa, although at an unofficial level and often
within the limits of secrecy. Ibn-Hazm cites a number of
p
examples. In Seville, libertinism was particularly
common among the courtiers, and was exemplified in the
behaviour of the rulers and ministers such as al-Mu'tadid,
#
2
al-Mu'tamid, Ibn- 'Ammar and others.
1. An anonymous son of a katib had a secret mistress
of noble birth and high standing (ibid., p. 91)•
A young girl was attracted by the son of a leader
and, failing to attract him, she kissed him, thus
stimulating his love for her (ibid., p. 162).
A lover, of noble birth, was abandoned by a
woman with whom he had had an affair, which in¬
creased his passion for her (ibid., p. 196).
Cases of homosexual libertinism are also
recorded, as in the case of Ahmad b. Path, son
of a katib, whose ethics were highly praised
until he fell in love with a certain Ibrahim
b. Ahmad (ibid., p. 123).
2. The example of al-Muetamid is representative.
Despite his passionate love for his official
wife, I'timad, he continued to be attracted
by other women. For example, he expressed
his sentiments for a concubine named Widad
in verse (Mutrib, p. 18). He also bid
farewell to a woman he loved in verse (ibid.)
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(2 ) Social Insti tutions: the Mosque
and the Marke t - .Pi ac e
The social significance of religion in Seville was
manifested at various levels and in numerous ways. The
role of the mosque as an instrument of social organisation
affected society in its near totality, with the exception
of the Christian and Jewish minorities, who were in turn
organised through their respective churches and synagogues."'"
The role of the mosque as a medium of educational
instruction had, indirectly, a marked influence on the
political system by moulding its personnel. Education was
formal in the sense that it consisted of attendance at
certain lectures by particular teachers who were recognised
1. There is no evidence of Sevillan churches or
synagogues that date back to the eleventh
century, as is the case for other Spanish
cities such as Cordoba where the synagogue
is still the object of visits by tourists,
but Christians and Jews did live in Seville.
For example, during the reign of al-Mu 'tadid
we have the incident involving a fight with
a Jew in the market-place (Bhakh., I, vol. i,
p. 354)- Tbe Christian Count Sisnando Davidez
is believed to have been employed in the court
of al-Mu ftadid. However, unlike Granada, where
the Jew, Abu-Ibrahim Isma fIl b. an-Naghralla,
and his son, Yusuf b. an-Naghralla, served as
ministers under 'Abd-Allah b. Buluggln's grand¬
father, Badis (Tib. , pp. 30—3^4-, 36-i+2, 1+6-$%;
Ehakh., I, vol. ii, pp. 268-72), the role of
the Christians and Jews was limited in Seville,
which supports our contention that the mosque
was the organisational forum for the near
totality of the Sevillan population.
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by the intellectual class.^ Yet lectures were open to all,
and no restrictions were imposed on attendance. The mosque
was unconditionally open, whether for worship or for educa¬
tion. Since the religious sciences were dominant in the
curriculum, the Sevillan fuqaha' were representative of the
type of scholar the system produced. The importance of
education in Seville is reflected by the prominent teachers
whose reputation attracted not only local disciples but
2
others from different parts of al-Andalus. The reputation
of the Sevillan masters was well established even prior to
the Banu 'Abbad period, and continued to flourish through¬
out the latter. Abu-Muhammad al-Bajl, perhaps the most
prominent Sevillan lecturer in the eleventh century, is
symbolic of the high quality of the Sevillan educational
heritage which stimulated the Sevillan fuqaha' of the
1. For example, as a sign of this recognition,
Ibn-Bashkuwal cites the teachers of many of
the figures he studies, with the intention
of evaluating their educational and intel¬
lectual capacity.
2. Although most of the non-Sevillan fuqaha'
who lived in Seville acquired their educa¬
tion under non-Sevillan (mostly Cordoban)
masters, Seville was sufficiently important
educationally to attract students from
'abroad'. For example, Abu-l-Mutarrid
'Abd-ar-Rahman b. Manfukh al-Qurash!t
(369/979-^6/l05ij-) attended the lectures
of Abu- fUmar al-Ishbill (Sila, I, p. 320).
Abu-Muhammad al-Bajl attracted students
even from Cordoba, two examples of whom
are Abu-l-Qasim Khalaf b. Sa 'id al-Azdl
Ibn-Manfukh (fl. c. lj.03/1012) (ibid.,
p. 162), and Abu-sAbd-Allah Muhammad b.
'Umar al-Malikl al-Hafiz (d. lpL9/1028)
(Sila, II, pp. I4.83-8I1).
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Banu 'Abbad period. Abu-Muhammad al-Baji's intellectual
influence was felt within his family circle, as his son,
Abu-l-Hasan 'All al-Baji, succeeded his father as a famous
lecturer and his students included Abu-l-Hasan Shurayh b.
Muhammad ar-Ru 'ayni al-Muqri' (551/1059-559/1163 )Abu-
Muhammad b. 'All b. Muhammad al-Baji was possibly the
2
grandson of the famous faqih.
The list of Abu-Muhammad al-Baji's disciples, whose
religious or literary achievements were sufficiently
important for their biographies to be recorded, included
the following Sevillans:
1.) Abu- 'Umar Ahmad b. Muhammad al-LaMhmi7
» #
(d. 4.28/IO36).3
2.) Abu-Bakr Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Qays! as-Sabti
(d. Ii.29/1037).^
3.) Abu- 'Umar Ahmad b. Muhallab al-Bahranl
(381/991-^9/1057).^
5.) Abu-l-Qasim Asbagh b. 'isa al-Yahsi al- 'Abdari
(333/955-518/1027).6
5.) Abft-l-Qasim Thabit b. Muhammad al-Hmawi
(338/9^1-9-^26/1035).7
1. Sila, I, p. 229.
2. ibid., p. 275.
3- ibid., p. 58.
5. ibid., p. 50.
5. ibid., p. 57.
6. ibido, p. IO9.











Abu-Muhammad Hajjaj b. Yusuf al-Lakhmi
b. az-Zahid (d. I4-29/IO37 )
Abu- 'Umar Sayyid b. Aban al-Khulanl
(d. i-i-lj-O/lOI4.8, at c. 87).2




'Abd-al-Wahid al-Judhamx (d. Lj.18/1027).
Abu-Marwan 'Abd-al-Malik b. 'Abd-al- 'Aziz
al-Lakhml Ibn-al-Bajl (Ijlj.7/1055-532/1137 ).
Abu-Bakr Muhammad b. Marwan al-Ayadl
(d. i^89/1095, at 86 ).6
Abu-l-Qasim Muhammad b. 'Ubayd-Allah
al-Bannanl al-Mu 'ammar (330/9^1 -1+2)^/1032 ).
Abu-Bakr Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Ash'arl
'
ft
Ibn-Abl-Muqni ' (d. ij.26/103)4.).
5
7
1. ibid., p. li|9-
2. ibid., p. 223-
3. ibid., p. 311.
ibid., p. 313.
5. ibid., p. 3i|7.
6. Sila, II, p. Ip87. Abu-Muhammad al-Bajl is
listed with the Cordoban masters. However,
all other references to him describe him as
having taught in Seville. Consequently, if
this reference is correct, then the obvious
conclusion is that Abu-Muhammad al-Bajl
taught in Seville and Cordoba.
7. ibid., p. ij-90.
8. ibid.






Mohammad b. Thabit al-13mawl
(d. 1+35/101+3).1
Abu- 'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. 'Abd-Allah
*
Ibn-al -Ahdab (357 /96 7-1+37A 01+5).2
Muhammad b. 'All al-Umaw!
(d. 1+22A030).3
Abu-Bakr Muhammad b. 'Umar az-Zubaydl
(d. 501A107). 1+
Abu- fAbd-Allah Marwan b. Hakam al-Qurashl
(386/996-I+62AO69)
Thus the number of Sevillan lecturers was by no means
small. In the list of fugaha" given in the section on
Justice, we find that they all received their initial
education in Seville, even though some sought their
further education in Cordoba or the Orient. On the other
hand, the fact that many Sevillan and non-Sevillan fuqaha'
taught in Seville indicates the internal promotion of
educational activity and a certain degree of self-sufficiency
in education. Sevillans who are explicitly known to have
taught, or whose students are cited as having attended their
lectures, include the following:
1. ibid., p. 1+98.
2. ibid., p. 560,
3. ibid., p. 5^3'
1+. ibid., p. 536.













Abu-'Umar Ahmad b. 'Abd-al-Qadir al-TJmawI
(d. 1I20/1029).1
Abu-'Abd-Allah Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Khulanl
* *
(i(.l8A027-508/llli|).2
Abu-l-Qasim Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Qays!
(436A0lj.Ij.-52 0A126 ).3
Abu- Ja 'far Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Lakhml
(d. 533A138). Ij-
Abu-Ishaq Ibrahim b. 'Abd-Allah b. Abl-Qabus
(35l/962-lj.l3/1022)
Abu-Ishaq Ibrahim b. Ayman
(d. I46OAO67).6
Abu-l-Qasim Isma '11 b. Muhammad al-Hadrl
• » •
(d. lj.29/1037).7
Abu-l-Hasan b. Muhammad ar-Ru'aynl al-Muqri'
(lj.51/1059-559/1163 ).8
Abu-Muhammad 'Abd-ALlah b. Ahmad b. Sulayman
(W4./1052-522/1128 ).9
Abu-l-Hasan 'All b. 'Abd-ar-Rahman at-Tanukh!
* •
Ibn-al-Akhdar (d. 5llj.Al20).l0
Abu-'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. 'Abd-Allah
Ibn-al-Ahdab (357/967-lj.37/101j.5) ,1:L











9. ibid., p. 283.
10. Sila, II, p. Ij-Olj-.










The significance of the mosque as a medium of educa¬
tion is also reflected in the number of educated Sevillans
who settled in other parts of the Islamic world. While
Seville attracted talents from abroad, Sevillans were
enriched by the experience of visiting different parts of
al-Andalus, the Maghrib and the Orient for purposes of
education, pilgrimage or commerce. Communication between
Seville and other parts was developed to the degree that
Sevillans emigrated abroad, where they familiarised them¬
selves with new environments and settled temporarily or
permanently. For example, the Sevillans Abu-l-Qasim Ahmad
b. Muhammad al-Hajj b. Yahya (d. [(-15/102and Abu-'Ami1
b. 'Ayyash al-Quda'l al-Malikl (fl. c. [|_53/l06l) settled
2
in Egypt. Abu-Bakr Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Qays! as-Sabtx
(d. i|29/l037) settled in Ceuta where he acquired his
kunya,-^ while Abu-l-Fath Sa'dun b. Muhammad az-Zuhrl■ ii ■ n i ■ i fci ■ mm' •
(d. i+l+O/lOW settled and died in Mecca at the age of
eighty.^" Finally, an example of a Sevillan who settled
in the Maghrib was Abu-Muhammad 'Abd-Allah b. Isma '~1
(d. Ij-97/1103) who settled in Aghmat.^
1. Sila, I, p. 39.
2. ibid., p. 218.
3. ibid., p. 50.
[4.. ibid., p. 225.
5. ibid., p. 279.
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It must not be forgotten that the weight of the
ulairia' and fuqaha' was significant in Seville, as in other
parts of al-Andalus, because their contact with the people
was more direct than that of the rulers. Furthermore,
religious men were often of humble origin with deep popular
grassroots. The fuqaha' often voiced the complaints,
desires and aspirations of the people, even though the
nature and degree of the confidence the people had in the
fuqaha' varied in different places and periods in
Andalusian history. However, their presence was always
felt as a force either supporting or opposing the govern¬
ment .
The mosque was an important medium of unification in
Seville, not only spiritually but socially. Added to the
unifying aspects of the mosque as a gathering-place for
common religious worship, and the psychological effects it
had in increasing spiritual cohesion and integration, was
the significance of the social aspect of the mosque as a
forum for assembly. Educational and religious gathering
in the mosque was complemented by a socio-political
dimension. However, the latter seems to have been
limited and controlled, because there is little evidence
in Seville of totally free political expression through
the mosque.
The general recognition and acceptance of the mosque
as the basic organisational social institution, and its
role as a means of politicisation and of transmitting
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information and state propaganda, are factors that served
the state by enabling it to exercise political control over
the Sevillan population. However, it is not possible to
specify the exact degree and nature of this influence. It
is certain that the state and the mosque co-existed, but
what influence did the mosque bring to bear on the state?
Although the top political decisions were taken in the
palace, and the market-place was where commercial
activities were regulated, and although the executive power
of the state was independent of the mosque, the latter seems
to have been the basic medium of communication between the
state and the people of Seville. Although information was
simply transmitted and there were no mechanisms for permit¬
ting open discussion, the state doubtless had to consider
the reaction to any decision it took and, consequently, to
conform to the general existing social framework. The state
had to work within the peripheral limits of the existing
social norms and traditions, and to be careful not to commit
grave violations of social conventions or religious belief.
Along with the mosque, the suq (market-place ) can also
be considered as a major social institution in Seville. The
full appreciation of the role of the Sevillan suq during the
eleventh century should be conceived in the context of
Seville's background as an important commercial centre.
Seville was the fastest-growing urban centre in eleventh-
century al-Andalus, and although some of the causes of this
development are negative, such as the decline of Cordoba and
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other large cities, others are positive. Seville's
agricultural productivity was basically maintained and
improved through irrigation. Snail-scale industry and
mining also helped to boost its economy and commercial
activities. Seville's political and military superiority,
and its aggression against other Taifas, contributed towards
increasing monetary circulation through the acquisition of
booty. Its economic prosperity was hindered by the payment
of tribute money imposed on it by Alfonso VI, but despite
the extreme gravity of its financial subordination to Castile
its economic survival and commercial prosperity were not
dealt a deadly blow. The end of the Banu 'Abbad dynasty,
which resulted, was in certain ways a political solution to
the economic crisis, and Seville's flourishing commerce was
not affected fundamentally by this change, nor was it
irreversibly paralysed. The most important factor and
stimulating force behind Seville's unrivalled success as a
commercial centre was its direct access to the Mediterranean
through the Guadalquivir. Seville therefore attracted
traders not only from other parts of al-Andalus, but also
from the Middle East and particularly from Africa, through
the Maghrib.
Tne fundamental characteristics of the Andalusian suq
have attracted the interest of modern scholars from the
purely urban and economic points of view,"'" but one dimension
1. See, for example, L. Torres Balbas, Plazas, zocos y
tiendas de las ciudades hispano-musulmanas, A.A., XII
(19/4.7), pp. I(-37-76, especially /4.I4.6-72, for the
Andalusian suq. For the wilayat as-suq in al-Andalus,
see P. Chalmeta, El sehor del zoco en Espana, Madrid,
1973, pp. 357-i)-9i|. '
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which has been neglected is its role as an agent of
socialisation and political consciousness. Despite the
scarcity of material on the eleventh-century Sevillan and
Andalusian suq, it can be reconstructed from the available
material on the suq during later periods.
The economisation of space constituted an essential
element of the Andalusian urban centres, and this was amply
reflected in the suq. Business was conducted in narrow
streets and small squares, often in the proximity of the
mosque, that other important social institution of the
Muslim city. Different areas specialised in the sale of
particular products, and while some markets operated on a
permanent basis others did so temporarily. The nature of
the products for sale varied quantitatively and qualita¬
tively, as did the size of markets and the scale of exchange.
The primary purpose of the suq in eleventh-century
Seville was to serve as a platform for commercial exchange,
which was regulated by the muhtasib or sahib as-suq.
Socialisation was, consequently, a by-product of the suq's
essential aim. There is no reason to deny the existence
of the muhtasib in Seville, but such an officer did not
enjoy the degree of power he did in other places and periods.
For example, the incident between a Jew and a Muslim in the
Sevillan suq in 1|_62/1069 was resolved by the sahib al-madlna
and not the muhtasib.^ It is not clear whether it was
»
because of the limitation of the muhtasib's authority or the
1. Dhakh. , I, vol. i, p. 25b•
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nature of the incident that it was resolved by the sahib al-
■' *
madlna. However, as a commercial centre, Seville required
the services of a muhtasib. Curing the Banu Umayya period,
the muhtasib had been subordinate to the qadl, but the former
gradually came to be designated by the ruler."'" By the early
twelfth century, the muhtasib was designated by the qadl, but
with the ruler's approval, as is indicated in Ibn-'Abdiln's
2
opinion on the matter. The muhtasib's role was aimed at
preventing fraud and regulating commercial activities, and
included the examination of the sizes of cargoes, weights and
measures. The muhtasib's responsibilities may have over¬
lapped the qadl's obligations, since the office of muhtasib
was intended to complement that of the qadl.^
The muhtasib was therefore not an official who was likely
to have been appreciated by the businessmen and salesmen, but
his role was essential for maintaining fair commerce. Further¬
more, the muhtasib's office carried religious implications, as
his major legal objective was: 'al-amr bi-l-ma 'ruf wa-n-nahy
. b
an al-munkar'. However, the extent to which this religious
principle was applicable in the regulation of commerce in
practical terms is more difficult to determine, particularly
1. Muqad., II, p. 577.
2. Ri sala, p. 20.
3* Muqad., II, pp. 576-77.
i|. ibid.; Risala, p. 20.
5. Mqqad., II, p. 776 ('Enjoining the good and
prohibiting evil ' ).
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when we consider that, unlike the mosque, the market-place
was a more worldly setting where self-interest was less
rigorously subjected to moral values and considerations.
(3) Social Disorder and Instability
Consciousness of the disruption of social life in
eleventh-century al-Andalus is illustrated by the protests
of such eminent figures as Ibn-Hazm, Ibn-Zaydun, Abu-1-Walld
al-Bajl and Ibn-Hayyan. As sharp and perceptive observers,
they were critical of a state of affairs that characterised
society as a whole, and they condemned the social trends of
the Taifa period with which they were contemporary. How¬
ever, although this criticism was sharp and penetrating, its
effects were limited and incapable of reversing the general
trend of Andalusian society. Ibn-Hazm's attitude x^as perhaps
the most bitter, because he was convinced that the system of
Taifa states was one that should be opposed since it was
intrinsically self-destructive. His piercing criticism of
both society and individuals resulted in attacks against him
and his isolation from the groups that preponderated
intellectually and politically."'" By contrast, Ibn-Zaydun was
not opposed to the Taifa system as such, and although he was
1. Ibn-Hazm, who was persecuted for his political
attitude, expressed his isolation in verse
(Dhakh., I, vol. i, pp. lljlp-ij.5). For Ibn-Hazm's
criticism of the Taifas for agreeing to pay
tribute money, of fuqaha' who exploited religion
for their own ends, and of the social ills
resulting from unjust taxation by the army and
the rulers, see the extracts in M. Asin Palacios,
Un codice inexplorado del cordobes Ibn-Hazm,
A.A., II (193^), PP. 35-37.
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critical of the Cordoban rulers and society he found him¬
self a home in Seville where he settled and attained
prominence. We also have the case of Abu-l-Walld al-Bajl
who, while remaining equally dissatisfied with the orienta¬
tion of Andalusian society, sought to reform it by
personally persuading different Taifa leaders to undertake
q
more constructive reforming policies. Another critic of
Andalusian society during the eleventh century and of the
Taifa leaders generally was Ibn-Hayyan, whose al-Matin is a
2
fairly critical history of the Taifa period. However,
this protest was not extended to organised social opposition.
We have cases of individuals who were aware of the
deterioration of social conditions; they analysed and
criticised it verbally, or in writing, but this did not serve
as a basis for a political- movement. On the other hand, it
is through this consciousness that the modern historian can
reconstruct some of the basic social features of the period.
As a result of the fragility of the existing social
institutions during the Taifa period, corruption flourished,
often remaining unchecked. To a certain degree, legality
became a relative conception, because, despite a unified
judicial system, where political interests were at stake,
what was legal in a given Taifa state was illegal in another
1. Ehakh., II: Rabat, fol. 28v.; Bodl., fol. 25v.;
Hulla, II, p. 98.
2. However, despite his criticism of many Taifa leaders,
Ibn-Hayyan greatly admired Abu-l-Walld Ibn-Jahwar of
Cordoba, under whom he served (Dhakh., I, vol. ii,
p. 117).
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and what was legal under one ruler became illegal upon his
replacement by another. The question of what was legal in
a given Taifa state acquires meaning only when placed
within the context of the legality of the Taifa state itself.
So although corruption was not encouraged officially, the
phenomenon persisted as a by-product of the system.
Corruption was expressed in several forms, of which
the most serious was perhaps the political one. Due to the
essentially frail basis of the Taifa state, spontaneous
violent reactions were the common means of preserving
political privileges and power. For example, those who
opposed a particular Taifa leader often opposed him from
'abroad', by seeking the collaboration of another Taifa
leader. Furthermore, the injustice of the systematic
elimination of political contenders was reflected at a
deeper level socially as corruption attained a serious level
and became widespread in Andalusian society.
Other forms of corruption were bribery, abuse of public
property and funds, and favouritism. Bribery seems to have
been common, and several specific examples are cited in a
series of letters by Ibn-Hayyan in which he describes the
activities of personalities, some of whom he mentions by
1
name. Although most of these personalities were Cordoban,
the comparable social conditions in Seville during the
Taifa period suggest the existence of similar examples of
fraud. Moreover, Seville and Cordoba enjoyed extensive
cultural and economic ties as neighbouring Taifas, and
Ibn-Hayyan's acquaintance with Seville, particularly during
1. For example, see the anonymous cases described in
Dhakh., I, vol. ii, pp. 100, 102, 1 Olp.
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the latter part of his life^leaves open the remote
possibility that the personalities he refers to were
Sevillan or lived in Seville.
Although there are indications that bribery and
corruption existed in Seville, their magnitude was less
than that prevailing in Cordoba."*" While, on the one
hand, Seville's comparative political stability as a Taifa
state contributed to the amelioration of the social
standards of living, the transformation of Cordoba's
status - from the central capital of al-Andalus to a
Taifa state that was subject to the attacks of numerous
adventurers and Taifa leaders - had adverse social effects.
1. Cordoba x^jas plundered on various occasions during
the fitna by the armies of 'Abd-al-Jabbar, known
as al-Mahdi, who overthrew the last ruler of Banu-
AbT- 'Amir, disposed of Hisham II and razed the
Madxna az-Zahra* (Dhakh. , II: Hist. Abb., I, p. 2I4J4;
Bayan, III, p. 61;). Au-Nasir Sulayman b. al-Hakam
overthrew al-Mahdl at the cost of great plunders
(Bayan, III, p. 112), and 'All b. Hammud succeeded
the former and imposed himself as a tyrant after-
acquiring a reputation as a just ruler (Bhakh., I,
vol. ii, pp. 78-79). Following the period of Banu-
Abl- 'Amir, Cordoba was ruled by numerous competing
adversaries none of whom was strong enough to
impose his rule permanently. Even the temporarily
successful rule of Banu Jahwar which was estab¬
lished by Abu-l-Hazm b. Jahwar in I4.23/IO31 (Dhakh. ,
I, vol. ii, pp. Ill;-l5) ended with al-Mu 'tamid's
conquest of Cordoba during the rule of 'Abd-al-
Malik b. Jahwar in I4.63/IO7O (ibid., pp. 12l|-23>) •
In the context of this instability, the example of
Ibn-Basha illustrates the abuse of political power
by high-ranking officials to a degree that was
never reached in Seville. Ibn-Basha ravaged the
remaining Banu Umayya palaces and sold all the
valuable materials he could lay his hands on, such
as marble, wood, bronze, iron and steel (Dhakh.,
I, vol. ii, pp. 111-12).
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The material prosperity in the highly-developed
Andalusian urban society aroused the greed of individuals
who sought to improve their living conditions by resorting
to illegal methods, and this phenomenon became more wide¬
spread in the conditions of political instability that
reigned during the Taifa period. However, this did not
pass unnoticed, and the attitude of Andalusians towards
some of the contradictions and injustices within their
society has been voiced by enlightened individuals who
criticised the malpractices of influential officials and
opportunists. For example, Ibn-Hayyan criticised two
anonymous underqualified wazlrs, describing them as
ignorant and undeserving of their posts."'" If Ibn-Zaydun's
critical attitude towards Banu Jahwar was caused by purely
personal reasons, Ibn-Hayyan criticised the wazir Ibn-
2
Jahwar more objectively. An anonymous Cordoban or
Sevillan figure, whose activities ranged from agriculture
and commerce to the silk industry, was eloquently accused
by Ibn-Hayyan of possessing exaggerated wealth, accompanied
by extreme ignorance, of abusing the property of the awqaf
2
and eating what belonged to orphans. He describes
another anonymous figure who raised market prices
1. Ehakh., I, vol. ii, p. 102.
2. For example, Ibn-Hayyan criticises Ibn-Jahwar for
having unduly honoured a common woman by attending
her funeral and allowing her grave to resemble that
of great kings (ibid., p. 107).
3* ibid., p. 102.
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artificially to accumulate profit, a state of affairs that
is blamed on the anarchy in Cordoba."*" Another reference
is to a common man who was uncommonly enriched during the
period of troubles in Cordoba, through fraud, injustice and
2
speculation, despite his illiteracy. On the other hand,
Ibn-Hayyan's criticism was not wholly defamatory. For
example, he praised Abu-l-Qasim Sawwar b. Ahmad very highly
as having avoided political slander, specifying his name
and identifying him as a Cordoban.^
(1|.) Conclusion: Social Integration
Sevillan society was firmly integrated and succeeded
in resisting the shocks resulting from the establishment of
different systems. Having adapted itself to the Bauu
'Abbad rulers, Sevillan society maintained its basic
structural composition which continued to survive under the
al-Murabitun.
«
Determination of the social integration of Sevillan
society requires the examination of the interrelationship
of its units. The members of Sevillan society were, to
some extent, loyal to one another and to their social
system. One indication is the high ratio of non-Sevillans
who poured into the city during this period. Although the
1. ibid., p. IO3.
2. ibid., pp. 101^.-5.
3. ibid., p. IO9.
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basic factor in the social integration of Sevillan society
was the fear of external threats, which explains its
fragility, solidarity and morale were high enough to
produce a general willingness among the Sevillans to unite
in their common struggle for survival. Furthermore, the
prosperity of Seville indicates that there was much to
protect. Co-operative activities such as commerce and
agriculture required decision-making and a hierarchy of
authority, with a legitimised power to give orders, while
regulative norms directed the highly-developed urban life
in Seville. The integrity of the social system was
maintained through social control or the standardisation of
reaction to violations. Disputes concerning the inter¬
pretation of relational or regulative norms, or regarding
factual aspects of conflicts of interest, were resolved
by having recourse either to non-official arrangements such
as traditional conventions, or to official, institutions
such as the police or the qadl.
The change in Seville was basically political and
economic and, to a lesser extent, social. The significance
of this political-economic transition must, however, be
understood in terms of its social implications. Sevillan
society was not transformed totally, but simply altered,as
a consequence of the Banu 'Abbad regime. The political
rulers previous to and during the period of Banu 'Abbad
all ruled over the Sevillans and rarely through them, which
indicates the political subordination to which Sevillan
society was subjected. The evolution of Sevillan society
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was regular, and its mutations progressed consistently.
The depoliticisation of Sevillan society was partly
compensated for by an active engagement in commercial or
industrial activities, but the social tensions, conflict
and occasional outbursts of violence were partly the result
of this suppression or limitation of political activities.
The type of social change in Sevillan society was not
a change in core-values. Any changes in Sevillan society
during the period of Banu 'Abbad must not be sought as a
variation of its structure or fundamental social institu¬
tions and norms. Rather, change in Sevillan society must
be conceived as a by-product of the interrelationship between
the political system and society. The social implications
of the triumph of the Banu 'Abbad dynasty were produced by
the political and economic autonomy of Sevillan society.
Gradual social change occurred consistently during the
period of Banu 'Abbad; but, rather than a structural
change, it was a quasi-structural or distributional type
of change, as the fundamental social structure of Seville
remained intact despite the superficial outward changes
that persisted throughout the period of Banu 'Abbad.
Newly-arrived elements, both individuals and groups,
acquired privileged positions in the political, and
administrative system. However, despite the misfortunes
that befell the few individuals whom al-Qadi Muhammad b.
'Abbad and al-Mu 'tadid swept away when consolidating their
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power, the traditional elite preserved their inherited
privileges and continued to survive side by side with
the newly-established Banu 'Abbad rulers. There was
also no fundamental improvement in the conditions and




I. Phases of the History of Seville under Banu 'Abbad
Many writers on the history of Seville under Banu 'Abbad
have attempted to subdivide the period into several phases.
The manner of these divisions and the reasons behind them
have varied in accordance with the different features that
various authors wished to stress. As early as the first
part of the twelfth century, Ibn-Bassam devoted three
separate sections in part two of his Adh-Bhakhira to al-Qadi
b. fAbbad, al-Mu'tadid and al-Mu'tamid, and although their
literary achievements constituted his primary concern he
studied their historical background, relying exclusively on
Ibn-Hayyan."'" It is important to observe that Ibn-Bassam
1. Dhakh. . II: Hist.Abb. . I, pp. 220-25, 21+1-59, 296-321+;
Rabat, fols. 2r.-2l+v.; Bodl. , fols. 2r.-21v. One
observes that it is only the fact that Ibn-Bassam
specifically recognises the importance of the histori¬
cal aspect of the background of the figures he studies
that permits us to isolate a historical dimension in
his approach. However, in general terms, Ibn-Bassam's
approach is basically centred on the model of bio¬
graphical dictionaries, and Adh-Dhakhira is indeed
foremost a biographical dictionary of Andalusian
literary figures. On the other hand, other authors of
biographical dictionaries differed by limiting them¬
selves to the presentation of literary or descriptive
information, thus lacking any historical dimension in
their approach,, Examples of biographers of this type
who studied some of the major Sevillan personalities
during the Banu 'Abbad period include Ibn-Khallikan
(Wafayat al-A'yan), Ibn-Khaqan (Qala'id al-'lqyan)
and Ibn-Farhun (Kitab ad-D~baj).
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surveyed the particular historical environment and main
events of the periods during which al-Qadl, al-Mu'tadid and
al-Mu'tamid b. 'Abbad and other Sevillan figures livedo
focusing primarily on the general historical background of
Seville. He therefore considered himself justified in
including individual historical phases to illustrate and
complement the literary aspects of each figure he studied.
Other historians have described Seville 's history during the
Banu 'Abbad period chronologically, as a part of their
general narrative and essentially descriptive approach to
the study of al-Andalus .
More recently, Hussayn Monds suggested that the Taifa
period be subdivided into three phases: IOO9-IO3I, 1031-
IO/4.O or IO/4.5, and IO/4.5-IO9O. The following constitute the
general features of the approach to eleventh-century al-
2
Andalus suggested by H. Monds:
1.) First phase: The first phase is that of the
disintegration of the Cordoban Caliphate during which the
would-be princes of the Taifas played a passive role, either
watching the fratricidal strife that revolved around the
struggle for the Caliphate or participating, to a limited
degree, in support of different struggling factions.
1. Examples include Ibn-'idharl (Bayan, III, pp. 193-
216), al-Marrakushl (Mu '.jib, pp. 93-1135-61)
and Ibn-al-Khatlb (A fmal, pp. 177-97).
2. Consideraciones, pp. 319-22.
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2.) Second phase: -After the end of the Caliphate on
the 20 November IO31, the formative period of the Taifas
begins, with different governors, military commanders, or
simple opportunists engaging in the task of attempting to
transform their province, city or even castle into a
principality. This was a period when the map of al-Andalus
changed constantly as a result of the conflicts between the
weaker and the more powerful Taifa leaders attaining an
unprecedented level of fratricidal violence. By about
10lj_0 or IOI4.5, the constitution of the major Taifas attained
its final form, one which remained essentially unaltered
throughout the remaining part of the Taifa period.
3-) Third phase: The third and final phase is that
of the maturity of the Taifas. The most important Taifas,
namely Seville, Badajoz, Granada, Valencia, Tenia and
Saragossa, could be studied individually. The climax of
the Taifa period is reached with the intervention of the
al-Murabitun and the reunification of al-Andalus. This
subsection could be followed by a conclusion on the whole
panorama of the eleventh century.
Although H. Mon&s is one of the few historians who
have attempted to present an approach to the political
history of eleventh-century al-Andalus in its totality,
his previous interpretations and conclusions on the
Banu Umayya period are partly reflected when considering
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1
the Taifa period. The latter is indeed conceived as a
prolongation of the period of Banu-Abl- 'Amir, and H. Mends
attempts to illustrate how the major founding leaders of
the most prominent Taifas (e.g. Banu Hammud of Malaga,
Algeciras and Cordoba, Banu 'Abbad of Seville, Banu Sumadih
of Almeria, Banu al-Aftas of Badajoz, Banu Razln of Santa
Maria of Albarrasln (Sahla) and Banu Bhi-n-Nun of Toledo)
were 'disciples' of al-Mansur [b. Abl-'Ariir]. H. Monks'
approach to the Taifa period is retroactive in that it
devalues the original independent forces that were in
evidence during the Taifa period. When studying the Taifa
period, H. Monds is principally concerned with attempting to
detect the causes of the collapse of the Banu Umayya dynasty.
The collapse of the Banu Umayya dynasty having been an un¬
usually rapid phenomenon, and for this reason alone extremely
difficult to explain satisfactorily, the search for new causes,
or the further elaboration of those already put forward, has
been extended to the Taifa period. Consequently, the Taifa
1. Although the tendency to perceive the Taifa period
from an angle that presumes the exclusive legality
and legitimacy of the Banu Umayya dynasty is common
among modern historians, a similar attitude was
adopted by Andalusian figures as early as the eleventh
century. For example, Ibn-Hazm is unable to accept or
comprehend the actual disintegration of al-Andalus into
Taifas when he expresses his indignation because the
Friday khutba was simultaneously read in the name of
four Caliphs: Khalaf al-Husrl, impersonating Hisham
II, in Seville, Muhammad b. al-Qasim b. 'All b. Hammud
in Algeciras, Muhammad b. Idris b. 'All b. Hammud in
Malaga and Idris b. Yahya b. 'All b. Hammud in Ceuta
(Naqt, p. 25).
2. Consideraciones, pp. 12l|-28, 313-19.
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period is only approached insofar as it is capable of
throwing more light on the previous Banu Umayya period (or
the following period of the al-Murabitun) and not as an
independent period of sufficient interest in itself.
The subdivision of the Banu 'Abbad period implies that
the latter was characterised by a certain degree of homo¬
geneity, because one can obviously only divide something
that already enjoys a certain level of unity. Socially,
economically and politically, the Taifa state of Seville
evolved along coherent lines, and its progress can be
conceived in terms of infancy, maturity and senility,
despite the limitations of this approach.
The three-phase approach to Seville's history presents
a number of advantages when considering its internal
politics. For example, in Chapter One of the present
thesis, the separate concentration on the periods of al-
Qjadl, al-Mu'tadid and al-Mu'tamid b. 'Abbad has made
possible a more profound analysis of the causes behind the
rise and fall of the Banu 'Abbad rulers, placing each in
his own background with its specific characteristics and
conditions, without of course neglecting the comprehensive
framework. This division is practical because each ruler
was basically concerned with a different, if related, phase
of the internal evolution of the Taifa state of Seville.
Where foreign policy is concerned, however, a division of
the period into discrete phases seems less practical. It
is more illuminating to trace the general outline of
Seville's foreign policy as a whole, analysing its long-
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and short-term objectives, the methods applied to attain
them, and concluding with a general evaluation of the
foreign policy.
Just as the division of time into centuries is
relative, the period of Banu 'Abbad can only be selected
and isolated at an abstract level, as a matter of con¬
venience, thus limiting the area of specialisation and
making possible a deeper penetration and understanding of
the period. However, in reality, the history of the Taifa
state of Seville forms an integral part of eleventh-century
al-Andalus, sharing its outstanding features and having
been determined by identical internal causes and external
pressures and influences. V/ithout an understanding of the
nature of Seville 's contact with other political entities
and the forces which stimulated their relations, a full
appreciation of the various dimensions of Seville's foreign
policy is impossible.
II. Foreign Policy Objectives
Seville's foreign policy during the Banu 'Abbad period
must be placed within the wider spectrum of 'international'
relations if its potential and limitations are to be
properly evaluated in the context of the surrounding and
neighbouring political entities. In its capacity as a
Taifa state, Seville influenced the destiny of other
political units, but the general course of its foreign
policy was, in turn, progressively and, in the end, fatally
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affected by external influences. The general pattern
that resulted reflects Seville's ability to dominate the
politically and economically weaker Taifas while being,
in turn, economically and politically submissive to the
larger states in a manner that appears extremely passive
and at times almost wilful. This duality of Seville's
foreign policy - that is, its aggression on the one hand
and its submissive indifferonce on the other - is clearly
reflected on the military plane. The immediate effects
of this contradiction were positive inasmuch as Seville
gained the appearance of a healthy and powerful Taifa
state. However, the contradiction and duality in
Seville's foreign policy perpetuated the internal imbalance
within this policy. The conflict which resulted from this
contradiction ensured that the growth of the influences and
pressures exerted on Seville by the larger political
entities remained unchecked, attaining such uncontrollable
proportions that Seville could no longer confront or even
contain them.
A major strand in Seville's foreign policy was its
political isolationism. Even though Seville signed
treaties of peace and formed alliances with both the
smaller and the larger states with which it maintained
relations, its ties with them remained marginal. Alliances
and coalitions were only decided on as a temporary measure
to obtain particular objectives. Seville's foreign
policy was based on the presumed hostility, of all other
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political units. Although Seville was initially threatened
by the Taifa leaders of Cordoba, Malaga and Badajoz, its
hostile reaction to the initial threats of certain Taifa
leaders during the early Taifa period^seems to have been
extended to the Taifa states generally and adopted as an
integral part of its foreign policy. Seville's continued
aggression against the weaker Taifa states clearly reflects
its hostility, while all agreement or collaboration with the
larger states was stimulated by purely pragmatic motives.
Seville's foreign policy was ideologically either
antagonistic or indifferent to the smaller Taifa states.
The ties which had previously linked the different regions
of al-Andalus politically, economically, socially and
culturally, were forgotten totally, and the maintenance of
Seville's autonomy and its military and territorial
expansion were the central consideration in the formulation
of its foreign policy. One important reason for this was,
of course, the false assumption of the Sevillans that their
military superiority, limited though it was, over the other
Taifa states would enable them to overpower and swallow up
the latter one by one.''' As a result, Seville never
attempted to peacefully attract the other Taifas into its
sphere of influence, a policy which might have enabled
1. Other Taifa leaders, however, were fully aware of the
stalemate that resulted from the finely balanced
power among the Taifas. For example, Prince 'Abd-
Allah was fully conscious of how this situation was
exploited by Alfonso VI (Tib., p. 69).
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Seville to lead the other Taifas in unison. Instead,
Seville consistently wielded its political and military
power with the intention of annihilating the other Taifa
states. This produced a strong reaction by the Taifa
leaders who were forced to struggle for their very survival
and to regard Seville with suspicion, fear and hatred.
The negative long-term effects of Seville's foreign policy
must therefore be placed in the context of the total
interdependence of its fate with that of other Taifa states
and the relationship between the common security of the
Taifa states as a whole, vis-d-vis the Christian North and
the Maghrib. This Seville, like other Taifa states,
failed to grasp, and the final price for this shortsighted¬
ness was no less than the end of the political and economic
existence of all the Taifa states, with the exception of
Saragossa.
Though fluctuating at times, the general course of
Seville's foreign policy from lpLl;/1023 to I4.8I4./1091 is clear
and consistent, if self-defeating in the final analysis.
The aims of Seville's foreign policy were equally clear to
those who pursued them, but were limited in terms of their
long-term benefits and soundness. The long-term objectives
were often confused with immediate goals, and the end and
the means were sometimes one and the same. The foreign
policy of the Taifa states was basically characterised by
two flaws. Firstly, they overlooked their ultimate
interest, which was the safeguarding and promotion of their
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political and economic future. Yet it is perhaps naive to
expect this from the Taifa states when their very existence
contained the ingredients of their final self-destruction.
Secondly, the Taifa states rarely took the initiative, so
that, rather than planning a foreign policy based on a
carefully studied and analysed strategy, their policies were
essentially opportunistic and they usually found themselves
responding to the course of developments imposed upon them
by external forces. This state of affairs, which was
characteristic of the foreign policy of the most powerful
Taifas, including Seville, resulted from the general political
environment which dominated political relations in eleventh-
century al-Andalus generally.
The subjection and absorption of other Taifa states
constituted a major objective of Seville's foreign policy,
and this target was pursued consistently, indiscriminately
and forcefully. Several factors explain Seville's pursuit
of its aggression against other Taifas which it regarded as
legitimate prey. Firstly, Seville considered the relative
military and socio-economic weakness of the other Taifas as
an advantage, concluding that their subjugation by the
Sevillan army was only a matter of time. Secondly, Seville
was attracted by the Taifas as a source of booty. In the
context of power politics which formed the very essence of
relations between the political entities in al-Andalus,
booty was in fact institutionalised. It was an effective
means of increasing the gap between the more powerful and
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the less powerful political units through the gradual
siphoning-off by the former of increasing portions of the
latter's sources of income. On the one hand, booty was
an important source of income for maintaining Seville's
professional army; on the other hand, it served as a means
of meeting Alfonso's demands for increases in the amount of
tribute money imposed on Seville. Thirdly, Seville sought
to increase its territory and, subsequently, the number of
its subjects as a means of enhancing its position as a
powerful state in al-Andalus. Fourthly, there are non-
material explanations for Seville's policy of aggression
against other Taifas. For example, the greatest dream of
both al-Mu'tadid and al-Mu'tamid had been to rule over
«
Cordoba, which was finally achieved by al-Mu'tamid in
if.63/107 O."'" By this time, both the city and its surrounding
areas had been ravaged on numerous occasions by various
parties. Economically, Cordoba was not more attractive
than a number of richer Taifas such as Toledo or Badajoz.
.The local Cordoban population welcomed al-Mu'tamid only
because he had imposed his rule by force. Al-Mu'tamid's
son, 'Abbad, lost his life when, at the instigation of
2al-Ma'mun b. Ehi-n-Nun, Ibn-'Ukasha reconquered Cordoba.
Al-Mu 'tadid had earlier lost his son, Isma'll, in an un¬
successful attempt to besiege it. It should also be
1. Dhakh., I, vol. ii, pp. 12l±-2$.
2* Dhakh. . II: Hjst. Abb. , I, pp. 323-2^.; these
passages are missing from Rabat and Bodl. mss.
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remembered in this context that the immediate cause of al-
Mu'tadid's decision to murder his other son, 'Abbad, known
as al-Mansur, had been the latter's refusal in 450/1058 to
lead against Cordoba a Sevillan army which he considered
not to be powerful enough for the task."*" Despite the
apparent disadvantages and the numerous obstacles, both
al-Mu'tadid and al-Mu'tamid placed the conquest of Cordoba
among their highest priorities, and the main cause was that
of prestige. Cordoba was more than what it represented
materially;" it was a symbol of the unity of al-Andalus,
having served as the capital of the Banu Umayya dynasty for
over three centuries.
The implications for its internal policy of Seville's
attempt to absorb the largest possible number of Taifas
were immediate. This policy seemed particularly attrac¬
tive for its immediate benefits. The material gains (e.g.
booty, territories, etc.) were extremely tempting. Further¬
more, for Seville, which appeared as a giant in the midst
of weaker Taifas, the risks of such a policy appeared
minimal, because once al-Qadl b. 'Abbad had consolidated
his position as the ruler of Seville, most of the Taifa
states lacked the determination and the capability to
strike back with any degree of success. The army's growth
and power were appropriately nourished by Seville's
expansionist policies, from which it benefited most directly.
1. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 256; these passages
are missing from Rabat and Bodl. mss.
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The ruler was, however, the ultimate beneficiary of this
policy, given his place at the very heart of the Sevillan
system. The inevitable long-term repercussions of this
policy were therefore overlooked. The weight of constant
warfare on the superstructure of Sevillan society, x^hich
was essentially not a war society, unlike other neigh¬
bouring societies such as the Castilian, exceeded the limits
of Seville's capacity and was, in the final analysis,
crippling. Its triumphs over other Taifas, glamorous as
they were on the surface, only concealed the draining
effects this policy had in the long run. Hence the symptoms
of Seville's economic burdens, such as the tribute it
offered Alfonso, were given little attention.
Seville's aggressive policy towards the Taifa states
did not make any exceptions except on a temporary basis and
for practical and tactical rather than ideological reasons.
The only criterion that seems to apply consistently to the
philosophy -underlying the conduct of Seville 's relations
with the other Taifa states is that of Seville 's immediate
gain and self-interest, often at the expense of the rights
of other parties and to the detriment of Seville's own
long-term interest.
The lack of any deep-rooted consciousness of solidarity
with other political entities was a major cause of Seville's
failure to co-operate with other Taifas and to lead them as
a united front. Instead, Seville sought to dominate them
by force. The Banu 'Abbad rulers lacked a solid state
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ideology, and their ties with the other Taifas were often
based on contradictory positions. Like other Taifa states,
Seville was officially a Muslim state. However, the actual
manner in which relations with other Taifas were conducted
was more often than not in flagrant contradiction of the
most basic of Islamic principles. For example, it is a
fundamental principle of Islamic international law (siyyar)
that relations should be conducted differently during peace¬
time and during wartime. Yet Seville 's relations with the
Taifas made, no such distinction. For example, the Taifa
leaders of Arcos and Moron were not only assassinated by
al-Mu 'tadid during peacetime, but in their capacity as his
allies."'" Frince 'Abd-Allah repeatedly expresses his
astonishment at the appearance of Sevillan and Castilian
military expeditions inside his territory without being
2
provoked by Granada and without any justifiable reason.
The occupation of Cordoba by the Sevillan army was carried
out even though Seville and Cordoba maintained peaceful
relations. As a matter of fact, the Sevillans went to
Cordoba in order to assist the Cordobans in defending them¬
selves against the attacks of al-Ma'mun b. Dhl-n-Nun, and,
having succeeded in their mission, the Sevillans occupied
the city for al-Mu ftamid.^
1. Bayan, III, pp. 295-96; A 'mal, p. l8l; 'ibar,
IV, p. 157.
2. e.g. Tib♦, pp. 72-76.
3. Dhakh. , I, vol. ii, pp. 12l|-25.
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Hie very fact of Seville's coalition with a Christian
king against other Muslim Taifa leaders is hard enough to
reconcile with the principles of Islamic international law.
Al-Mu 'tamid was indeed fully aware of contravening Islamic
international law when he joined forces with Alfonso VI and
caught Prince 'Abd-Allah by surprise, for the latter did
not expect a Muslim to join forces with Alfonso against
1
him, as he states explicitly. This was a miscalculation
on 'Abd-Allah ' s part x^hich he paid for quite heavily by
losing the fortresses of Estepa and Martos in addition to
being forced to increase the amount of tribute money paid
to Alfonso.^
Seville's consciousness of any ethnic solidarity was
equally lacking, and we find that the Banu 'Abbad rulers
fought Taifa leaders of several backgrounds. For example,
their enemies included the deeply-Arabised Banu Jahwar of
Cordoba and Banu al-Aftas of Badajos. Berber Taifa
leaders who clashed with Banu 'Abbad included Banu Zlrl of
Granada and Malaga and Banu Hammud of Cordoba, Malaga and
Algeciras. Yet racial origin was never a major cause of
Seville's collision with other Taifas. For example, the
Berber leader of Carmona was an ally, then an enemy, of
al-Mu'tadid. At a period when coalitions were repeatedly
arranged and dissolved, it seems futile to seek a racial
pattern in the alliances of the Taifas. Where would the
1. Tib., p. 69•
2. ibid., pp. 75>-76.
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antagonistic Taifas of Granada, led by Prince 'Abd-Allah,
and Malaga, led by his brother Tamlm, fit in a racial scheme
of allied Taifas? Seville was also hostile to other Taifas
regardless of their size or power. large Taifas like
Badajoz and Toledo were among Seville's eternal enemies.
Less powerful Taifas like Granada and Malaga also clashed
with Seville, while the smallest Taifas such as Carmona,
Moron and Arcos were its victims as xvell. Nor were any
Taifas spared on the consideration that their populations
would suffer from the consequences of military attacks,
even though they had much in common with the inhabitants of
the Sevillan Taifa state. The distinction between the
rulers (i.e. the regime) and the subjects was never seriously
conceived of, or the Sevillan army would never have attacked
the fortresses of Granada and plundered its fields in-
alliance with Alfonso's army.
Like their internal policy, the foreign policy of Banu
'Abbad was in the final analysis based on crude force or,
more specifically, on its abuse. It is this heavy reliance
on power as a fundamental column carrying the full weight of
their entire political system that best explains their
success in al-Andalus and their inevitable end also.
A major objective of Seville's foreign policy was to
consolidate and increase its sovereignty by promoting its
authority among other Taifa states and gaining widespread
recognition. In its attempt to seek general external
acceptance, Seville was initially faced with colossal
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handicaps, which were gradually overcome during the period
ipllp/l023-^31/1039, the reign of al-Qadl b. 'Abbad. As
Seville's security was stabilised, and its sovereignty
became unchallenged and finally accepted in al-Andalus, its
hostility towards the Taifas persisted, becoming an end .in
itself. The forces which had served to achieve this end
remained unleashed and were thereafter directed at increasing
the range of Seville's newly-acquired privileges and status.
Seville's search for external recognition took different
forms but evolved in a pattern that was determined by the
earliest phase of its external relations. The most urgent
issue for al-Qadl b. 'Abbad had been to preserve his leader¬
ship and the territorial integrity of the Taifa state of
Seville legally, while his acceptance by the Sevillans was
largely dependent on his ability to defend them against
external perils. Al-Qadl's aims of imposing his legitimacy
and achieving recognition by external political entities were
therefore originally motivated by the need for self-
preservation and constituted a defensive measure against the
aggression of other Taifa leaders.
However, as Seville became more solidly established
during al-Mu'tadid's reign, its external relations took an
increasingly offensive and aggressive turn. The aim of
the Sevillan ruler was no longer the acceptance of his
authority within the Sevillan frontiers; he now sought to
implement his rule in other Taifa states. Al-Mu'tadid
therefore organised military expeditions in various
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directions (e.g. southwards against Algeciras, northwards
against Badajoz and eastwards against Carmona and Malaga).
His methods varied widely, but he pursued his policy
ruthlessly. This policy was continued and expanded from
Ij.63/1070 to ^8!^/l091 when al-Mu 'tamid's popularity reached
an unprecedented level among the populations of other
Taifas throughout al-Andalus, even though Seville's leader¬
ship over the remaining Taifas was at no time accepted by
the Andalusian masses or even influential groups such as
intellectuals or religious men.
The weakness of Seville's external relations since
I4.3I/1039 basically lay in a lack of depth and vision. The
credibility of Seville's foreign relations was damaged by
its high degree of opportunism and brutality, coupled by
the often crude and unimaginative methods of implementation.
The aim of increasing Sevillan authority and
sovereignty was without limits and constituted an obsession
rather than a clear policy with long-term benefits. The
soundness, wisdom and legitimacy of this policy were all
presupposed, but its long-term aims and success were never
seriously considered. The development of events was to
illustrate that the type of recognition Seville sought with
so much perseverance was in the final analysis contrary to
its most vital interest, its struggle for survival. How¬
ever, the legitimacy of Seville's quest for external
recognition is not questionable in itself, rather it is the
unlimited ambition that nourished Seville's external
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relations, as well as the superficial style in which this
was implemented, which in the end diminished its
credibility.
III. The Role of Warfare in Sevillan Foreign Policy
(1) FLundering Expeditions
During a period when the more powerful states did not
hesitate to impose their superiority upon the weaker ones,
military aggression constituted the most direct and
efficient method of implementing Seville's foreign policy.
This method was as commonly used by the Taifas as it was by
Alfonso VI or Yusuf b. Tashufln. It took a variety of
forms, as dictated by varying circumstances and conditions,
but regardless of its apparent sophistication or simplicity
the basic function of military aggression remained that of a
vital instrument for the execution of foreign policy.
One of the common forms of warfare in eleventh-century
al-Andalus, plundering raids were organised as military
expeditions against the weaker Taifas with the double
objective of reaping material benefits and increasing the gap
of power between aggressor and victim. Throughout the Banu
'Abbad period, Seville sent military expeditions to devastate
the territories not only of weaker Taifas, but equally of
those with which it competed for supremacy over al-Andalus.
At the same time, the Sevillan territories were subject to
the aggression of expeditions sent by Alfonso. In the
eastern parts of al-Andalus, raids organised by Rodrigo Diaz,
the Cid Campeador, were identical to Alfonso's in pattern
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and purpose, but on a minor scale. The sizes of the
expeditions varied according to the magnitude of the raids
and the immediate objectives aimed at, but their form and
pattern of operation were fairly consistent.
The factor of surprise was an essential condition for
the success of organised raids by military expeditions in
al-Andalus. Great speed was required for expeditions to
catch the enemy by surprise and unprepared. The purpose of
military expeditions was not to confront the enemy, but to
strike and, in case of unequal odds, to flee without giving
the opposite party sufficient time to organise a counter¬
attack. As the cities were surrounded by protective walls,
the rural areas were the main target for attack, and
particularly common were the plunderings of villages and
destruction of crops. Speed was required not only to
initiate raids, but also to escape successfully with the
acquired booty. Speed and surprise attacks also served to
facilitate the retreat of military expeditions before the
enemy was able to organise and strike back.
High mobility and an extended range of striking ability
were other characteristics essential for the success of
military expeditions in al-Andalus. Hiring the early part
of the eleventh century, al-Mansur b. Abl-'Amir's annual
expeditions were able to overcome difficult geographical
barriers, reaching as far northwards as Santiago de
Compostela. During the Taifa period, the expeditions
organised by Alfonso or Rodrigo Diaz, the Cid, ravaged the
territories of Valencia, Denia, Tortosa, Granada, Toledo,
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Seville, etc."'" The particular advantage resulting from
the mobility and long-range striking capability of military
expeditions was that they could be directed at distant,
vulnerable and materially profitable targets.
Alfonso's expeditions into various Taifas were
virtually unchallenged and unanswered. These expeditions
were damaging enough to the Taifas agriculturally and
materially, but their ultimate objective was to wage an
economic war against the Taifas. The raids therefore
served Alfonso as a means of expressing and manifesting his
strength, with the final objective of intimidating the
Taifas, thus forcing them to submit to such demands as
offering him annual tribute money. The threatening power
of Alfonso's raids was consequently effective, arid the
psychological pressure it exerted on the Taifa leaders is
frankly and repeatedly expressed by Frince 'Abd-Allah. of
2
Granada.
Military expeditions implied a wider gap of power
between the two parties involved and the capacity of the
more powerful to exploit the weaker party's incapacity to
defend its territories and property. This disparity of
power also implied that the attacking party would, at the
most, meet ineffective resistance, and that no punitive
measures would or indeed could be adopted against it. In
the short term, military expeditions therefore constituted
1. e.g. see Roderici, pp. 918-19, and Fhimera, II, pp.
537-38, 562.
2. Tib., pp. 73-75, 122-26.
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a safe investment, because the risks of material loss were
nil or minimal, while material profit was almost always
certain. Such was, indeed, the historical pattern. For
example, Prince 'Abd-Allah was in no position to contain
the expeditions sent by Alfonso and al-Mu'tamid into
Granada, nor could he retaliate."'" Even in the prime of
its growth and at the height of its power, the Sevillan
army could not counter Alfonso's punitive expeditions into
Sevillan territory when Alfonso's ultimatum that al-Mu. 'tamid
2
surrender Seville unconditionally was rejected. In all the
above-mentioned examples, and in many others, the military
expeditions reaped what fruits they could without directly
incurring any serious consequences. This may indeed be
considered as a major factor which encouraged the
persistence throughout the Taifa period of this type of
warfare, the immediate risks of which could be easily
calculated.
i
(2) Conventional Expansionist Warfare:
Warfare between Seville and other Taifas
Organised expansionist warfare was the most conventional
method applied to obtain Seville's ultimate foreign policy
objective, the incorporation of the largest number of Taifas
into its territorial boundaries. When the Sevillan army
attacked another Taifa, the former was usually met in open
field, for this was the most efficient way of facing an
1. Tib., pp. 70-71, 74-75"
2. Mawsh., pp. 26-28.
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aggressor and avoiding the material damage that accompanies
an army 's free and unrestrained movement in enemy territory.
In cases where the Sevillan army outmatched that of a xveaker
Taifa, the latter usually took refuge in a fortress or
fortified city, giving the former the comfortable choice of
laying siege to it or plundering the riiral areas before
collecting booty and returning to Seville.
The Sevillan army was usually on the offensive and
triumphant, but two serious obstacles limited its success,
with the result that the fortresses, cities or territories
that the Sevillans acquired were costly. The first
handicap that faced the Sevillan army was socio-geographical.
The Sevillans fought in -unfamiliar terrain and approached the
populations in the Taifas they attacked as a conquered people.
For example, the Sevillan army suffered one of its greatest-
military defeats in Badajoz, where geographical factors had a
major role in determining the outcome of the encounter with
al-Muzaffar b. al-Aftas ' army."1" A second obstacle which
hindered the full success of Seville's military exploits was
that the parties attacked often sought the assistance of
others, thereby tipping the balance of power against Seville.
An illustrative example is the successful conquest of Malaga
by the Sevillan army during al-Mu 'tamid's reign and its
1. The Sevillan army was attacked by surprise while
crossing a valley, and that portion of the army
which managed to escape suffered great losses
while fleeing towards Seville through foreign
territory (Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 225;
Rabat, fol. l|v.; Bodl., fol. Ij-v.).
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defeat following the arrival of Badis b. Zlri 's men to
assist the few African mercenaries who continued to hold
out against the Sevillans.
Until the fall of Cordoba to al-Mu'tamid in [(.63/107 0,
confrontation with the more powerful Taifas absorbed the
largest amount of Seville's energies in the implementation
of its foreign policy. Seville did not hesitate to con¬
front the armies of the most powerful Taifa rulers
including Banu al-Aftas of Badajoz, Banu BhI-n-Nun of
Toledo, Banu Jahwar of Cordoba and Banu Zlrl of Malaga and
Granada. Curiously, the Sevillan army did not compete with
Alfonso VI and other Christian leaders, but implemented a
military policy vis-A-vis the other Taifas that was
encouraged and complemented by the Castilian ruler. The
offensive aggression of the Sevillan army against the more
powerful Taifas is therefore not indicative of the former's
absolute military superiority, since the former was not
totally independent and only operated within limits con¬
ceded by the Castilian ruler. Alfonso's policy of non¬
interference with the activities of the Sevillan army
served his long-term interest.
The Sevillan army prolonged its aggression against the
more powerful Taifas despite the failures it suffered in
the process. For example, it failed to annex Malaga,
Toledo, Granada and Badajoz. This failure to defeat the
1. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 3^1; Rabat, fols.
13r.-13v.; Bodl., fol. 12v.
- 2i|l -
major Taifas can be explained by purely technical factors.
The armaments, methods and military tactics employed by the
Sevillan army were identical to those commonly utilised by
the armies of other Taifas, and the Sevillan commanders
were by no means exceptional by Andalusian standards.
Furthermore, the Sevillan army was largely composed of
mercenaries and slaves who did not fight for an ideological
cause and were thus lacking in high morale, which is often
decisive in determining the outcome of battles. The
logical explanation for the pursuit of Seville's offensive
against the more powerful Taifas must be basically political
and economic. The Sevillan ruler's nourishment of these
wars served to increase his prestige both internally and
abroad. The Sevillan rulers were further compelled to
encourage war against the other Taifas, which, along with
taxation, served as a major means of meeting Castile 's
demands for tribute money.
Unlike the fall of Toledo (Ij.78/103^) and the Battle of
az-Zallaqa (lj.79/1086), two events the outcome of which
shattered the precarious balance of power in al-Andalus,
Seville's battles with the more powerful Taifas have
received only cursory treatment from both contemporary and
later historians. However, the importance of these
battles arises from their relevance to Seville's history,
the significance of which is generally recognised. Of the
more powerful Taifas, Cordoba and Badajoz were the two chief
targets that Seville's foreign policy was aimed at. For
example, much of al-Mu'tamid's struggle with al-Ma'mun b.
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Dhi-n-Nun was related to the supremacy over Cordoba, the
symbolic value of which attracted the ambitions of the most
prominent Taifa leaders. On the other hand, al-Mu 'tadid's
eagerness and desire to annex his competitive neighbouring
Taifa, Badajoz, was stimulated by a deep-seated antipathy
towards al-Muzaffar b. al-Aftas of Badajoz which dated back
to the period before his accession to power. The irony of
the apparent success of the Sevillan army over the other
Taifas is that the manpower and financial resources that
were required indirectly contributed to Seville's
vulnerability to the attacks and demands of Castile and,
later, the Maghrib.
The internal divisions among the inhabitants of Eeja
(Baja) during the fitna were expressed physically in the
entire destruction of the city, including both the pre-
p
Islamic and the newer sections. This sudden decline of
Beja aroused the ambitions of al-Qadl b. 'Abbad and al-
Mansur 'Abd-Allah b. Muhammad b. Maslama b. al-Aftas to
# • •
dominate it, and their struggle reached unexpected dimensions.
In 1|21/1030 al-Qadl b. 'Abbad sent his army, accompanied by
that of Muhammad b. 'Abd-Allah al-Barzall of Carmona and led
by his son, Isma/ll, and just as they began to reconstruct
the city the combined forces of the son of the ruler of
Badajoz, al-Muzaffar b. al-Aftas, and another Taifa leader,
2
Ibn-Tayfur, attacked, occupying the ruined city. The
1. Dhakh. , II: Hi s t ♦ Abb ♦ , I, p. 223 J Rabat, fol. l+r.;
Bodl., fol. Ipc.
2. ibid.; Bayan, III, p. 202.
1
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Sevillan army reorganised itself and mounted a counter¬
attack, plundering wide areas up to Ebora (labira) and
other parts of the Gharb. The result was a resounding
victory for the Sevillan army. The captives sent to
Seville included high-ranking officers and a brother of
Ibn-Tayfur who was crucified in Seville, while al-Muzaffar
b. al-Aftas was taken prisoner by the Taifa leader of
Carmona. With his son as a prisoner of war, the ruler of
Badajoz found himself in no position to challenge his
rivals. Al-Muzaffar was released in RabI ' 1 lj.21/March IO3O,
but the psychological scars of the humiliation of his defeat
and captivity were to affect the future relations between
Badajoz and Seville drastically.^
In l!25/l033 al-Qadi b. 'Abbad sent his son Isma *11 at
the head of a military expedition tox^ards Galicia and, x^hile
crossing the territories of Badajoz, the Sevillans x^ere
ambushed by al-Muzaffar at the head of the entire army of
Badajoz. Part of the Sevillan army surrendered, but
Isma*11 b. 'Abbad and his soldiers managed to escape to
Lisbon (Ushbuna) with tremendous difficulty, having had to
kill their horses for survival. Isma'il's men were pursued
and suffered great loss of lives at the hands of al-Muzaffar
and 'Christian soldiers'.^"
1. ibid.
2. Dhakh., II: Hist .Abb. , I, p. 22£; Rabat, fol. i+v.j
BodI., fol. i|v.
3. ibid.; Bayan, III, p. 2O3.
i|. ibid.
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The question of the effects of the encounters between
the Sevillan army and that of Badajoz in 421/1030 and 1+2$/
IO33 on al-Mu'tadid, and whether they influenced his outlook
and relations with Badajoz after his establishment as ruler
in 433/1 OI4.I> is an intriguing one. It is quite clear that
Isma/ll and not his brother 'Abbad (later al-Mu'tadid) led
the Sevillan army against Ibn-al-Aftas in Beja and Badajoz.
What is not so obvious is the absence or presence of 'Abbad
during the two encounters, a matter on which all sources are
silent. In I4.21/1030, when al-Muzaffar was released by
Muhammad al-Barzall, 'Abbad was probably fourteen years old,
having been seven years of age when his father offered him
as hostage to Yahya b. Haramud in I4II4/IO23 . He was therefore
perhaps too young to participate in the victory at Beja, but
what about the defeat at Badajoz in lj-25/1033? £f our cal¬
culations are correct, he must have reached the age of
eighteen by I4.25/IO33, and considering that the Banu 'Abbad
rulers encouraged the participation of their sons in military
ventures, it is possible that 'Abbad was among the defeated
Sevillan troops who fled for their lives when ambushed by
al-Mus;affar 's army. However, whether it was because of the
personal suffering and hunger or simply the treachery of al-
Muzaffar, who had been freed mercifully by Seville's ally four
years earlier, the defeat of I4.25/IO33 triggered a permanent
hatred and bitterness between Banu 'Abbad and Banu al-Aftas
#
that determined the unceasing deterioration of relations
between Seville and Badajoz.
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Although al-Mu 'tadid' s contempt for al-Muzaffar had a
deeply personal and emotional dimension, the deeper
explanation for Seville's aggression against Badajoz is to
be found in their competition as powerful Taifas. Al-
Mu'tadid did not wait long, after his establishment as
ruler, to attack. In kh-2/10^0 he attacked Niebla (Labia),
forcing the helpless Taifa leader, Ibn-Yahya, to send for
al-Muzaffar b. al-Aftas ' assistance."'" As often happened
among the Taifa leaders, al-Muzaffar came to assist Ibn-
Yahya, but decided to keep Niebla for himself, as a result
of which Ibn-Yahya turned to al-Mu ftadid for help. As the
defender of Ibn-Yahya, al-Mu 'tadid formed a coalition with
the armies of his allies the Berber Taifa leaders,
especially Badis b. Habbus, who immediately responded to the
2
request. In the meanwhile, Ibn-Jahwar of Cordoba attempted
to intervene diplomatically with the hope of preventing a
confrontation between al-Mu 'tadid and al-Muzaffar. Ibn-
• #
Jahwar's motive for desiring to maintain the status quo was
his fear of the possible annexation of Badajoz to Seville,
in which case Cordoba would become the next target. Al-
Mu 'tadid's claims as the champion of Hisham II's right to
the Caliphate had met with success among some Taifa leaders,
and any further increase in Seville's power would certainly
lead to an attempt to conquer the old capital of Banu Umayya.
1. Rhakh., II: Hi s t. Abb . , I, p. 2lf.7; Rabat, fol. 8r.;
Bodl., fol. 7v.; Bayan, III, p. 2O9.
2. Dhakh. , II: Hist .Abb . , I, pp. 2lp7—Lj.8; Rabat, fol.
8r.; Bodl., fol. 7v.; Bayan, III, p. 210.
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Ibn-Jahwar therefore sent his messengers to all the Taifa
leaders on al-Mu'tadid's side except Muhammad b. Idrls of
Malaga who, like al-Mu 'tadid himself, had claims to the
q
Caliphate of al-Andalus. However, Ibn-Jahwar's peaceful
intervention failed and the armies of al-Mu'tadid and his
allies began their march from Seville to Niebla, destroying
whatever they found on their way. In Niebla, al-MuMadid
personally participated in al-Muzaffar 's decisive defeat,
and the Sevillan army occupied several fortresses and
destroyed buildings and crops as it chased al-Muzaffar up
to the capital city of Badajoz.^ Defeated, al-Muzaffar
found no supporters among the Taifa leaders willing to help
him avenge himself on al~Mu 'tadid and, with the mediation of
Ibn-Jahwar, had to accept a peace treaty with al-Mu'tadid in
RabI ' 1 1+1+3 /July-Augus t 1051 . ^
Quite apart from the significance of Badajoz and other
major Taifas as targets, the annexation of Cordoba was central
to Sevillan foreign policy throughout al-Mu ftadid's reign, and
was brought to fruition by al-Mu etamid in 1+69/1076 when
Cordoba was definitively reconquered. In 1+63/IO7O the
Sevillan army was successful in conquering Cordoba by posing
1. Ihakh. , II: Hi s t. Abb . , I, p. 21+8; Rabat, fol. 8r.;
Boal., fols. 7v.-8r.; Bayan, HI, p. 210.
2. Riakh. , II: Hi s t. Abb . , I, p. 2l+8; Rabat, fol. 8r.;
Bodl., fol. 8r.; Bayan, III, pp. 210-11.
3- ibid.
Dhakh. , II: Hist .Abb. , I, pp. 2l+9, 252; Rabat, fol.
9r.; Bodl., fol. 8v.; the passages from p. 252 are
missing from Rabat and Bodl. mss.; Bayan, HI, pp.
212-13. ~~~
- 214-7 -
as Ibn-Jahwar's ally and striking unexpectedly from inside
the city walls. Led by al-Mu 'tamid 's son, 'Abbad, the
Sevillan army defeated al-Ma'mun b. Dhi-n-Nun's army which
had come to attack Cordoba, and having fulfilled this mission
the Sevillans occupied Cordoba for al-Mu 'tamid."1" Having
eliminated Ibn-Jahwar, al-Mu 'tamid left his son 'Abbad and
his commander Ibn-Martln in charge of affairs in Cordoba
2
before returning to Seville. However, Ibn-Lhl-n-Nun did
not accept his defeat as definitive and tempted Ibn-fUkasha,
who commanded a fortress not far from Cordoba, to conquer the
old capital of al-Andalus. Leading his troops in 1+6 7/1071+,
Ibn- 'Ukasha entered Cordoba by night by bribing the city
guards. With the collaboration of a group of Cordoban
dissidents, Ibn-'Ukasha was led to the house where 'Abbad
was residing and, killing the latter instantly, he searched
for Ibn-Martin who, despite a terrible state of drunkenness,
managed to escape.^ Ibn-'Ukasha was proclaimed in the
mosque of Cordoba as the new ruler, and Ibn-Hal-n-Nun came
to Cordoba where he died after only one month, perhaps as a
result of poison. With the death of Ibn-Dnl-n-Nun, al-
Mu 'tamid re-established himself as the ruler of Cordoba
without difficulty, and had Ibn- Ukasha killed.
1. Lhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 322; these passages are
missing from Rabat and Bodl. mss.; A 'mal, pp. 171-72.
2. ibid.
3. Dhakhc, II: Hist .Abb., I, pp. 323-21+; these passages
are missing from Rabat and Bodl. mss.; A fmal, pp.
173-71+.
1+. Dhakh. , II: Hist .Abb., I, p. 321+.
5. ibid.
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The annexation of Cordoba to Seville was al-Mu 'tamid's
overriding ambition in foreign policy, and served to
increase his image as a potential ruler and that of his
army as a powerful military machine. However, the manner
in which the Sevillan. army occupied Cordoba reflects a high
degree of irregularity. The sudden change of position from
Cordoba, 's defender to its conqueror, without any provocation
or apparent justification, not only reflects a total lack of
ethical consideration but also indicates the lack of any
realistic long-term calculation on the part of the Sevillan
army. The latter's instinctive and sponta.neous change of
allegiance against Cordoba illustrates the superficiality
and contradictions underlying the shifting coalitions of
Taifas in al-Andalus. However puzzling it may appear,
Seville's change of position was perfectly in line with
the illogical character of the Taifa period.
Tne Sevillans ' behaviour was in their short-term
interest for several reasons. Firstly, there were similar
precedents such as al-Muzaffar b. al-Aftas' sudden decision
to occupy Niebla, having initially come to defend it against
the Sevillan army in I|i|_2/1050. Secondly, there was no
superior force to prevent the Sevillans from occupying any
Taifa state they could. With the defeat of al-Muzaffar b.
al-Aftas and the death of al-Ma'mun b. Dhi-n-Nun, no other
Taifa leader was capable of contesting al-Mu 'tamid's power
to annex Cordoba. Thirdly, the repercussions of such an
annexation were nil, since the other Taifas were suspicious
of each other, too concerned with their own internal problems
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or in practice incapable of assisting the Cordobans.
Despite the immediate benefits of Cordoba's annexation
by Seville, the long-term damage it caused was greater.
Banu Jahwar of Cordoba, whom al-Muftamid had eliminated,
had had a record as the most equitable, just and represen¬
tative Taifa leaders. Although not elected by the people,
a notion which did not exist either in Europe or in the
Islamic world at that time, the Banu Jahwar rulers had the
greatest sense of responsibility towards their subjects
and, of all the Taifa leaders, they reaped the least
personal benefit from their political power. Furthermore,
their policy towards the other Taifas was one of concilia¬
tion and peaceful co-existence.
After al-Mu'tadid's victory over al-Muzaffar b. al-
Aftas in Rabl'l 1+1+3/July-August I0f?l> confrontation with
the weaker Taifas was adopted as a part of Seville's com¬
prehensive foreign policy towards the Taifas. The smaller
neighbouring Taifas were the target of the Sevillan army
by preference, which meant that Seville's military efforts
were, initially, mainly concentrated in the Gharb (Western
al-Andalus).
The fragility of the smaller Taifas had several causes
and was an intrinsic feature of their existence. Firstly,
because of their small size, their economic infrastructure
forced them to maintain an economy of subsistence and
dependence. Secondly, the internal situation was unstable
because the rulers of the smaller Taifas were generally
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tyrannical, thus losing the support of their people. One
example was the ruler of Silves (Shilb), Ahmad b. Jarrah,
who adopted such titles as 'king of kings', only to be
put to death by his oppressed subjects."'" Thirdly, up to
!|ij-2/10^0, during the period when Seville did not interfere
with their internal policies, the smaller Taifas were in
constant strife with one another. The disparity of power
between Seville and the smaller Taifas led to the former's
plans to annex the latter, a task which the Sevillan army
found simple.
Al-Mu'tadid directed his army in the Gharb against
the Taifa leaders Ibn-Yahya, Ibn-Harun, Ibn-Mazln and al-
Bakrl, conquering their territories and concluding his
first series of attacks with the annexation of Algeciras
after the defeat of its ruler, al-Qasim b. Muhammad b.
2
Hammud. Having annexed the weaker Taifas in the Gharb
and secured control over the Strait of Gibraltar by conquer¬
ing Algeciras, al-Muftadid ended his nominal recognition of
Hisharn II as Caliph and the latter's name ceased to be
mentioned in the mosques.^ In ^(-55/1063, al-Mu. 'tadid
secured the last Taifa in the Gharb, Silves, before con¬
centrating his efforts southwards.^" Seville's military
1. Bayan, III, pp. 215-16.
2. Dhakh. , II: Hist .Abb. , I, p. 2l|9; Rabat, fol. 9r.;
Bodl. , fcl. 8v.; Bayan, III, p. 213; A fmal, p. 182.
3. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 250; Rabat, fol. 9r.J
Bodl., fol. 8v.; Jadwa, p. 36; Bayan, III, p. 215.
If.. Dhakh. , II: Hi s t. Abb . , I, p.250; Rabat, fol. 9v.;
Bodl. , fol. 9:r.; Bayan, III, p. 21I4..
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activities were temporarily halted at the end of 551/1059,
but al-Mu 'tadid again resumed his activities by instigating
trouble inside the remaining weaker Taifas south of Seville.
He then commenced a series of attacks and annexed a number
of weaker Taifas as swiftly as he had those in the Gharb.
For example, Abu-n-Nasr Fattuh b. Hilal b. Abl-Qarra al-
Yafranl was defeated in 557/1061; and Ronda was occupied by
the Sevillan army."*" The defeat of 'imad ad-Dawla Manad
b. Muhammad b„ Nuh ad-Dammarl and the occupation of Moron
2
by the Sevillans came in 558/1065- Carmona, which was
ruled by al-Mustazhir 'Aziz b. Muhammad al-Barzall,
succumbed to the Sevillans in 559/1066.^ In 561/1068
al-Mu'tadid's army defeated Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Khazrun
of Apco3, despite his previous co-operation in overthrowing
other Taifa leaders.^ However, although the superiority
of the Sevillan army was significant, the internal weak¬
nesses of the smaller Taifas facilitated their defeat.
For example, in Silves, the ruler was killed by discontented
subjects. Although on a smaller scale, Seville's relations
1. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 25l; Rabat, fol. 10r.;
Bodl., fol. 9v.; Bayan, III, pp. 215, 315-
2. Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 251; Rabat, fols. 9v.-
10r.; Bodl., fols. 9r.-9v.; Bayan, III, pp. 215, 296.
3. Bayan, III, p. 312.
5- Dhakh., II: Hist.Abb., I, p. 251; Rabat, fol. 10r.;
Bodl., fol. 9v.; Bayan, III, pp. 215, 283, 295-
5. Bayan, III, pp. 215-16.
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with the weaker Taifas were similar in form and pattern to
Alfonso VI's relations with the Taifas generally. Al-
Mu'tadia's policy vis-a-vis the weaker Taifas therefore
strengthened Seville in the immediate term and permitted
al-Mu 'tamid to construct a policy that was essentially
directed against the more powerful Taifas.
In a wider perspective, Seville's elimination or
weakening of the most powerful Taifas such as Cordoba,
Badajoz, and Toledo served to diminish the defensive
capability of the Taifas as a whole vis-a-vis Castile.
The latter therefore came to constitute a direct military
threat to Seville, because the belt of larger Taifas
separating Castile from Seville was exhausted by the double
military and economic pressures by Castile from the North
and Seville from the South. It is clear that, by con¬
tinuing the military attacks against the more powerful
Taifas initiated by al-Qadl and al-Mu 'tadid, al-Mu'tamid
was unaware of the ultimate consequences of this policy
even as late as 78/1035, when he adopted a neutral attitude
to Alfonso's annexation of Toledo and did not assist its
inhabitants. Seville's victories against the more power¬
ful Taifas therefore ultimately led to the inevitable
military confrontation with Castile, a challenge the
Sevillan army was not prepared to meet in terms of its
technical and human potential.
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(3 ) Defensive Warfare: Relations with Castile
and the Maghrib
(a) The Pall of Toledo and its Effects on Seville
The fall of Toledo and its dependencies to Alfonso VI
in lj.78/1035 shattered the entire pattern of relations
between Castile and the Taifa states."*" After his conquest
of Toledo, the Castilian king ended his policy of co¬
existence with the Taifas which had been based on exerting
military and diplomatic pressures to extract tribute money
from them. Alfonso's conquest of Toledo was an extra¬
ordinary occurrence in itself, with traumatic implications
for the Taifa leaders, but the Castilian ruler went further
2
and established it as his new capital. His arrogance
following the conquest of Toledo, and his harsh treatment
of the Muslim Toledans, aroused widespread anger in al-
Andalus. For example, Alfonso's transformation of the
great mosque of Toledo into a cathedral, while welcomed by
the Catholics in Alfonso's court, was humiliating to the
o
Andalusian Maslims, who resented it bitterly. Even the
Mozarabs did not support such extreme action by Alfonso.
1. Alfonso's conquest of Toledo has been described
in numerous sources (e.g. Primera, II, pp. 530-31;
Dhakh., IV, vol. i, pp. 127-32; Tib., pp. 76-77;
Iktifa: Hist.Abb., II, pp. 18-21; Wafayat, V, pp.
27-28; Kamil, VIII, p. 138).
2. Primera, II, pp. 530-31-
3. ibid., pp. 5^4-0—iq.2; Dhakh., IV, vol. i, pp. I3I-32.
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Alfonso 's behaviour is explained by the fact that he came
to consider himself as the rightful ruler over al-Andalus
This is further indicated by his adoption of such pompous
titles as Efoperor of the two religions (al-Imbratur Ehu-1-
Millatayn). The direct cause of the break between
Alfonso and al-Muttamid was the incident involving the
killing by the latter of Alfonso's Jewish tribute collec¬
tor, Ibn-Shalib, for refusing al-Mu'tamid's money on the
■3
grounds that it was debased. However, it is from
1. Alfonso's hostile and contemptuous attitude towards
the Taifa leaders following his subjugation of
Toledo was clearly expressed to al-Mu tamid's envoy:
'How can I leave these decadent people [in
peace ] when each one assumes the titles of
their caliphs, kings and princes, calling
himself al-Mu'tadid. al-Mu 'tamid, al-
» ^
Mu 'tasim, al-Mutawakkil, al-Musta'ln, al-
Muqtadir, al-Amxn or al-Ma'mun, and none
of them is capable of drawing his sword in
his defence?' (Iktifa: Hist.Abb., II, p. 20.)
For Alfonso's hostile attitude towards the Taifa
leaders, see Dhakh., IV, vol. i, pp. I3O-3I.
2. This title is used in Adfonso's letter to al-Mu 'tamid
after the conquest of Toledo (Mawsh., p. 25). His
use of the title is explicitly described in a twelfth-
century chronicle,
'He [Alfonso] called himself Prince of the
Faithful (Amir al-Mu'minln), and in the
letters which he issued he wrote "from
the Bnperor of the two religions (al-
Imbratur Ehu-1-Millatayn) " , and he
swore to the numerous messengers of the
Taifa leaders that he would not spare any
of the rebels in the peninsula (jazlra)..'
(Iktif a : Hist. Abb . , II, p. 20.)
3. Mawsh. , pp. 28-29; Rawd, p. 81p-
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Alfonso's own letter to al-Mu 'tamid that his ultimatum to
the Sevillan ruler is expressed in the most unequivocal
terms, because he orders al-Mu 'tamid to actually hand
over all Sevillan territories to the new governor, Alvar
Fdnez.1
Ihe fall of Toledo convinced Alfonso that all the
other Taifas without exception could, and indeed must,
follow a similar fate. In short, he was no longer
willing to accept any price for offering peace, whether
it be political allegiance or hard cash. His un¬
compromising attitude therefore led to his construction
of a new policy, fully oriented towards the achievement
of this end.
If the fall of Toledo came to the Taifa leaders as
a sudden surprise, Alfonso's new policy was in fact the
- outcome of internal clashes in Castile between different
groups of conflicting political orientations. The
three major forces of political significance in eleventh-
century Castile were the crown, represented by the
monarch, the Iberian Church, represented by the Mozarabs,
and the Catholic Church, largely inspired by French
Cluniac monks. Despite the essentially socio-religious
dimension of the conflict, it is basically the political
implications of the outcome of this struggle in Seville
and the other Taifas that concern us most.
Alfonso's transition from a policy based on extract¬
ing tribute from the Taifas to his new annexationist policy
1. Mawsh., p. 25«
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resulted in a break with the Mozarabs. The Mozarab Church
emanated from the Arabised Christian masses whose co¬
existence with the Muslims in al-Andalus profoundly marked
their life style, temperament and even beliefs. Just as
the Muslim rulers had not sought their extermination, so
the Mozarabs could not bring themselves to be un¬
compromisingly aggressive. Their religious affiliation
to the Castilian crown was sincere and dedicated, but the
Mozarabs still subscribed to a practical Castilian policy
of extracting the maximum material profit by influencing
and shaping the internal struggles among the Taifas.
Sisnando Davldiz, Alfonso's Mozarab adviser who was
appointed as the first governor of Toledo, advised
q
Alfonso to rule al-Andalus through the Taifa leaders.
In his sound analysis and perceptive approach to the
general political situation, Sisnando supported a flexible
policy that did not drastically affect the balance of
power in al-Andalus which, if broken, would result in out¬
side intervention from the Maghrib to the detriment of
Castile's interest. Sisnando even hinted at this possible
2
consequence of Alfonso's policy.
1. Sisnando was of the view that the Taifa leaders
would make ideal governors for Alfonso. He
therefore offered the Castilian ruler the
following counsel:
'..Do not get angry with the [Taifa]
rulers of the peninsula, because you
will not be able to do without them,
and, in addition, you will not find
governors who will be more obedient




The struggle of the Cluniac monks against the
hispanic rite of the Mozarabs had taken an important turn
in ij.73/1080 when the hispanic rite was officially banned
from the kingdom of Leon and Castile during the council
of Burgos. The fall of Toledo in 1|78/1085 contributed
to furthering the cause of the Cluniacs who then estab¬
lished themselves definitely in Spain with their main
headquarters in the monastery of Sahagun. The Catholic
Church was sharply opposed to the Mozarab Church, and
supported Alfonso's policy of tribute extraction only as
an immediate state leading to the eventual annexation of
al-Andalus in its totality. Leniency towards the
Andalusians was interpreted as unnecessary compromise,
even treason. The final success of the Catholic Church
in persuading Alfonso to adopt a hostile policy towards
the Taifas was due as much to the highly organised and
disciplined Cluniac monks as to the more comprehensive
ideology of struggle against the infidel, as part of a
wider Christian liberation movement. The role of the
Cluniac monks was of the greatest importance as a force
of stimulation that furnished the growing Castilian state
with a sense of spiritual and legal justification and an
ideology of struggle. However, many of the advocates of
a hostile policy who surrounded Alfonso in his court were
not particularly religious. The campaign for the
adoption of a more aggressive policy had been voiced by
Alfonso 's closest officials long before the fall of Toledo.
For example, Alfonso's missions to force tribute money
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on 'Abd-Allah. b. Buluggin, in approximately 467/1074 and
4.83/IO9O, were respectively headed by Pedro Ansurez and
Alvar Fahez, two advocates of a stern policy vis-st-vis the
Taifa leaders."'" This future policy was not even a secret
to fAbd-Allah b. Buluggin, who recounts how Sisnando had
2
informed him of Alfonso's intentions to subdue the Taifas.
Finally, the Castilian king, who determined the final out¬
come of the struggle between the two Churches most
directly, benefited most by increasing his power and status
as a. result of siding with the more aggressive tendency.
(b) Hie Battle of az-Zallaqa and its Effects
on Seville
The results of the Battle of az-Zallaqa were
portentous for lusuf b. Tashufln in that the way to
the establishment of his sovereignty over al-Andalus had
been paved, and equally so for Alfonso VI, whose plans
3
to conquer al-Andalus had been dealt a deadly blow.
1. Tib., pp. 76, 123.
2. ibid., p. 73*
3. The Battle of az-Zallaqa has been given partial or
detailed treatment by contemporary and later
historians. Examples include Alfonso X (Primera,
II, pp. 557-58), Ibn- 'idharl (Bayan, IV, pp. I3O-4O),
an-Nuwayrl (Nihaya , pp. 99-101"), 'Abd-Allah b.
Buluggin (Tib., pp. 104-6), al-Himyarl (Rawd, pp.
73-95), al-Marrakushi (Ma '.jib, pp. 1.32-35), and an
anonymous author (Mawsh., pp. 44-53 )• Modern his¬
torians of al-Andalus and the Maghrib have also
dealt with az-Zall3.qa, particularly in the context
of the reconquest initiated by Alfonso VI and the
extension of Yusuf b. Tashufln's influence and
sovereignty over al-Andalus. For example, see A.
Huici Miranda, Las grandes bat-alias de la Reconquista
durante las invasiones afrXcanas (Almoravides, Almo-
hades y Benimerines ), Madrid, 1958, pp. 19-82, and E.
Levi-Provenqal, E. Garcia G6mez and J. Olivier Asln,
Novedades sobre la batalla llamada al-Zallaqa (1086 J,
A.A., XV (1950), pp. 111-55- For a different approach,
see Muhammad 'Abd-Allah fInan, Duwal at-Tawa if, 2nd
ed., Cairo, 1969, pp. 321-32.
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The extremely high morale of the victors at az-Zallaqa is
portrayed in the letters they wrote describing their
triumph."*" However, the consequences of az-Zallaqa were
most fatal for Seville and the other Taifas. The battle
led to the inevitable end of their very existence as
political entities, despite the glamour of their super¬
ficial success.
_
The Sevillan soldiers, their commanders and al-
Mu'tamid himself received great praise for their heroic
conduct at az-Zallaqa. However, the Sevillans did not
take the decision to participate in az-Zallaqa voluntarily,
but were instead forced to take part by changing internal
2
and external conditions. The essential nature of
1. e.g. see Zusuf 's letter to Tamlm b. al-Mu'izz
reproduced in Duwal, pp. I4.I4.6-50, and al-Mu 'tamid 's
letter to his son ar-Rashld (Xhata, II, pp. HI4.-I5) •
2. Tne Taifa leaders were led to seek Zusuf's assistance
in 14-78/1085 by a combination of circumstances (the
fall of Toledo, Alfonso's military pressure, and the
inability of the Taifas to present a united front).
The following conversation which al-Mu 'tamid had with
his son, ar-Rashxd, fully reflects his hesitation and
reluctance before deciding to demand Yusuf's assis¬
tance :
'After seven years, this accursed Alfonso has
wrested Toledo from the hands of Ibn-Ihl-n-Nun
and converted it into a seat of infidelity.
He has now turned his attention on us and, if
he attacks with his weight, he will not leave
us in peace until he has taken Seville. There¬
fore, we think that we should send to this
Saharan who is king of the Maghrib and ask him
to cross over and chase away this accursed dog
from us since we cannot do this for ourselves..
I prefer, by God, to graze camels rather than
pigs. ' (Mawsh., pp. 31-32. )
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Seville 's involvement in az-Zallaqa was defensive and con¬
sisted simply in halting Alfonso's increasingly intensive
attacks against the Taifas. Alfonso's conquest of Toledo
in Ij-78/1085 was, in lj.79/1086, very much in the minds of all
the Taifa leaders, whose greatest fear was that they would
follow suit. Given the intensity of inter-Taifa strife
and its destructive economic and social effects which had
existed from the time of their creation, the Taifas could
not conceive the plausibility of a common response to
Alfonso's annexationist policies even when the end of their
very existence became imminent. The only possibility left
was either to surrender unconditionally to Alfonso, or to
seek Musuf's assistance, the latter being the choice of
preference.
However, by reacting to Alfonso's policies in unison
and by having recourse to Musuf, the Taifas had actually
widened the scope of political involvement in the Iberian
peninsula to include the Maghrib, without fully anticipa¬
ting the consequences. By appealing to Musuf, the Taifa
leaders were in fact falling into his sphere of influence,
thus losing the power to initiate policies vis-d-vis
Alfonso, whose threat they could no longer confront
independently. Al-Mu 'tamid and the other Taifa leaders
had not given the probability of a massive involvement in
al-Andalus by Alfonso and lusuf the weight it deserved.
Consequently, the Taifa leaders were -unable to deal with
the developments involving an increasingly active role by
their more powerful neighbours, which caught them by surprise
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at a point when the clock could no longer be reversed. In
other words, the escalation of external political and military
participation in al-Andalus became inevitable.
If the Taifas were defending their existence at az~
Zallaqa, the outcome led to the development of several
factors that rendered their survival extremely precarious.
Firstly, lusuf's influence was solidly and definitely
entrenched in al-Andalus as a result of the credit he
received for the victory at az-Zallaqa. By recognising and
appreciating his role as their saviour against the annexa¬
tionist ambitions of Alfonso, the Taifa leaders placed them¬
selves under lusuf 's spiritual and moral tutelage and were
obliged to consider his reaction before taking important
decisions. In their weaknesses, divisions and frustrations,
the Taifa leaders were politically obliged to accept and
recognise his leadership as -Amir al-Mu'minin (Prince of the
Faithful). They went further and reported their grievances
against one another to lusuf, thereby giving him the status
of an arbitrator among them."'" Despite lusuf's official
refusal on the grounds that it had never been his intention
to interfere in the internal matters of the Taifas, the very
fact that he had been asked to arbitrate reflects the
1. For example, Tamlm of Malaga appealed for Musuf's
arbitration in his conflict with his brother eAbd-
Allah (Tib., p. 106). Ibn-Rashlq appealed for
lusuf's arbitration in his disagreement with al-
Mu 'tamid over Murcia (ibid., pp. 110-11). Follow¬
ing his second crossing to al-Andalus, lusuf gave
up the idea of attempting to save the divided
Taifas from Alfonso and decided to return to the
Maghrib on several occasions, because the Taifa
leaders burdened him with their frivolous com¬
plaints against one another (ibid., pp. 106-7,
111-llj.).
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significant increase in his status in al-Andalus
following az-Zallaqa. Musuf had therefore gained the
power to initiate policies in al-Andalus which the
Taifa leaders were no longer in a position to reject.
It has been argued that Zusuf 's participation in
az-Zallaqa was basically a step towards his total
subjugation of the Taifas, and that this had been his
intention from the very start when he first crossed to
al-Andalus. Although useful for vilifying Yusuf "s
personality, this argument has little supporting evidence.
Firstly, there is no evidence to prove that he intended
to subjugate al-Andalus before az-Zallaqa, the outcome
of which he could not be sure of at that stage. It
was, after all, the Taifa leaders who had approached
Yusuf for his assistance. Far from being decided,
Musuf was initially extremely cautious before deciding
to support the Taifa leaders against Alfonso. His
reluctance to respond immediately even aroused the
impatience of Alfonso, who sent Yusuf a letter accusing
him of cowardice for delaying the confrontation and
challenging him to a battle on Moroccan soil provided
that 3!usuf furnished him with the appropriate ships for
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crossing the Strait."'" The assumption that Yusuf intended
to subjugate al-Andalus before az-Zallaqa can only be
derived from guesses at his personal motives. On the
other hand, there is equally insufficient evidence to
argue that his motive had actually been not to conquer
the Taifas before az-Zallaqa. The only evidence there is
1. Alfonso's letter is described in a letter to Tamlm
b. al-Mu/izz b. Badis by no other than Zusuf b.
Tashufin. "Yusuf's letter has been discovered by
Muhammad fAbd-Allah 'inan and the text is fully
reproduced in Duwal, pp. L\.L\-6-$0. Alfonso's letter
is partly reproduced in Mawsh., pp. 29-30* A more
complete version of Alfonso's letter has been re¬
produced in a. more neutral source (Husn, p. Ij.).
Several features indicate the authenticity of this
version. To begin with, the letter appears in a
work written by a trustworthy author, Shihab-ad-Km
Mahmud b. Sulayman al-Halabi, who attained the high
post of ra'is diwan al-insha* in Egypt. The work in
which the letter appears, Kitab Husn at-Tawassul ila
Sjnafat at-Tarassul, was intended to illustrate style
and rhetoric in letter writing. Al-Halabl quotes
Alfonso's letter for its style,, which he is unlikely
to have altered, especially since he was really
interested in Yusuf b. Tashufin's reply and Alfonso's
letter was only quoted in this context. Furthermore,
al-Halabi was an Egyptian who lived two hundred years
after the letter in question was written and he was
therefore not motivated to change its contents, by
which he was unaffected. However, it is the contents
of the letter that indicate its authenticity more
convincingly. Al-Halabi gives the name of the Mozarab,
Ibn-al-Fakhkhar, who wrote the actual text of the
letter, thereby confirming that it had been written in
Arabic (ibid.). Unlike the letter attributed to
Alfonso in Al-Hulal al-Mawshiyya, this version opens
with a reference to Jesus Christ, as Alfonso VI is
likely to have done. More importantly, the version
of the letter in al-Halabi 's work is more complete
than the one in Al-Hulal al-Mawshiyya, which seems to
have been a condensed version of the form quoted by
al-Halabi. Finally, Yusuf's reply in the form of a
Qur'anic sura is more credible than the poetic version
of Yusuf 's reply given in Al-Halal al-Mawshiyya.
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indicates his decision to conquer the Taifas after he
had become convinced of their incapacity to successfully
overcome their divisions and to survive Alfonso's
annexationist policy.
A second major negative effect of az-Zallaqa was the
release of internal socio-economic forces aimed at the
annihilation of the Taifa system as such. Supported by
the Andalusian masses, religious and pseudo-religious men
led a campaign against the Taifa leaders generally. The
most serious accusation made against the Taifa leaders
was that they imposed taxes which were anti-Islamic and
unjust. The Taifa leaders had overburdened their subjects
with taxes as a major means of meeting their lavish palace
spending on the one hand but, more importantly, to pay
Alfonso's increasing tribute in return for peace. After
az-Zallaqa and Zusuf 's widespread popularity in al-Andalus,
influential religious leaders from different parts of al-
Andalus pressured lusuf to put an end to the oppressive
fiscal policy adopted in the Taifas, by forbidding all
extra-Islamic taxes. The fuq aha ' assumed an active role
in support of "Zusuf against the Taifa leaders. Even when
sent to fusuf as envoys by Taifa leaders, they were openly
critical of the latter and, though aware of this, the Taifa
leaders were helpless to react. For example, the faqlh
Ibn-al-Qulay el was well known for his role as an inter¬
mediary agent in contacts with ^usuf 'Abd-Allah b.
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Buluggln's brother Tamim sent the QadI Ibn-Sahl fifty
mithqals to plead his cause with Yusuf, but Ibn-Sahl
declined the offer."*" 'Abd-Allah gives a full account of
how his envoy, Ibn-al-Qalay (1, did all he could to vilify
'Abd-Allah's image. The motivation of the fuqaha * 's
enmity towards the Taifa leaders varied. For example,
whereas al-Qadi Ibn-Sahl acted as a matter of principle,
Ibn-al-Qulayei had a grudge against Badis, which he
intended to settle with his grandson, fAbd-Allah.^ Dae
to the massive discontent with the heavy taxation in the
Taifas, the Taifa leaders did not try to justify their
fiscal policies on legal or rational grounds. Rather,
they attempted to minimise the cause-effect relationship
of the tribute they paid Alfonso and the increase in
internal taxation, arguing that the former did not affect
the latter.
Besides overtaxation, Tusuf and the Andalusian
fuqaha' accused the Taifa leaders of an equally serious
charge: conspiracy with the Christian king, Alfonso VI,
against Islam and the interests of their subjects. This
charge was equally difficult to refute because, following








various Taifas, including Granada and Seville, on whom he
reimposed tribute. 'Abd-Allah b. Buluggln admitted his
inability to confront Alfonso, and sought to justify the
tribute money he was being forced to pay the latter by
informing Musuf that this did not constitute a burden on
his people since he paid the tribute from his personal
1 6
wealth. Al-Mu ftamid, who found himself equally helpless
in facing Alfonso 's attacks, argued that making treaties
with Alfonso did not affect his allegiance to Tusuf or
his duties towards his subjects. When Wusuf's decision
to conquer Seville became apparent, al-Mu 'tamid denied all
allegiance to Yusuf on the grounds that, whereas Tusuf had
been his guest and ally when the Taifas confronted Alfonso
at az-Zallaqa, his pressure against Seville had made him
2
equal in status to other neighbouring Taifa leaders.
However, in the final analysis, the Taifa leaders failed
to refute the accusations directed against them when they
failed to contain the threat of Alfonso's newly-revitalised
annexationist policy. The Taifa leaders failed to meet
Alfonso's financial demands other than by resorting to
heavy taxation, which brought them trouble from Musuf.
Although the Sevillan army remained exceptionally loyal
to al-Mu'tamid throughout, the commanders of other armies in
al-Andalus formed a pressure group that Musuf manipulated to
actually execute his decision to conquer the Taifas. While
the backbone of Yusuf's army was Moroccan, there is evidence
1* ibid., p. 127.
2. ibid., p. I69.
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that Aadalusian elements were incorporated into it once the
decision to conquer the Taifas had become definite. Yusuf 's
policy of rejecting Andalusian collaboration was replaced by
his heavy reliance on Andalusian commanders whose familiar¬
ity with the terrain and internal weaknesses - of the Taifa
leaders rendered their guidance indispensable.
It should further be borne in mind that, despite the
magnitude of az-Zall&qa and the appearance of the new
factors mentioned above, some features of the previous
situation remained unchanged, contributing significantly to
the final collapse of the Taifas. Among these was the
persistence of Alfonso's threat to the survival of the
Taifas. Az-Zallaqa served to discourage and halt Alfonso's
drive to conquer al-Andalus, but his army was not crippled
permanently, as the victory was not pursued by the victors.
Since Zusuf returned to the Maghrib immediately after the
battle, Alfonso again began to prepare for his attacks
against individual Taifas. Xusuf returned to al-Andalus
when al-Mu/tamid and other Taifa leaders sought his leader¬
ship in organising a siege against the Christian fortress
of Aledo (Liyylt). However, when news arrived that Alfonso
was coming to Aledo's rescue, Xusuf abandoned the project
halfway, on the pretext that the Taifa leaders were hope¬
lessly divided and that it was their responsibility to
defend themselves by uniting."'" With Xusuf's departure to
1. ibid., p. 112.
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the Maghrib after Aledo, the Taifa leaders began to con¬
solidate their defensive capacity in anticipation of an
eventual attack by Yusuf or Alfonso. 'Abd-Allah b.
Buluggln gives a detailed account of the preparations he
undertook in Granada."^" Using his military strength as
a threatening weapon, Alfonso forced Ibn-Hud of Saragossa
2
to pay him tribute money. Threatened by the Christian
army under the leadership of Alvar Fanez, 'Abd-ALlah too
agreed to pay him 30,000 mithqals for security over a
period of three years. Other Taifas were also forced to
accept Alfonso's conditions.
Another important point which should be stressed when
considering the result of az-Zallaqa was that, despite the
appearance to the contrary, the victory did not end inter-
Taifa strife and thus produced no unifying effects
internally. Added to the tribute money the Taifa leaders
had to pay Alfonso were the great expenses which were
required to court Yusuf and to maintain his army in al-
Andalus. These expenses were impossible to meet, given
that the Andalusian subjects refused to pay taxes and
could not be punished for it by the Taifa leaders.^ The
faqxh al-Qalay fI publicly preached in Granada, for
example, that taxes should not be paid to fAbd-Allah b.
3
Buluggln. The internal strife of the Taifas persisted
1. ibid., p. 120.
2. ibid., p. 122.
3» ibid., pp. 123, 127.
I4.. ibid., p. IO9.
5. ibid., p. 110.
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even when Alfonso restarted his attacks following az-
Zallaqa. Furthermore, the reaction of the Taifas to the
new factor of Yusuf's presence in al-Andalus was as
passive and short-sighted as was their attitude towards
Alfonso. The advance from the South therefore followed a
course similar to the previous Northern advance of Alfonso,
as Tusuf was permitted to conquer different Taifas
individually with the others passively awaiting their
turn. Hence "Xusuf was successful in conquering the
Taifas with unusual speed and efficiency. The paralysis
of the Taifas and their self-destructive tendencies,
which resulted from their disunity, ultimately led to
their inevitable destruction, a task in which Yiisuf
proved more successful than Alfonso. The military situa¬
tion following az-Zallaqa closely reflects the socio¬
economic and political developments. The armies of the
Taifa states were not up to the task of defending their
collective existence, for two reasons. Firstly, the
Taifa armies were numerically inferior to those of Alfonso
and Yusuf. Secondly, the Taifa leaders never considered
the idea of collective defensive measures. They did not
even conceive the possibility of a collective effort when
their survival demanded it."*"
1. On several occasions in his memoirs, fAbd-Allah
expresses his conviction that it was impossible
for the Taifa leaders to unite (e.g. ibid., pp.
69, 81j.).
IV. Conclusion:
The Failure of Sevillan Foreign Policy
The optimism of the Taifa leaders that followed the
Battle of az-Zallaqa was short-lived. Yusuf returned to
the Maghrib and then came back to support the Taifa
leaders in besieging the fortress of Aledo (Liyylt) in
i|8l/l088j but after several months of siege he decided to
abandon the project. The reasons for Yusuf 's abrupt
decision are not clear. Some sources suggest that,
having heard of Alfonso's preparations to come to the
rescue of Aledo, Yusuf was frightened away."'" Others
suggest that he abandoned the siege out of fear that some
of the Andalusian Taifa leaders or rebels such as Ibn-
Rashlq of Murcia would join Alfonso's forces, thus tipping
2
the balance of power in favour of the Christians.
Yusuf's own pretext was that the Taifa leaders were hope-
lessly divided. However, it appears that, during the
siege of Aledo, Yusuf had decided to conquer the Taifas
for himself and, having directly acquainted himself with
their weaknesses, he actually planned to implement an
annexationist policy by attacking them individually.
By this time, the situation in al-Andalus had changed
fundamentally in Yusuf 's favour, and the time for his
intervention was ripe.
1. Roderici, pp. 930-31.
2. Tib., pp. 112-13.
3« ibid.
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After Tusuf 's third crossing from the Maghrib to al-
Andalus, his army began its conquest of the Taifas
individually. The conquest was rapid and efficient,
because the Taifas did not collaborate with each other
and the al-Murabitun army was able to subdue them one
after another. Furthermore, neither Alfonso nor any
other Christian ruler came to rescue the Taifas, which
indicates the superiority of Tusuf 's army. The campaign
was successfully terminated by hfi^/HOZ with the conquest
of Valencia, which had fallen into the hands of the Cid
Campeador, Rodrigo Diaz, in 1^78/1085. Seville fell in
I4.8Z4-/1091, after strong resistance. Although some of
the Taifas, such as Seville and Almeria, offered
resistance, others, like Granada, preferred to capitulate
under advantageous terms for the Taifa ruler and his
family. Finally, all the Taifas except Saragossa fell
to the army of the al-Murabitun.
Like the other Taifas, Seville was unable to resist
Yusuf 's army. However, perhaps no other Taifa con¬
tributed as significantly as Seville to the creation of
the conditions which made Musuf 's intervention inevitable,
because by I4.8I/IO88 it became clear that either Musuf or
Alfonso would conquer the Taifas, the disintegration and
continuous quarrels of which had attained such a level as
to render their continuing existence as independent
entities no longer viable. Moreover, the tremendous
1. ibid., pp. l51|-59.
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strength attained by the kingdom of Leon and Castile on
the one hand, and the Maghrib on the other, created a
disparity of power with the Taifas that could only lead
to their annexation by one or the other of the larger
entities.
The fail of Seville was therefore the final outcome
of the limitations of its foreign policy, in that the
latter did not take into account the possible direct
intervention of -Alfonso VI, which in turn stimulated
^usuf's intervention. In fact, all the principles of
Sevillan foreign policy indirectly nourished Alfonso's
increasing presence and influence in al-Andalus.
Seville 's hostility towards both the weaker and the more
powerful Taifas did not consider Castile 's competition
in this area. Seville agreed to offer Castile tribute
on an annual basis without realising that this could
make the Castilian kingdom into a powerful state which
even the combined might of the Taifas could no longer
match. As a matter of fact, al-Mu 'tamid 's treaties and
alliances with Alfonso at no time reflected any suspicion
whatsoever that the latter could one day adopt an
aggressive policy seeking Seville 's unconditional
surrender.
On the other hand, one observes that al-Mu'tamid
continued to implement foreign policy on the exact lines
adopted by al-Mu'tadid. Having inherited a Taifa that
was far more powerful than it had been in /lOlp., when
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al-Mu 'tadid became the ruler, al-Mu 'tamid pursued the same
policy. Seville therefore expanded eastwards to Murcia,
and north-eastwards to include Cordoba, during al-Mu 'tamid 's
reign. Yet the very weakness of this policy was that it
did not take into consideration the new factors which had
developed, notably Alfonso's unprecedented consolidation of
power as a result of the internal stability which followed
his reunifica.tion of Leon and Castile, and the continuous
inflow of tribute money from the shattered Taifas whose
strength dwindled gradually as a result of their unceasing
internecine strife. Ihe ultimate objective of Sevillau
foreign policy seems to have been no less than sovereignty
over the whole of al-Andalus; but, given the unrealistic
nature of this objective, taking into account the finely
balanced power between the Taifas, it has to be concluded
that Seville's entire foreign policy was inherently
implausible and self-defeating.
However, in the final analysis, it is perhaps
unreasonable to demand a policy from Seville that could
have saved al-Aadalus from the inevitable intervention
of an external party. After all, the Taifa state xtfas a
non-viable entity as such because it contained the
ingredients for its self-destruction, as has been observed
by Ibn-Hazm, Ibn-HayySn and even *Abd-Allah b. Buluggln of
Granada. The failure of Seville 's foreign policy must
therefore be considered in the context of the fragility
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